ELECTORAL POLITICS IN THE INDIAN STATES

PARTY SYSTEMS AND CLEAVAGES

EDITORS
MYRON WEINER
JOHN OSGOOD FIELD

VOLUME IV
STUDIES IN ELECTORAL POLITICS IN THE INDIAN STATES

MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
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In addition to the national and sectoral trends revealed by election data, competitive politics in India have given rise to a number of distinctive state party systems. The studies in this volume (along with Volume 1) are addressed to this political diversity. They portray the ways in which tradition and change have coalesced at the state level to produce varied political patterns and election outcomes. Each of the five chapters focuses on a distinctive feature of a state's politics and analyzes its electoral manifestations.

PUNJAB : The intermingling of communal and secular politics as revealed by the social bases of support for the Akali Dal, Jana Sangh, and Congress and the interplay of these parties in the formation of electoral alliances and state ministries.

TAMIL NADU : The politicization of Tamil cultural consciousness and its relationship to the polarization of electoral politics around Congress and the DMK.

UTTAR PRADESH : The flash-party phenomenon as illustrated by the rise of the BKD and its electoral impact on the fluid, faction-ridden politics of India's largest state.

MYSORE (Karnataka) : The origins of party transformation and ministerial

(Continued on back flap)

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

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Studies in Electoral Politics in the Indian States, Vol. IV

Electoral Politics in the Indian States

PARTY SYSTEMS AND CLEAVAGES

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INTRODUCTION

The M. I. T. Indian Election Data Project was begun in early 1968 initially under a pilot grant from the Center for International Studies, followed by a major grant from the National Science Foundation, with the objective of undertaking a series of computer-based studies of elections in India since 1952 in the more than 3,000 state assembly constituencies. The early ambitious hope was that these studies could bring to the analysis of Indian elections some of the methodologies and sophisticated statistical tools that have been developed for the study of elections in the United States and other developed countries, test with the Indian electoral data some of the general propositions that have emerged in recent studies of political development, improve our knowledge of the world's largest democratic state, and enhance our capacity to predict future electoral change in India.

The technical dimensions of this project proved to be so formidable that at times we despaired of producing any studies! The data had to be computerized, "cleaned," and checked for inconsistencies. They then had to be arranged in files, concepts had to be converted into measures, and innumerable problems of how to compare constituencies with one another and with themselves over time had to be resolved. At an early stage in the project we considered matching selected census data to constituencies in order to relate some electoral variables such as turnout, competitiveness, and party performance to socio-economic variables but decided not to do so since a number of such studies were under way elsewhere—particularly the work of W. H. Morris-Jones and Biplab Das Gupta at the Institute for Commonwealth Studies in London, Rajni Kothari at the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies in Delhi, Paul Brass at the University of Washington, Harry Blair at Bucknell, and Donald Zagoria at Columbia University.

As the months, then years, passed and the technical problems grew, our research objectives became more limited. We settled on two modest goals: (1) to put the data in usable form and make it widely available to scholars in the United States and India; and (2) to conduct a number of pilot studies on themes that might prove of interest both to India area experts and to those with a broader concern with electoral behaviour in developing countries, in order to illustrate some of the potential uses of the data.

Computer tapes containing the election data have been placed on file with the Indian Council for Social Science Research in New Delhi, at the Inter-University Consortium at the University of Michigan and at the

International Data Library at the University of California, Berkeley. These tapes contain the state election results by constituencies for each general election from 1952 through 1967, the mid-term elections of 1968-69, and several earlier mid-term elections. (Some of the studies used 1971 and 1972 state election data, but since these are "unofficial" returns not yet published by the Indian Election Commission, we have not incorporated them into the permanent archives.) With the tapes is documentation explaining what the archives contain, how they are arranged, and how they can be used. They are available to scholars everywhere under the procedures established by each of these three centres.

Pilot studies were undertaken by members of the M. I. T. faculty and staff and by scholars at other universities. They fall into two principal groups. The first focuses on the relationship between electoral behaviour and some aspects of modernization, taking as their starting point "all-India" problems or phenomena. These studies look at the electoral correlates of India's Green Revolution (Frankel), of varying rates and patterns of migration (Katzenstein), and of urbanization (Weiner and Field). A related group of studies examines changing voting patterns in two types of "backward" regions in India, areas that were formerly part of princely India (Richter) and areas in which tribals live (Weiner and Field). Another study examines the electoral performance of women candidates in state assembly elections (Desai and Bhagwati).

Most of these studies make some use of census and other socio-economic data; the urban study, for example, relates electoral characteristics to city size, the migration study to different patterns of migration, the Green Revolution study to agrarian conditions and their change, and the princely study to selected indices of development. But in the main these studies tend to treat the environment as space; they look not at how tribals voted, but at how tribal constituencies voted; not at how urban dwellers voted, but at how urban constituencies voted; and so on.

A major theme of several of these studies is the way in which national electoral trends intersect with regional variations, and the way in which specific categories of local constituencies are influenced by the state in which they are located. Thus, "princely," urban and tribal constituencies each have characteristics of their own; but their electoral patterns are also strongly influenced on the one hand by the particular state in which they are located and by national trends on the other. One striking conclusion is that it is meaningless to characterize the electoral patterns of urban India as a whole, or migrant areas as a whole, or tribal India as a whole. In a country as diverse as India, all statistical differences are "washed out" in national averages. For the purpose of testing most theories of political participation, such as the relationship between social mobilization and political participation, the state and other component units are

far more useful levels of analysis than is India at large, an important lesson for scholars doing cross-national aggregate analyses.

The second group of studies examines the major cleavages in Indian politics and their party and electoral manifestations. Divisions based on class, caste, tribe, religion, urban-rural differences, language, region, and factional alignments are the raw material of Indian political life. The pilot studies examine three types of cleavage politics in the party and electoral systems: ideological cleavages, focusing on the Communist parties of West Bengal (Field and Franda) and Kerala (Hardgrave); regional and ethnic cleavages, focusing on cultural nationalism in Tamil Nadu (Barnett) and religion-based parties in the Punjab (Brass); and caste-cum-factional rivalries in Uttar Pradesh (Baxter) and Mysore (Wood and Hammond). A major theme of these studies is the question of how institutionalized are individual parties and state party systems, that is, how dependable and persistent is the support for individual parties over several elections, and to what extent do voters give their support to "major" parties as opposed to frittering away their votes for smaller parties and independent candidates.

It is not possible to summarize here the many findings of these studies, but several can be mentioned: the importance of what can be called "proximity" variables, such as ethnic concentrations, railroad and river lines, and settlement clusters; the durable bases of party support in states like West Bengal, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu, but not in Uttar Pradesh, where "flash" parties are indicative of fragile voter loyalties; the mobilizing capacity of princely candidates and ethnic parties like the DMK in Tamil Nadu or the tribal Jharkhand Party in Bihar to increase voter turnout, but the inability of ideological parties with a class appeal to do the same; the poor performance of incumbents standing for re-election; the surprisingly large margin of victory for most party candidates and the correspondingly few constituencies that are intensely competitive in terms of how the vote is distributed; and finally, the considerable amount of continuity in party support and electoral outcomes from one election to another, a possible measure of the extent to which Indian parties are institutionalized.

A major effort was made to develop and consistently use measures for the various concepts that were employed. These include measures of participation, competitiveness and bloc cohesion, party institutionalization, and party performance. Procedures were also devised for measuring the way in which votes are translated into seats, the success with which votes are "transferred" from one party to another over time, and how party swings take place, especially with regard to the gains and losses for incumbents.

Preliminary versions of most of these studies were presented in June 1972 at a seminar on electoral patterns in the Indian states held at the estate of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in Brookline, Massa-

chusetts. We want to take this opportunity to express our appreciation to Baldev Raj Nayar of McGill University and to Walter Dean Burnham, Hayward Alker, and Douglas Hibbs of M. I. T. for participating in the seminar and providing helpful critical comments on the papers.

At M. I. T. this project has largely been a three-person enterprise which included, along with the director and co-director, our associate Priscilla Battis, who "interacted" with the computer and provided the printout for almost all of the studies in this series. Without her technical skills, organizing talents, and boundless energy we would not have achieved even our limited objectives. We should also like to express appreciation to James Wixson for his technical assistance and to Jessie Janjigian for editorial assistance as we approached publication. We are grateful to the National Science Foundation for making these investigations possible.

Myron Weiner
John Osgood Field

PREFACE

It should come as no surprise to those familiar with India that its patterns of electoral cleavages and party alignments vary greatly from one state to another. India is a country with an electorate of about two hundred million voters. More than a dozen of its states are larger than most countries, and linguistic and cultural diversities within the country are at least as great as those throughout all of Europe.

What is surprising is that, from time to time, observers of the Indian scene point to conflict in one part of India as the harbinger of a national political schism. Thus, a revolt of agricultural labourers in a district of Tamil Nadu is reported as the beginning of rural warfare between peasants and agricultural labourers, or the "Green revolution turning red." Similarly, an outburst of linguistic regionalism in Andhra was at one time interpreted as foreshadowing a period of national disintegration. And more recently, agitations in several northern Indian cities by doctors, engineers, teachers, and students have been described as the precursor of a national revolt by India's middle classes.

India is indeed rife with cleavages: between sectional interests, workers and management, peasants and their tenants and labourers, the middle class and the business community, and between one or another linguistic, religious, and caste communities. Although no one of these cleavages characterizes the national electoral and party system, they are all often simultaneously present. One of the tasks of scholars attempting to understand how the Indian political system works has been to map out these various cleavages in order to grasp how and why they vary from one region to another, how they are manifest in electoral behaviour and party alignments, and under what conditions they change.

The five studies included in this volume add to our understanding of electoral cleavages and party alignments in five of the Indian states. Three of the states are in South India: Tamil Nadu, Kerala, and Mysore (now Karnataka). Two are in the north: Uttar Pradesh and Punjab. An earlier volume in this series deals with West Bengal. Together, the six studies reveal a number of significant characteristics of the Indian party system and electoral behaviour at the state level.

Three distinct patterns of electoral cleavage are illustrated by the cases. In the Punjab and Tamil Nadu, social identities—religion in one instance and language in the other—provide the raw material for political conflicts and alignments. In West Bengal and Kerala the divisions are along ideological lines. In U. P. and Karnataka caste and faction form the basis of party affiliations and internal party divisions.

The studies also reveal that there is no simple fit between social cleavages and electoral preferences. In the Punjab, as Brass writes, the three major parties—the Akali Dal, Jana Sangh and Congress—do not neatly divide the electorate along Hindu-Sikh lines. In Kerala, as Hardgrave reports, caste and subregion modify the tendency of agricultural labourers and industrial workers to support the Communists. In Tamil Nadu, as Barnett notes, Tamil cultural consciousness has played an important role in polarizing politics around Congress and the DMK, but neither class, caste, rural-urban, nor language divisions sharply separate the voters.

The political cleavages, however, that characterize the states reported here have remained remarkably persistent from one election to another. Ideological parties divided both Kerala and West Bengal even before independence. Factional division, intertwined with caste and subregion, have remained the basis of U. P.'s fragmented party system at least since the first elections of 1952. The present two-party division between Congress and the DMK in Tamil Nadu dates back only to the 1962 elections, but its antecedents are older. The Justice Party, the cultural nationalist precursor of the DMK, drew substantial electoral support as early as the 1920s. The three-party division in the Punjab, and the electorally dominant position of the Congress Party in Mysore, have also endured from election to election.

This is not to suggest that election results have not varied substantially between 1952 and 1974. In state after state, however, continuity has persisted with respect to basic political cleavages, the structure of the party system, and even, in some instances, the individual parties themselves.

When existing parties were not sufficiently responsive to the rise of new local discontents, state party systems have been hospitable to the emergence of new parties. Bombay city, for example, produced the Shiv Sena Party, a nativist response to the migration of South Indians to the city, and Andhra produced the Telengana Praja Samiti, a sub-regional movement calling for the creation of a new state. Discontent with the existing Congress Party in the mid-sixties gave rise to the creation of opposition parties by Congress factions in U. P., Bihar, Orissa, West Bengal, and Kerala. And tribal parties seeking to carve separate states out of Assam polarized politics in large parts of that state.

The newly emerged cleavages and parties, however, tended to affect only their own states. In India's segmented political system the issues and social cleavages of one regional segment have remarkably little effect on other areas. The discontent of one region does not necessarily foreshadow the discontent of other regions, nor does the expansion of electoral support for one political party in a given state necessarily signify that that party is on the upswing nationally. By-elections and special state mid-term elec-

tions have been poor indicators of national trends.

There have, however, been enough exceptions to the segmentation hypothesis to caution us against overgeneralizing. There have been occasions when political conflicts in one state have been followed by similar conflicts in other states, either because the one has influenced the other or because both are affected by common discontents. The movement for the reorganization of states along linguistic lines, which was forceful in the Telugu region of Madras in the early 1950s, soon spread throughout the country, and shaped political cleavages in the old states of Madras, Hyderabad, Mysore, Bombay, and the Punjab. More recently, demands for breaking existing states into smaller units have given rise to new political parties, as in Assam and Andhra, or to divisions within parties, as in Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, and Bihar. Student protests have echoed across state boundaries. In early 1974 student agitations in Gujarat led to the establishment of President's Rule and the removal of the Chief Minister and his government. Within weeks a similar student movement erupted against the Congress government in Bihar.

Between 1969 and 1972 Prime Minister Indira Gandhi actively sought to influence electoral cleavages and party alignments within the states by emphasizing a set of issues intended to cut across existing cleavages. Mrs. Gandhi's attack against the "syndicate" within the old Congress, the split in the Congress Party itself, the dramatic nationalization of the banks, her attacks against the princely order, the new electoral slogan "garibi hatao" (eliminate poverty), and the emphasis on programmes to bring about a more equitable distribution of wealth can all be viewed as an effort to establish new electoral alignments. Mrs. Gandhi's strategy was confirmed by her victory in the 1971 parliamentary elections. It was reinforced the following year in elections to the state legislative assemblies.

The victory of the new Congress was widely regarded by many observers as the end of the old cleavages and alignments within the states. Now, it was believed, issues defined by the national leadership would shape electoral patterns. It was suggested that the new political cleavages would be economic and class-based rather than dependent upon identity issues that were community-based.

Here, at last, appeared to be confirmation in India of an argument by students of electoral behaviour, that in societies with overlapping social cleavages the reduction of one cleavage is likely to give rise to intensification of another. Thus, Butler and Stokes in their classic study of British politics noted that the reduction of class cleavages in the U. K. revived the importance of "nationalist" cleavages in Scotland and Wales. Similar arguments have been used to explain the rise of new political ethnic pluralisms in Belgium, Canada, France, Spain, and Yugoslavia. The reverse of the Butler-Stokes observation appeared to be relevant for India: a reduction

in linguistic, cultural, and other "nationalist" cleavages gives rise to class conflict.

By elevating class issues to the national level, by appealing directly to the rural and urban poor and to the discontented urban middle class, Mrs. Gandhi demonstrated that the Indian electorate could be realigned on economic lines irrespective of caste, religious, linguistic, and tribal identities. Indeed, by emphasizing economic issues that cut across the country as a whole, national rather than "parochial" identities would be elevated. Electoral politics within the states, so her supporters argued, could be shaped by national politics, and class and economic issues could be made more salient than factional concerns, ethnic identities, and patronage politics.

For three years this was the theme of Mrs. Gandhi's leadership. It began with her successful campaign against the "syndicate" during the Presidential election of 1969, and continued through the Congress split, the parliamentary elections of 1971, the successful war with Pakistan over Bangladesh, and Mrs. Gandhi's final electoral triumph in the state elections of 1972. But was this a new era in Indian politics or a brief interlude?

A close examination of the electoral returns and party alignments even during this period reveals that the old alignments were hardly dead. As Wood and Hammond point out in their study of the 1971 elections in Karnataka, there was more a "changing of the guard" than any fundamental electoral transformation. Although the regional parties did poorly, they were by no means wiped out. As Baxter points out, the Jat-supported BKD was defeated in 1971, but the Jat peasant proprietors in western U. P. remained a major political force.

We are too close to these events to note with any certainty what the state electoral patterns will be for the remainder of the 1970s. Elections held in a few of the states in 1974 do suggest, however, that the patterns of the fifties and sixties are more persistent than the pattern suggested by the brief era of "national" politics between 1969 and 1972. The 1974 election results suggest that the Congress decline and the growth of state parties during the 1960s, both of which were arrested by Mrs. Gandhi's dramatic adversary politics, may now be resuming. In the recent elections in U. P., Congress won a majority of seats, but the BKD and Jana Sangh returned as major electoral forces. (The BKD won 106 seats, the Jana Sangh 61, and Congress 215 out of a state total of 425.) In Orissa the Utkal Congress, a regional party, prevented Congress from winning a majority of seats. In the small states of Manipur, Nagaland, and Pondicherry regional parties won a plurality or majority of seats in the state legislatures.

India has had a remarkably stable and durable party system, and much of that stability has been based upon persistent patterns of voter support. Even in the elections in which Mrs. Gandhi's Congress swept the polls,

the Congress vote increased by only a few points. Parties like the Jana Sangh, the Communist and Socialist parties, Swatantra, and numerous regional parties still retained their solid bases of support, for the opposition is at least as institutionalized as Congress. The numbers reveal that in most elections a majority of voters voted against the government and for the opposition parties. Even when there are major changes in seat distribution, the studies in this volume show that stable patterns of voter orientations in India are maintained. Paradoxically, the Indian electoral system is characterized by a durability of voter behaviour, while its party system reveals the volatility of changing party alignments.

A complex relationship between regional and national influences exists both at the electoral and party level. Too often observers have fluctuated from one extreme to another—from the view that regional politics is autonomous and divisive to the view that national issues and leaders sway the entire electorate. Regionalism in India, like sectionalism in America, is a permanent feature of the political system. It must be understood in its own terms. It is neither an alternative to national politics nor a passing phase. The strength of the national leadership and its capacity to influence voter behaviour and party alignments in the states is more problematic. In the absence of a national mass media, an international conflict, or a national presidential election it is not easy for national leaders in India to bring about a new electoral and party realignment for the country as a whole.

June 1974 *Myron Weiner*

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CASTE AND FACTIONAL CLEAVAGES

INTRODUCTION

The phenomenon of the "flash" party is the subject of Craig Baxter's study of competitive politics in the north Indian state of Uttar Pradesh. In 1967 a magnetic Congress Party leader in U. P. by the name of Charan Singh broke from Congress to organize his own party, the Bharatiya Kranti Dal (BKD), as the "Spokesman for the middle farmer and individual ownership," representing especially the Jat caste of peasant proprietors to which Charan Singh belonged. In elections two years later this new party blanketed the state, contested 402 out of 425 constituencies, won 99 seats (second only to Congress) and one out of every five votes cast in the state as a whole. As a result of factional conflict within the state Congress, Charan Singh soon formed his own coalition government. Moreover, with the split in Prime Minister Gandhi's Congress Party nationally, and in U. P. as well, it looked as if the very fate of Mrs. Gandhi's government depended upon the turn of electoral events in U. P., India's largest state holding the largest bloc of parliamentary members and the state from which Prime Ministers Jawaharlal Nehru, Lal Bahadur Shastri, and Indira Gandhi herself had all come. In this complex changing situation many of Charan Singh's followers—some say Charan Singh himself—dreamt of glory; the pivotal role of the BKD in the politics of U. P., they thought, might lead them to play a pivotal role in national politics if in the elections of 1971 Mrs. Gandhi failed to win a clear majority of parliament.

But in the parliamentary elections of 1971 Mrs. Gandhi's Congress won an overwhelming victory, in U. P. and nationally, with the result that BKD members of the U. P. state assembly defected to the ruling Congress; the flash party had apparently burned itself out as the major political force it had once appeared to be. The "speculative stock," to use Baxter's phrase, had fallen.

The story of the rise and fall of the BKD is more than an interesting historical episode. It raises questions concerning the character of the party system in India's largest state. It leads us to ask whether India has discontent and volatile electorates easily won over by a strong leader and a new party, then just as easily attracted back to the governing party when it produces a popular leader and new promises, as Congress did under Mrs. Gandhi's leadership. Moreover, as Baxter points out, the "flash" party is not simply a U. P. phenomenon since the BKD had counterparts in Bihar with the Jana Kranti Dal, in West Bengal with the Bangla Congress, in Orissa with the Jana Congress, and similar dissident groups in Madhya Pradesh and Haryana.

Baxter captures some of the structural characteristics of U. P. politics: the importance of caste as the basis of political appeal, now overlaid with class interests (for the Jat caste is a caste of peasant proprietors, and Charan Singh and his party workers alternated between a caste and class appeal); the subregional character of caste in U. P. so that it is difficult for any single group to build a statewide movement (the Jats are a force primarily in western U.P.); the seeming frailty of individual loyalties to parties (especially as compared with states like West Bengal and Kerala); and hence a party system that is so fluid that it is readily susceptible to "flash" parties like the BKD.

To find out where from the BKD derived its support, Baxter examines the transfer of both votes and seats. Through the use of regression analysis he is able to show where the BKD drew its support, how much came from the two major parties in the state, Congress and Jana Sangh, and how much from the various minor parties and independents. Though it was the Jana Sangh which lost seats most heavily in the 1969 elections, Baxter shows that only a relatively small proportion of Jana Sangh voters switched to the BKD, an important point in estimating the future strength of the Sangh in a state in which it has had substantial voter appeal. The "floating" vote, he concludes, could be found in all parties, including the Jana Sangh and Congress; but the largest part of the BKD support came from the smaller parties and, most substantially of all, from among the voters that had previously voted for independent candidates. Alas, the computer is unable to tell us the class and caste of these unattached voters; but Baxter, as an astute observer of the U. P. political scene, argues that the BKD drew its largest support from the Jat caste of peasant proprietors in western U. P. No one who knows U. P. well is likely to quarrel with Baxter's conclusion that this peasant proprietor community will continue to remain an influential political force in the state and that "it will be heard whether as a separate party or as a faction in the Congress," an observation confirmed by the resurgence of the BKD in the 1974 assembly elections.

It would not be surprising if other social groups also create their own parties, for as Baxter demonstrates, this populous (88 million), politically fragmented state with its non-institutionalized party system provides a hospitable environment for "flash" parties. We shall be grateful to Baxter for showing us how the analysis of an historic episode can illuminate the way in which an electoral and party system operates.

The second chapter in this section on caste and factional cleavages examines the impact of the national Congress Party split on the Congress Party in the state of Karnataka, or, to use its former name, Mysore. Unlike Uttar Pradesh, Karnataka has a long history of stable Congress rule. In every election from 1952 through 1972 Congress won a majority of seats in the state legislative assembly. It is one of the few states in which Congress

has actually won the support of a majority of the electorate, and except for the period of the split, the state has avoided President's Rule from New Delhi. Although caste and factional conflicts have played a significant role in both electoral and party politics in Karnataka, they have proven to be less destructive for stable government than in U. P., where there have been frequent party defections and intricate alliances between factions of Congress and the opposition parties.

By exploring the changes, both by the electorate and by various groups within Congress, that took place during the period of the split, from 1969 through 1972, Wood and Hammond teach us a great deal about the impact of national schisms on state politics. They describe the two major factions within the Karnataka Congress, the one coming predominantly from the old princely state of Mysore and the other from regions subsequently added to form the larger state, the predominance in each of one of the two leading castes in the state, and some of the generational and occupational differences between those who belonged to each of the factions.

The dominant faction in the Karnataka Congress, the group in control of the state government, was closely linked to the wing of the national party organization opposed to Mrs. Gandhi. When the split occurred, the dissident faction of the state party sided with Mrs. Gandhi, less because of a congruence in programme and ideology than because of the political logic of factional conflict. The outcome for the dissidents was fortuitous. The electorate proved to be more moved in the 1971 parliamentary elections by Mrs. Gandhi's personal appeal and programme than they were by the local Congress Party organization. It was not long before the dissident Congressmen were able to parlay their victories in the parliamentary elections into a victory in the state assembly elections the following year against the "old" Congress. Thus, a realignment of the electorate on the basis of national considerations resulted in the transfer of power within the local Congress from one party faction to another. Mrs. Gandhi's national position was strengthened by the support of one wing of the Karnataka Congress and, in turn, a faction of the state Congress profited by attaching itself to an electorally popular national leadership. Viewed, therefore, from the state level, Wood and Hammond are able to show why Mrs. Gandhi's victory resulted not in any fundamental social transformation of the party leadership but rather in a rotation of interparty elite.

M. W.

CHAPTER III

THE RISE AND FALL OF THE BHARATIYA KRANTI DAL IN UTTAR PRADESH

Craig Baxter

Lucknow: Gupta ministry falls. Charan Singh leads defection from Congress and is expected to form new government.—News Item, April 1, 1967.

1. Factionalism in the U. P. Congress

Factionalism, based both on ideological differences and on disputes over the disribution of the spoils of office, has been a fact of life for the Congress Party. Most political parties in India, the Jana Sangh being the notable exception, have at one time been included under the Congress umbrella, either before or after independence. Both the Communist Party and the Hindu Mahasabha, to take the political extremes, worked with the Congress at various times in the freedom movement but had irrevocably split from the larger party before 1947. Shortly after independence the Congress Socialist Party left the shelter of the Congress, and in 1951 a group under Acharya Kripalani departed. By the time of the First General Elections most ideologically based groups, aside from Swatantra, were gone.

Factionalism rooted in the division of the gains of electoral victory continued but was contained within the Congress itself by the efforts of Nehru and other post-independence leaders. The leadership could, with but small loss of membership, allocate ministerial positions and constituency electoral assignments at the state level and could "elevate" some aspirants to the parliamentary level where the presence of the Prime Minister would enforce discipline.

The death of towering leaders at the state level and finally the death of Nehru himself contributed to a loss of control. Disputes between "organizational" and "ministerial" wings of the state parties became a major, and almost the only, activity of Congressmen at the state level. As factional disputes intensified, political direction of governmental activities by ministers deteriorated, and in some states near *immobilisme* seemed to be the rule.

For the Congress the most dangerous period was that between the death of Nehru in May 1964 and the consolidation of power by his daughter, Indira Gandhi, following the events of 1969 which saw a split in the national

Congress and culminated in her stunning election victories in 1971 and 1972. This period was marked by the general elections of 1967, in which the Congress suffered a severe setback, either losing majorities or achieving sharply reduced majorities in almost all states. Factionalism—and a new device, rampant defection—now assumed an ominous role. Factional leaders often presided over groups of sufficient size to tip the balance against the Congress should they withdraw from the party. If their demands for a greater share of the spoils of victory were not met, this is precisely what several factions did.

In several states (Bihar, Orissa, and West Bengal, for example) departure from the Congress preceded the election and contributed to the loss of a Congress majority and the installation of a—usually fragile—non-Congress Government. In others, including Uttar Pradesh (U. P.), Haryana, and Madhya Pradesh, withdrawal occurred after the election and resulted in the collapse of a Congress ministry and the forming of a—again, usually fragile—coalition administration. In most instances, but not all, new elections were required within a year or two, and the defecting factions contested as political parties opposed to the Congress. Such parties have been ascribed the general descriptive "flash parties," referring to the sudden brilliance displayed in the 1967-69 period and predicting—possibly prematurely in some cases—their eventual decline into something much less than a major competitor for office.

One such flash party is the Bharatiya Kranti Dal in U. P., India's largest state. Following a short historical note on the party and a quick look at events in U.P., this chapter analyzes the BKD's startling performance in the state elections of 1969, using computerized data as a primary source supplemented by the *Reports* of the Election Commission and other electoral information.[1] The data are limited, and so will be the conclusions.

Nevertheless, a number of questions concerning electoral competition can be asked and at least tentatively answered. The principal focus of this inquiry will concern the effect of the BKD's entry in the 1969 poll on the Congress and its largest competitor, the Bharatiya Jana Sangh. Trends from earlier elections might well have led to a prediction that U. P. would see a two-party system within the state embracing the Congress and the Jana Sangh. In 1969 the Jana Sangh declined, not disastrously but perceptibly. Was the BKD's performance at the expense of the Jana Sangh or did its strength come from other sources? Did the BKD consolidate,

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[1] The present writer, a historian by training and a Foreign Service Officer by vocation, admits to a total lack of knowledge of the intricacies of "computerdom" and wishes to acknowledge with full appreciation the guidance provided by Miss Priscilla Battis and Dr. John O. Field of MIT. He wishes to add here that the views expressed are his and not those of the Foreign Service or the U. S. Department of State.

for at least one election, forces which were already disenchanted with the Congress but which were scattered among other parties and independents? Was an emerging two-party system permanently or only temporarily halted?

Initial answers to these questions can be given here, subject to further discussion and some "hedging" later in this study. It seems clear from the data that the BKD, unlike established opposition parties (which tend to transfer votes to and from the Congress), gained its principal strength from accumulating votes from minor opposition parties and from independents. In the U. P. context the only party qualifying as an established opposition party is the Jana Sangh, and while it undoubtedly lost some votes to the BKD—and to the Congress—it was not a major contributor to BKD strength. This consolidation of diverse anti-Congress votes may be a general attribute of "flash" parties, although a study of the U. P. experience alone cannot give solid support to such a conclusion. As to the two-party system in the state, no firm prediction can be made. The Congress and the Jana Sangh remain the only two parties with statewide organizational strength, the former continuing to be much stronger than the latter, and these two will no doubt remain in competition. The speed with which the BKD meteor will burn itself out, if indeed it does, will be the critical variable, and this can be tested only with another state election (presently scheduled for February 1974).

In a state as large as U. P. it seems useful to use data at a number of levels. (See Figure III:1 for a map indicating the regions and districts of Uttar Pradesh. The constituency must be the basic level, and it is advantageous that constituencies were not redelimited between 1967 and 1969. For other purposes the district, that near permanent feature of Indian administration, will provide the needed element of continuity. The diversity of U. P. lends itself to a third level for measurement, the region, of which six will be defined. Finally, in the postscript on the 1971 parliamentary elections, comparisons will be made between the 1969 and 1971 contests by using the Lok Sabha constituency, a grouping of five assembly constituencies.

2. The Establishment of the BKD

In the 1967 elections the Congress failed to win a majority in the U. P. legislative assembly, capturing only 199 of 425 seats.[2] The leadership of Congress returned to former Chief Minister Chandra Bhanu Gupta, who had held the office from 1960, when he ousted Sampurnanand in an acrimonious factional fight, until 1963, when he was dropped under the

[2] See Table III:2 for results of the 1967 elections.



Figure III : 1

UTTAR PRADESH, SHOWING REGIONS AND DISTRICTS

Kamaraj Plan.[3] His successor in office, Sucheta Kripalani, had been elected to the Lok Sabha in 1967 and thereby effectively removed from state politics. Gupta's task of putting together a ministry was difficult. A factional leader himself, he was opposed by the then minority faction of Kamlapati Tripathi and had long been disliked by the Jat leader of western U. P., Chaudhury Charan Singh.[4] Both Tripathi—who had been upset in the election in his own constituency but would soon enter the assembly in a by-election—and Charan Singh could be expected to demand a high price in terms of cabinet positions in return for their support. As the leader of a minority party, Gupta also had to contend with the possibility that a grand alliance of the opposition might be formed and deprive him of the opportunity of returning to the chief ministership. Gupta offset this by bargaining with independents, who numbered 37, and attempting to detach members belonging to smaller parties from their allegiance.

The bargaining appeared to have worked, and a Congress ministry was sworn in. However, a warning of trouble was presented when Charan Singh refused to accept an offered place in the cabinet. On April 1, when Gupta presented his cabinet to the assembly for a vote of confidence, Charan Singh startled the meeting by crossing the aisle and announcing that he was ending his 45-year career in the Congress. He was joined by others; and when the dust settled, Charan Singh headed a new party, the Jana Congress, which included 13 members who had been elected as Congressmen and two who had come in as independents. Of the 15, two besides Charan Singh came from his home district, Meerut, and four (three from Congress and one independent) came from Faizabad, home district of Jai Ram Verma, who was to become Charan Singh's chief lieutenant.

Charan Singh had been a power in the Meerut District Congress since before independence and was described, depending on one's point of view, as "leader" or "dictator."[5] He was named to a junior position in the

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[3] The Kamaraj Plan entailed the resignation of leading Congress office-holders at the Centre and in the states so that they might devote themselves to organizational work within the party.

[4] Congress factionalism in U. P. has been studied in Paul Brass, *Factional Politics in an Indian State* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965). One of Brass' chapters pertains to Meerut. I have described the fall of the Gupta ministry and the role of the Jana Sangh in the Charan Singh move in my *The Jana Sangh, A Biography of an Indian Political Party* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1969), pp. 296-298. For inter-party politics in U. P. see Angela Burger, *Opposition in a Dominant Party System* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969). On national activities of the BKD see Lewis P. Fickett, Jr., "The Politics of Regionalism in India," *Pacific Affairs*, Summer 1971 (Vol. 44, No. 2), pp. 193-210.

[5] See Brass, *op. cit.*, pp. 139-143, for a commentary on Charan Singh and Meerut District. The following paragraph is based partly on Brass' analysis and partly on the writer's conversations with Charan Singh and others.

ministry by long-time U.P. Congress boss and Chief Minister Pandit Govind Ballabh Pant in 1946 and remained close to Pant throughout that elder statesman's career in Lucknow and New Delhi. Charan Singh became a full minister in 1952 under Pant and was continually in the cabinet until the 1967 election, with the exception of a two-year period, 1959-60. He was an early defector from the Sampurnanand ministry which succeeded Pant's in 1955 when Pant went to the Centre as Home Minister. Charan Singh worked with Gupta in pulling down the Sampurnanand ministry and in setting up a new cabinet under Gupta in 1960. However, the agreement was only on a specific project, and the two rarely worked well in a ministry which was riven with factional disputes.[6] A representative of the Jats, a caste of peasant proprietors, Charan Singh became a spokesman for the middle farmer and individual ownership. He strongly opposed proposals in the Congress for cooperative farming, wrote several tracts on the subject, and at one time seemed to some to be a potential member of the right-wing Swatantra Party. Charan Singh, however, would probably find the "free enterprise" stance of Minoo Masani as unappealing as he would find the peasant views of N. G. Ranga appealing.[7] This, then, was the man who was to lead the move against the Congress ministry in U. P. He raised the cry of "Bania domination" against the Gupta cabinet, a cry which would strike a responsive chord with the peasantry.[8]

Charan Singh immediately assumed the leadership of the Samyukta Vidhayak Dal (SVD—literally, United Legislative Party), a grouping which comprised the non-Congress members of the legislative assembly and which had staked a claim to form a ministry before Gupta's negotiations appeared to be successful. The SVD had already found the drafting of a common programme difficult, as the parties ranged from the Jana Sangh and Swatantra on the right to the Samyukta Socialists and the two Communist parties on the left, with the Praja Socialists, Republicans, and most independents somewhere in-between. Charan Singh's commanding prominence temporarily patched over the differences, and he assumed office as Chief Minister on April 6. All of the constituent parties were represented in the cabinet in approximate ratio to their strength in the assembly. The Jana Sangh, as the largest, exacted the post of Deputy Chief Minister but

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[6] Visitors to Lucknow during the early sixties were treated to intra-cabinet recriminations more frequently than to assessments of the administrative and developmental goals of the government.

[7] For an especially lucid portrayal of Masani, Ranga, and the Swatantra Party generally see Howard L. Erdman, *The Swatantra Party and Indian Conservatism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967).

[8] "Bania" is used to describe a caste comprising Hindu businessmen and moneylenders. Politically, it tends to be pejorative and captures the usual peasant distrust of commercial interests.

was denied a claim to the Home Ministry, which Charan Singh retained for himself. Only one member of the cabinet other than Charan Singh had any previous executive experience, Jai Ram Verma of Faizabad District, who took the agriculture portfolio.[9]

In a state which had been distinguished by poor administration at the cabinet level and torn by factionalism and intrigue, the SVD cabinet seemed a breath of fresh air. Despite some initial success, however, the stresses among the parties and continued pressure brought by the Congress led the coalition to eventual collapse. Secret balloting for indirectly elected seats in the Legislative Council and the Rajya Sabha were events which showed the lack of cohesion most openly, but programmatic difficulties also were frequent (as, for example, the dispute over Urdu as an official language in the state). Defections to and from the SVD occurred often as U. P. caught the infection of "aya Ram, gaya Ram," a dominant pattern of post-1967 state politics.[10] The ministry struggled along until February 17, 1968, when Charan Singh submitted his resignation. A week later President's Rule was proclaimed in U. P. with a new election set for February 1969.

Before looking more closely at the data for the 1969 elections, we should note several political events in the state which followed them. In the elections Congress increased its number of seats from 199 to 211, two seats short of a majority. This time Gupta's task was easier, and he quickly acquired the necessary support to gain a majority and form a Congress ministry. The anti-Gupta faction was given representation, and Kamlapati Tripathi was made Deputy Chief Minister while he retained, for the time being, his position as president of the state Congress Party unit.

In the summer of 1969 began the series of events which ended in the split in the Congress Party at the national level. Gupta remained with the Organization Congress led by Nijalingappa, while Tripathi went to the Ruling Congress headed by Mrs. Gandhi. Gupta tried to preserve his ministry and did so for a time by adding new members to the cabinet in an effort to purchase loyalty with office. In one last-ditch attempt to stave off defeat Gupta added 29 new members on November 23, but this failed to save the ministry and it collapsed.

Charan Singh then put together a new team which took office in February 1970, and had the support, but not the membership, of the Tripathi faction. The Ruling Congress tried to pressure Charan Singh into merger. He refused and his ministry fell in September. In November T. N. Singh

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[9] Like Charan Singh only on a lesser scale, Verma was a leader of an agricultural caste, the Kurmis, in his district.

[10] "Aya Ram, gaya Ram" means, literally, "Ram comes, Ram goes," signifying frequent crossings of the aisle.

of the Organization Congress formed a new ministry with the support of the BKD (now turned full circle), the Jana Sangh, the SSP, and Swatantra. T. N. Singh, a member of the Rajya Sabha, was required to find a seat in the assembly and failed to do so when he was defeated in a by-election. He then resigned and was replaced by a Ruling Congress government headed by Tripathi on April 5, 1971. The resounding victory of the Ruling Congress in the February 1971 parliamentary elections served as a stimulant to wavering members of the Organization Congress, who now flocked to the Tripathi banner. The BKD also contributed to the increase in Ruling Congress strength; a current estimate gives only 43 members for the BKD in the assembly.[11] Tripathi melded members of both Charan Singh ministries and the 1969 Gupta ministry, along with some new members in what appeared to be a fairly stable government. Stability, however, is not a long-range matter in the current U. P. context, and the Tripathi cabinet fell in June 1973 following a rebellion within a segment of the police force.

One last item must be mentioned before looking closely at the election data. As mentioned earlier, Charan Singh's party was first called the Jana Congress and it arose from acute factionalism within the Congress Party. Following the death of Nehru and continuing beyond the 1967 elections, a series of splits took place in the Congress, encompassing almost every state. The dissidents took various names. In Bihar a group headed by Mahamaya Prasad Sinha associated with political maverick Raja Kamakhya Narayan Singh of Ramgarh to form the Jana Kranti Dal. The JKD won only 13 seats in 1967 but the precarious balance in the Bihar assembly permitted Sinha to lead a coalition ministry in that state. In West Bengal a number of Congressmen under the leadership of Ajoy Mukherjee rebelled against the strong-arm leadership of Atulya Ghosh and formed the Bangla Congress. As in Bihar the opposition coalition looked to the former Congressman for leadership, and Mukherjee became Chief Minister. In Orissa dissidents opposed to Biju Patnaik formed the Jana Congress, ran in an election alliance with the Swatantra Party, and took a junior role in the ministry headed by Swatantra leader Maharaja Rajendra Narayan Singh Deo. A small Jana Congress also appeared in Madhya Pradesh in time to contest the elections. Following the elections dissident Congressmen defected from the party and headed coalition ministries in Madhya Pradesh and Haryana. These several state groups (except from Haryana), joined by others in states where the Congress remained in control, met in November

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[11] *Times of India*, January 12, 1973. The BKD was the largest opposition group at the time of the report, exceeding both the Organization Congress and the Jana Sangh. Jai Ram Verma was the assembly leader of the party, with Charan Singh as chairman of the organization.

1967 to form a national organization under the name Bharatiya Kranti Dal.[12] On paper the group was impressive, with three chief ministers, 180 members of legislative assemblies,[13] and a number of members of parliament under the leadership of Prakash Vir Shastri.[14] The tally was illusory. No chief ministers remain. And the split in the Congress changed the political equation in most states and brought many dissidents back into the fold as members of the Ruling Congress, most notably the remnant of the Bangla Congress.

3. The 1969 Elections

During the year between the fall of the Charan Singh ministry and the polling in February 1969, the BKD and other members of the former SVD made a number of attempts to build an electoral alliance against the Congress. Their negotiations were unsuccessful, as the acrimony between the parties, the hopes of the individual parties—especially the BKD and the Jana Sangh—of winning a majority on their own, and the seeming weakness of the Congress worked against cooperation. Thus one does not find in U.P. either the United Front approach of West Bengal or the two-party (Akali Dal and Jana Sangh) alliance of Punjab, but a free-for-all battle similar to that in Bihar. It is therefore possible to look at the strength of each party separately and to determine the location of shifts without the complication of attempting to unscramble alliances.

The state-wide results of the 1969 elections are shown in Table III:1, along with comparative data for 1967. The immediate—and erroneous—conclusion is that the Jana Sangh lost many seats to the BKD and, more correctly, that it may have also lost some to the Congress. We will look at the interchange of seats shortly, but first it should be noted that, as measured by the number of candidates put up by these parties, the Congress, the Jana Sangh, and the BKD all thought of themselves as state-wide parties and as potential winners of an absolute majority of the seats. The Congress and the Jana Sangh could reasonably put forward such a claim on the basis of 1967 returns, when the Congress, though declining, won a plurality in

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[12] Bharatiya Kranti Dal literally means "Indian Revolutionary Party," a somewhat misleading name for a party dominated by middle-size landowners.

[13] Fickett, *op. cit.*, gives the number 180 in November as follows: JKD (Bihar), 26; BKD (Madhya Pradesh), 34; BKD (Maharashtra), 4; Janata Paksha (Mysore), 16; Jana Congress (Orissa), 26; Janata Party (Rajasthan), 11; Jana Congress (U. P.), 29; Bangla Congress (West Bengal), 34. Aisle-crossing was so frequent that any precise tally is difficult.

[14] Shastri, like Charan Singh, is an Arya Samajist and had until 1971 a three-for-three election record as an independent from Gurgaon in the Punjab first and from Hapur in Meerut District in his second and third tries. See Baxter, *The Jana Sangh*, *op. cit.*, pp. 173-174, 269. Shastri is a Tyagi by caste and, as Brass points out (*op. cit.*, pp. 143-148), this caste has been allied with the Jats in Meerut.

both seats and votes and the Jana Sangh doubled the number of seats it had won in 1962 and felt itself to be the trend of the future.

TABLE III:1

Election Results for the Legislative Assembly: Uttar Pradesh (1967 and 1969)

1967				Party	1969			
CONT	WON	LD	Votes		CONT	WON	LD	Votes
425	199	29	32.2	Congress	424	211	14	33.7
401	98	151	21.7	Jana Sangh	397	49	178	17.9
255	44	144	10.0	Samyukta Socialist	258	33	171	7.8
207	12	178	4.7	Swatantra	72	5	61	1.3
168	10	139	4.1	Republican	172	1	146	3.5
167	11	130	4.1	Praja Socialist	92	3	77	1.7
96	13	65	3.2	Communist	109	4	80	3.1
57	1	47	1.3	Communist (Marxist)	21	1	16	0.5
				Bharatiya Kranti Dal	402	98	173	21.3
				Forward Bloc	9	0	9	0.1
				Other Parties	256	2	246	2.1
1238	37	1117	18.7	Independents	659	18	620	7.1
2014	425	2000		Total	2871	425	1791	

Source: For 1967, Craig Baxter, *District Voting Trends in India* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969); for 1969, official *Report* of the Election Commission of India.

In 1969 the Congress omitted one seat in Muzaffarnagar District. The BKD did not contest 23 seats, six of them in the hilly Uttarkhand and Kumaon divisions and three more in adjacent Dehra Dun District, suggesting that in these areas the party had been unable to attract local leaders with presumably ready-made followings, something they were able to do in many other parts of the state. In no other area did the BKD omit more than one constituency per district. The Jana Sangh did not contest in 28 constituencies. Ten of these were in the western districts where the Jana Sangh had done relatively poorly in previous elections. In Rae Bareli, Pratapgarh, and Jalaun districts two seats were omitted, and the others were scattered throughout the state without any discernible pattern. In at least one case the Jana Sangh gave its support to another candidate, to the Hindu Mahasabha in a Gorakhpur District seat.

If seriousness of candidacy can be measured in terms of deposits lost (i.e., by polling less than one-sixth of the votes) the Congress overall was by far the most rational party in its aspirations. Only 14 of 424 Congress candidates (3%) forfeited their deposits, as against 178 of 397 Jana Sangh candidates (45%) and 173 of 402 BKD candidates (43%). Although the BKD and Jana Sangh were about equally unrealistic, with 6.8 candidates

per constituency in 1969 loss of deposits was certain to be high (it was 62% throughout the state). In fact, no party other than the three largest retained as many as half its deposits.

Experience and Incumbency

The BKD was not without a number of seasoned candidates. The electoral background and 1969 record of the party's nominees is given in Table III:2. Of the 402 candidates, 146 (36%) had contested before in the same or nearly the same constituency, 18 of them in all four previous elections since independence.[18]

TABLE III:2

The Previous Experience of BKD Candidates in 1969 and Their Performance in 1969

Previous Experience	In 1969		
	Won	Lost but Retained Deposit	Lost and Lost Deposit
Contested four and			
Won four	4	3	0
Won three	4	0	1
Won two	1	1	1
Won one	0	2	0
Won none	1	0	0
Contested three and			
Won three	1	1	0
Won two	2	2	3
Won one	2	1	1
Won none	1	1	0
Contested two and			
Won two	2	2	1
Won one	8	6	2
Won none	9	3	1
Contested one and			
Won one	9	6	4
Won none	23	17	21
No previous contest	31	86	138
Total	98	131	173

Source: Developed from the official *Reports* of the Election Commission for 1951-52, 1957, 1962, 1967, and 1969.

[18] Identification was done by name and location. A few others may also have had experience and shifted to seats outside the district in which they had contested previously.

The record of success among the experienced candidates was understandably higher than that of the new entrants. Only an eighth of the new candidates won seats, while those with experience were successful in almost half (46%) of the cases compared with an overall success rate of one in four. At the other end of the scale, the inexperienced nominees lost their deposits 54% of the time, while the veterans lost deposits at a rat of 24% compared with an overall record of 43%.

In more specific terms, 43 of the BKD candidates were incumbents, and 22 (51%) of these won; of the 21 losers, three also lost their deposits. There is little variation among the three principal contributors to the BKD's pre-election strength, measured in terms of the ticket on which the incumbents were elected in 1967. Ten of 21 former Congressmen won, and one of the 11 losers also lost his deposit. Four of ten elected in 1967 as inindependents (most as dissident Congressmen opposing the official candidate) were re-elected and one of the six who failed also lost his deposit. Six former members of the SSP contested and they split evenly, three winning and three losing. Both former Republicans and both former Swatantra members retained their seats. Only one former Jana Sanghi was able to do so, and the other lost his deposit. In the key western districts the record of the incumbents was 12 wins and three losses, each of the losers running second to Congress candidates, two of them very closely.

It will be seen from Table III:2 that only four of the seven candidates who had been successful in each of the four previous assembly elections were winners in 1969. Heading the group was Charan Singh himself, who in 1969 recorded one of the widest margins of victory in Indian electoral history. The most prominent of those who did not move to a fifth victory was Jai Ram Verma, who despite organizing a rather strong performance by the BKD in Faizabad District lost by an almost two-to-one margin to the Congress candidate who replaced him. This defeat notwithstanding, it is of note that in the western districts the four-time previous winners for the BKD won again in three of four constituencies, whereas outside that area they were one for three.

The Interchange of Seats

The first place to look for sources of BKD strength, as well as for the party's impact on others, is at the changes in the seats themselves. Table III:3 summarizes the changes in the overall complexion of the U.P. Legislative Assembly, while Figure III:2 maps the BKD winners according to the party winning the seat in the 1967 election.

The first thing which is apparent is that the Congress was the principal contributor of seats to the BKD—57 of 98, or 58%. Included here are the ten Congressmen who switched to the BKD and retained their seats. Despite

Figure III : 2

BKD WINS IN 1969

TABLE III:3

Changes in Assembly Seats by Party: Uttar Pradesh (1967-1969)

Party	Seats 1967	Retained	Gains From	Other Party	Losses To	Net Change	Seats 1969
CON			67	JS	24	+43	
			22	SSP	20	+ 2	
			9	CPI	3	+ 6	
			6	PSP	1	+ 5	
			6	SWA	1	+ 5	
			2	RPI		+ 2	
				BKD	57	−57	
				KMP	1	− 1	
			16	IND	9	+ 7	
	199	83	128		116	+12	211
BKD			57	CON		+57	
			10	JS		+10	
			8	SSP		+ 8	
			5	RPI		+ 5	
			3	PSP		+ 3	
			2	SWA		+ 2	
			2	CPI		+ 2	
			1	CPM		+ 1	
			10	IND		+10	
	—	—	98			+98	98
JS			24	CON	67	−43	
			3	SSP	1	+ 2	
			1	SWA	2	− 1	
			1	CPI		+ 1	
			1	RPI		+ 1	
				CPM	1	− 1	
				BKD	10	−10	
			2	IND		+ 2	
	98	17	32		81	−49	49
SSP			20	CON	22	− 2	
			1	RPI		+ 1	
			1	JS	3	− 2	
			1	RSP		+ 1	
				BKD	8	− 8	
			2	IND	3	− 1	
	44	8	25		36	−11	33
CPI			3	CON	9	− 6	
				JS	1	− 1	
				BKD	2	− 2	
	13	2	3		12	− 9	4

SWA			2	JS	1	+ 1	
			1	CON	6	− 5	
				PSP	1	− 1	
				BKD	2	− 2	
	12	2	3		10	− 7	5
PSP			1	CON	6	− 5	
			1	SWA		+ 1	
				SSP	1	− 1	
				BKD	3	− 3	
	11	1	2		10	− 8	9
CPM			1	JS		+ 1	
				BKD	1	− 1	
	1	0	1		1	0	1
HMS			1	IND		+ 1	
	—	—	1			+ 1	1
KMP			1	CON		+ 1	
	—	—	1			+ 1	1
RPI				BKD	5	− 5	
				CON	2	− 2	
				JS	1	− 1	
				SSP	1	− 1	
	10	1			9	− 9	1
IND			9	CON	16	− 7	
			3	SSP	2	+ 1	
				BKD	10	−10	
				HMS	1	− 1	
				JS	2	− 2	
	37	6	12		31	−19	18
Total	425	119	306		306	0	425

Source: Developed from official *Report* of 1969 election (which includes 1967 data).

claims by both the Jana Sangh and the SSP that they were hurt by the entrance of the BKD in the race, this is simply not the case when a seat-winner analysis is undertaken.[18] Both parties were hurt, but only ten former Jana Sangh seats and eight of the SSP went to the BKD. These included one Jana Sanghi and three Samyukta Socialists who found their

[18] See, e.g., *Hindustan Times*, February 27, 1969. The argument is also put forward in V. B. Singh, "Jan Sangh in Uttar Pradesh," *Economic and Political Weekly*, Annual Number, January 1971, pp. 307-316, especially p. 309 in which the author states: "The BKD . . . adversely affected the performance of all the other parties except Congress."

original party's programme and discipline such that they switched to the BKD. Three of the Jana Sangh's losses to the BKD came within the city limits of Lucknow. The Jana Sangh in 1967 won three of the four seats in the city and supported an independent who won the third. All four seats were taken by the BKD in 1969, including that of the independent, who now ran as a Jana Sangh nominee.

Much higher than the 57 seat interaction between the Congress and the BKD was the record between the Congress and the Jana Sangh. The two parties exchanged 81 seats, with 67 going from Jana Sangh to Congress and only 24 going from Congress to Jana Sangh. The net loss to the Congress of 43 seats accounts for 88% of the total net loss of 49 for the Jana Sangh. Losses occurred especially in the northern-tier districts of Bahraich, Basti, and Gonda and in the central districts of Sitapur, Kheri, and Hardoi—all considered part of the Jana Sangh heartland. In Lucknow Division the party sustained a loss of 17 seats, falling from 18 to but one, a constituency in Rae Bareili District, ironically the only district in which the Jana Sangh had not won a seat in 1967. The party dropped five seats net in Faizabad Division, which includes the northern-tier districts mentioned above. Although these defeats alone do not account for even a majority of the Jana Sangh losses, these were more bitter than others, for it is here that the party assumed it had a strong base on which it could build an overwhelming lead in its planned march to victory. These districts are to the Jana Sangh what southern Illinois is to the Republicans. Elsewhere, the Jana Sangh had contested many constituencies for the first time in 1967, and some losses could be expected. In one of these areas the Sangh had built an organization around Swami Brahmanandji of Hamirpur. He won his parliamentary seat in 1967, and the Jana Sangh took four of the five assembly seats in a district in which the party had never won a seat before and had never polled more than 5.4% of the vote. The Swami deserted the Jana Sangh for the Congress before the 1969 poll, and the Jana Sangh was wiped out.

The SSP also declined in number of seats won but not so drastically as the Jana Sangh. It fell from 44 seats to 33. With the Congress, the SSP had a near standoff, as it took 20 former Congress seats and lost 22 to the Congress. The party's contribution to the BKD was only eight seats, and these were generally scattered throughout the state and included three with candidates elected on the SSP ticket in 1967 who switched to the BKD. The SSP's heaviest losses were in Etawah District, where the party rocketed from no seats in 1962 to six in 1967 and then back where it started in 1969. Four were lost to the Congress and two to the BKD, but only one of the latter was a switching candidate. Two others who switched from the SSP to BKD lost in 1969. The elections reduced the SSP very much to the territory it and the PSP, merged and separately, had

considered a base of support since 1952: eastern U. P. roughly from Bara Banki and Pratapgarh to the Bihar border.

The Congress showed a high retention rate in comparison with other parties and especially in contrast to 1967. It retained 83 of 199 seats, or 42%. Congress was clearly the dominant party in that it retained, gained, or lost a total of 327 seats (77%) while being the largest interactor with every other party in the state. Congress picked up 128 seats from its opponents in 1969, 67 of these from the Jana Sangh, and lost 116 seats it had won in 1967, 57 of these to the BKD, 24 to the Jana Sangh, and 20 to the SSP. To state it another way, of the 305 seats which changed hands Congress was involved as gainer or loser in 244 (80%). Only 61 (20%) exchanges by-passed the Congress. No party listed except the CPM and the Hindu Mahasabha failed to exchange seats with the Congress.

We see, then, a double action in seat exchanges. Congress gained heavily from the Jana Sangh and the SSP, but lost more heavily to the BKD. It gained its advantage over its 1967 showing by picking up seats at a strong pace from the smaller parties. Such double action is not unique in U. P. electoral history. Not without reason has it been said that one of the least secure positions is that of a non-Congress member of the legislative assembly. Often elected as a protest against the unresponsiveness of a Congress incumbent, these members are themselves liable to subsequent rejection, for as members of the opposition they are usually unable to wield the power necessary to convert demands into meaningful outputs.

If the seriousness of a candidacy can be measured after the election by retention or failure to retain the security deposit, it may also be credible to measure pre-election seriousness by the place of the candidate's party in the preceding election. That is, if a party finished second it can reasonably hope to move up one notch and win the seat the next time around. In well-organized parties like the Congress and Jana Sangh a second-place finisher, particularly if he was not a losing incumbent, might be designated formally or informally to work in that constituency in anticipation of the next election so that he can build on both a party base and a personal following.

By the standard of first- and second-place finishes in 1967, only two parties could have any reasonable hope of winning a majority of the seats without an alliance in 1969. The Congress, of course, was one of these. It finished first or second in 364 constituencies (86%) in 1967. Posing as an alternative to the Congress was the Jana Sangh, which failed by a small margin to attain a "one-two" ranking in a majority of the seats. It achieved that position in 208 constituencies (49%). Trailing far behind was the SSP with 83, finishing in second in fewer constituencies than it had finished first.

The position was vastly altered by the 1969 election, and it is here that

the BKD did the greatest immediate harm to the Jana Sangh. It had taken 57 wins from the Congress, and it took 58 "one-two" finishes from the Jana Sangh. However, in so doing it was not able to attain the stature of a reasonable alternative to Congress for itself. It finished first or second in a total of 174 seats, far short of a majority, although it reduced the Jana Sangh's number to 156. The Congress continued to dominate in this regard, actually gaining 15 constituencies to form a total of 379. Despite its net loss of 43 seats to the Congress, the Jana Sangh suffered a net loss of only eight constituencies to the Congress in terms of first and second placings. In addition, the party enjoyed a slight net gain against all other parties except the BKD. If the SSP had any hopes of rising in the 1969 elections to be a challenger in 1974, those hopes were dashed as it fell far out of contention with only 66 top two places. Even the addition of its new—and again—found partner, the PSP, raises the SSP's total to only 73. A summary of changes in first two finishes is presented in Table III:4.

TABLE III:4

Legislative Assembly: First- and Second-Place Finishes

Party	1967			1969			Change
	Won	Second	Total	Won	Second	Total	
CON	199	195	364	211	168	379	+15
JS	98	110	208	49	107	156	−52
SSP	44	39	83	33	33	66	−17
CPI	13	15	28	4	15	19	−99
SWA	12	9	21	5	2	7	−14
PSP	11	14	25	3	4	7	−18
RPI	10	9	19	1	5	6	−13
CPM	1	1	2	1	0	1	− 1
BKD				98	76	174	+174
HMS				1	0	1	+ 1
KMP				1	1	2	+ 2
RPA				0	2	2	+ 2
IND	37	63	100	18	12	30	−70
Total	425	425	850	425	425	850	0

Another way in which the impact of the BKD on Congress and the Jana Sangh can be measured is to look at the 98 seats won by the new party and then to determine where the party losing the seat finished in 1969. Of the 57 seats won from the Congress by the BKD, the Congress fell only to

second place in 47, slipped to third in eight, and dropped to fourth in the remaining two. The ten seats in which the Congress finished below second found second place held by the Jana Sangh and SSP four times each and the RPI and the PSP once each. However, in none of the ten seats which the Jana Sangh yielded to the BKD did it finish second; third and fourth spots were attained in five cases each. The Congress joined the BKD in benefiting from Jana Sangh drops as it finished second to the BKD in nine seats; the CPI was second in the other. Overall, the Congress was second to the BKD in 82 of the 98 constituencies won by the BKD; the Jana Sangh was second in six; the SSP in four; the CPI and RPI in two each; and the PSP and an independent in one each. In sum, when the BKD won, it was in a race with the Congress in the vast majority of the cases. However, the Jana Sangh finished second to the Congress 92 times, while the BKD was second on 64 occasions. Of the 49 seats won by the Jana Sangh the Congress was second 40 times. Thus, for each of the two challengers the Congress was the most important competitor.

Shifts in Voting

The determination of shifts in seats is a concrete operation in that it is clear which party won a constituency in each election. To be sure, one party (the BKD, for example) might cause a second party (Jana Sangh) to lose seats to a third (Congress), a scenario which, though entirely credible, is analytically difficult to establish. Murkier still is the pattern of voting shifts within a constituency, district, region, or state. The election statistics indicate net changes-one can state from the record that such and such party gained or lost so many percentage points in the electoral unit studied, but one cannot state with any assurance the manner in which those changes took place. One thing is clear, however: a loss of 3.8% in the Jana Sangh vote from 1967 to 1969 does not account for more than a fraction of the gain from scratch to 21.3% by the BKD even if all those who deserted from the Jana Sangh cast their votes for the BKD in 1969, a most unlikely circumstance.

Evidence developed and opinions formulated in the field support a general conclusion that votes tend to flow to and from opposition parties from and to the Congress but tend not to flow between opposition parties themselves. The key word here is "tend." No doubt some votes flow between opposition parties, especially when candidates switch from one non-Congress party to another and carry personal followings with them or when caste or religious considerations are important. In a one-party dominant system, opposition parties are more often interest articulators than aggregators and represent specific interests which are usually more strongly opposed to the interests of other opposition parties than they

are to a broad umbrella grouping like the Congress.[17]

The BKD's presence on the ballot affected all of the established contestants. The larger the BKD vote, the greater the decline in support for every other party and for independent candidates as well. This is shown in Table III:5. The minor parties and independents were twice as affected by the BKD's arrival on the scene as were Congress, the Jana Sangh, SSP, and the Communists. As the table indicates, every 1% increase in the support received by the BKD resulted in a .4% decline in the vote for the lesser parties and independents, as against a .2% decline for the leading parties. Congress and the Jana Sangh were impacted quite evenly. Neither was especially hurt by the BKD so far as the size of their vote is concerned. The SSP and the Communists suffered slightly less than Congress and the Jana Sangh. On the whole, the BKD had a rather uniform impact on these several major parties, extracting support quite equitably from them all.

TABLE III:5

The Impact of the BKD on the Established Parties (and Independents) in Uttar Pradesh (1969)

For every 1% larger the BKD vote in 1969, the opponent shown suffered a decline in support from 1967 by the amount B. (N—the 402 constituencies contested by the BKD in 1969.)

Independent Variable	Effect On Vote Change 1967-1969	B	R^2
BKD vote, 1969	Minor parties & Independents	.407	.11
	Congress	.229	.07
	Jana Sangh	.202	.08
	SSP & CP's	.162	.05
		1.000*	

* Every percent vote received by the BKD had to come from another party's previous support. Because all parties (and independents) have been taken into account, the values of B total (minus) 1.0.

NOTE: Each value of B and each R^2 are significant at the .05 level of confidence.

Another measure of the effect of the BKD on the two major parties is to compare the 1967 and 1969 results in constituencies contested in both elections, both with and without BKD competition. The measure is, perhaps, weakened by the small number of cases in which established parties did not meet the BKD in 1969. The Jana Sangh contested 378

[17] In this regard see, for example, the comments in Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 429-430.

seats in both elections. Of these the party registered a decline in its share of the vote in 242 constituencies (64%) and increased its share in only 136 (36%). In 1969 the BKD contested all but 20 of these constituencies (in which the Jana Sangh vote increased in ten and decreased in ten). In the 358 constituencies where the BKD competed with the Jana Sangh, the Jana Sangh vote declined in 232 (65%) and increased in 126 (35%). The slight difference between the two sets of constituencies leads to the belief that the Jana Sangh was fated to lose votes in 1969, BKD or no BKD.

The picture when BKD competition with Congress is studied is not entirely dissimilar, although a moderately stronger case could be made that the presence of a BKD candidate impeded what otherwise would have been a somewhat stronger Congress showing. The Congress contested 424 seats in both elections. Of these the BKD contested 401 and omitted 23. Overall the Congress recorded gains in 239 (56%). With the BKD as a competitor the constituencies in which gains were made number 222 (55%). When the BKD was not contesting, the gains were 17 in the 23 seats (74%).

While the above may indicate that the BKD did not greatly affect the performance of either the Congress or the Jana Sangh, it does not provide an indication of the BKD's sources of strength. It is necessary to look at a third category of voters, those who in 1967 supported the smaller parties and independents. Neither the lesser parties nor the independents can be assumed to have institutionalized support, and it seems likely that it is here that the BKD gathered together those who were unhappy with the Congress but equally disenchanted with the Jana Sangh. The wide dispersion of candidates from this group—the SSP with 258 candidates was the most active party—requires that a level of analysis higher than the constituency be used.

Figure III:3 shows the percentage of votes received by the Congress and Jana Sangh in 1962, 1967, and 1969 and by the BKD in 1969 both for the entire state and by broadly defined regions.[18] In the figure the BKD vote is plotted midway between the Congress and Jana Sangh vote so that a measure can be obtained of the BKD's filling of the gap. In each of the three elections more than half of the voters in the state supported one of the two major parties. This was also true in four of the six regions. Only in the central region in 1962 and in the western region in all three elections did the Congress and Jana Sangh together fail to obtain half of the total vote. It is in the western region that the conglomeration of lesser

[18] The regions analyzed in this study are depicted in Figure III:1. The Hills region includes Uttarkhand and Kumaon revenue divisions plus Dehra Dun District; Rohilkhand, the revenue division of Ratnani; Oudh (or Avadh), the revenue divisions of Lucknow and Faizabad; the East, the revenue divisions of Gorakhpur and Varanasi; the Central, the revenue divisions of Allahabad and Jhansi; and the West, the revenue divisions of Agra and Meerut minus Dehra Dun District.



Figure III – 1
CONGRESS, JANA SANGH, AND BKD VOTING STRENGTH BY REGIONS
1962, 1967, and 1969

parties and independents was most ready to be consolidated in 1969, as the BKD outpolled both major parties. If the 1962 and 1969 elections are compared, it can be seen that the Congress decline was evident in the state and in all but two regions, Oudh (Avadh) and Rohilkhand, while the Jana Sangh increase was displayed in the state and in all but the same two regions. It can also be seen that the BKD did poorest in one of these regions, Oudh (excluding the sparsely populated Hills); but the other, Rohilkhand, was its second strongest region. In sum, the BKD appears to have drawn votes most extensively from the non-major party area. Its votes in 1969 comprised nearly half (45%) of those not polled for the Jana Sangh or the Congress.

Owing to their importance for the Jana Sangh and BKD, respectively, two of the regions, Oudh and the West, would be worthy of closer consideration were space available. Oudh, an area in which larger landlords (zamindars) once flourished and in which strong traditional loyalties were developed, had been the heartland of the Jana Sangh's strength in U. P.[19] This was especially true of Gonda, Bahraich, Kheri, Sitapur, and Hardoi districts and beyond into the Rohilkhand districts of Shahjahanpur and Bareilly. As mentioned earlier, the Jana Sangh suffered a sharp loss of seats in Oudh and, as can be seen from Figure III:3, the party fell below its 1962 level in terms of votes polled. Several reasons may be suggested for this change, each of which bears closer investigation. In general, it would appear that the Jana Sangh has not been able to develop strong public association with the party, while the hold of traditional leaders may be declining as the zamindari abolition programmes have taken effect.[20]

The western area saw the BKD outpoll all other parties and win 39 of the 83 seats in the region. Throughout much of this region the agricultural castes, principally the Jats, dominate, and Charan Singh is the principal "political" Jat. Allied with the Jats are other important rural castes, including the Ahirs and the Gujars. Moreover, as Brass details, alliances have also been made with urban and non-peasant proprietor castes as well.[21] Of the six regions in the state, agricultural development has been highest in the west. Demands on the system are articulated with

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[19] For the historical background of Oudh see Thomas R. Metcalf, *The Aftermath of Revolt: India 1857-1870* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964); and his "Landlords Without Land: The U. P. Zamindars Today," *Pacific Affairs*, Spring and Summer 1967 (Vol. 40, Nos. 1-2), pp. 5-18.

[20] I have discussed the importance of Oudh in earlier elections in my *The Jana Sangh*, *op. cit.*, p. 101, pp. 162-163, pp. 220-221, and pp. 275-280. For a discussion of the party's weaknesses, see Singh, *op. cit.*

[21] Brass, *op. cit.*, pp. 137-166. A careful study of the political organization and capability of the Jats is M. C. Pradhan, *The Political System of the Jats of Northern India* (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1966). The politics of agricultural castes and their factionalism are excellently detailed in Robert George Schwab, "Social Stratification and Political Power:

some precision, and lethargic indecision in Lucknow can result in defeat for the ruling party. It would seem that here and in neighboring Rohilkhand the BKD (or something like it) may have a more durable impact on voting in U. P. Rohilkhand also serves as the area of principal overlap between the BKD and the Jana Sangh, in that two of the five districts in the state in which each party polled more than 20% of the vote in 1969 are in Rohilkhand (Pilibhit and Budaun) and one just to the south (Etah).

Another level intermediate between the region and the constituency which can be used is the district, of which there are 54 in the state.[22] Vote gains and losses by parties at the district level are presented in Table III:6, which also contains an analysis of the party recording the largest gain in support cross-tabulated with the party (or group of independents) suffering the greatest loss.

The district record on largest losers between 1967 and 1969 shows that, among parties, the Jana Sangh led in this category with nine districts in which its vote declined more than anyone else's; Swatantra had eight, the PSP five, Congress and the SSP three each, and independents 26. On the other hand, the BKD was the largest gainer in 43 of the 54 districts, the Congress in six, the Jana Sangh in three, and the CPI and SSP in one each. Closer analysis of the districts according to which party was the largest gainer shows hat the BKD took seven of its 43 at the expense of the Jana Sangh, four each from the PSP and Swatantra, three from the SSP, two from Congress, and 23—more than half—from the independent cluster. The district figures also bear out the almost complete annihilation of the PSP and Swatantra as effective parties in the state, much of this at the hands of the BKD.

In a tabulation of districts in which the parties gained or lost in their share of the vote—as opposed to being largest gainer or loser—several points can be noted beyond the obvious statement that the BKD gained in each of the 52 districts in which it competed[23] An increase in the number

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A Study of Party Factionalism in Haryana," Ph.D. dissertation, McGill University, 1973. Although dealing with Haryana, Schwab's analysis contains much of interest to students of the neighboring U. P. area.

[22] Space does not permit the detailing of district accumulations. For 1967 see my *District Voting Trends in India* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969). This work, a statistical handbook of district election returns from 1952 through 1969, was prepared prior to the publication of the official 1969 report of the Election Commission, and the material on the 1969 poll was taken from press reports. The official report identifies a greater number of minor party candidates and, for the first time, contains district accumulations. It should be used for 1969.

[23] The BKD did not contest in Uttar Kashi or Dehra Dun districts.

of recorded parties coupled with a decrease in the number of candidates was one contributor to the decline in the independent vote, which is noted in all but three districts. It seems clear, nonetheless, that much of the vote lost by independents, if not most, went to the BKD. The Congress increased its vote in 14 more districts than it declined in keeping with its marginally better performance in 1969. The CPI also registered a slight positive record on balance. Jana Sangh declined in 28 more districts than it advanced, and the SSP in 21 more. The sharp decline in the prospects of Swatantra,

TABLE III:6

District-Level Changes in the Popular Vote, by Party: Uttar Pradesh (1967-1969)

Party	The Number of Districts in which the Party at Left		
	Gained	Lost	Difference
CON	34	20	+14
JS	13	41	−28
SSP	15	36	−21
PSP	10	34	−24
SWA	1	39	−38
RPI	23	25	− 2
CPI	26	26	+ 3
CPM	54	22	−18
BKD	52	0	+52
Minor Parties	52	0	+52
IND	3	51	−48

When Party Below was the Largest Gainer	The Largest Loser Was:
CON (6)	SWA − 3
	IND − 2
	JS − 1
BKD (43)	JS − 7
	PSP − 4
	CON − 2
	SWA − 4
	SSP − 3
	IND − 23
JS (3)	SWA − 1
	CON − 1
	PSP − 1
SSP (1)	IND − 1
CPI (1)	JS − 1

the PSP, and CPM were highlighted in the net decreases recorded by those parties. It seems that the BKD garnered some of this vote both by absorbing candidates using Swatantra and PSP labels in 1967 and by appealing in some degree to the rural clientele of both parties. The thoroughly disorganized RPI about held its own, although in the only two districts in which it was the largest loser the BKD was the largest winner.

What do the foregoing analyses tell us about the sources of BKD strength and the effect of that party on the performance of the Congress and the Jana Sangh? In looking at changes in seats we noted that there was a pattern of double shifts in which the predominant trend was from the Jana Sangh to Congress and from Congress to the BKD. We have also seen that the presence or absence of BKD competition had no significant effect on the share of the votes received by the two major parties in the constituencies, i.e., the Congress was advancing and the Jana Sangh retreating in 1969. The critical source of strength for the BKD was its success in consolidating the minor party and independent vote, although it undoubtedly drew some votes from the Congress and the Jana Sangh. The consolidation of non-major party votes, while far from complete, permitted the BKD to displace the Congress from first place 57 times and the Jana Sangh from second place 58 times. The BKD also picked up ten seats from the Jana Sangh and 19 second places from the Congress. In short, the BKD turned a two-horse into a three-horse race—but it added to the advantage of the frontrunner and displaced the second-place holder by a small margin, while pushing all other contestants so far back that it is doubtful if they will be seriously heard from again.

4. Postscript: The 1971 Lok Sabha Elections

In order to maintain strength, parties must institutionalize their followings to a considerable degree. They must build a core of loyal supporters who will serve as a base which can be expanded by campaigning among the uncommitted vote and, to the extent possible, among the presumed core of other parties. In strong two-party systems the competing parties concentrate their major efforts on the "swing vote," but to do so they must be assured of a measurable base. In U. P. no party is highly institutionalized. The Congress in the post-split period comes closest but falls far short of the mark, say, of the Conservative and Labour parties in Great Britain. The Jana Sangh has a strong cadre of workers drawn from the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh but has not been able to secure a firm base. The 1971 Lok Sabha election provides an opportunity to look at the institutionalization of the BKD and at the same time to see to what extent the Congress could improve on its 1969 gains and the Jana Sangh could show resilience from its 1969 losses. The results of the 1967 and 1971 parliamentary polls

are given in Table III:7.

TABLE III:7

Election Results for the Lok Sabha: Uttar Pradesh (1967 and 1971)

1967				Party	1971		
CONT	WON	LD	Votes		CONT	WON	Votes
85	47	2	35.0	Congress (Ruling-1969)	78	73	48.6
				Congress (Organization)	54	1	8.6
77	12	22	22.6	Jana Sangh	37	4	12.3
43	8	19	10.3	Samyukta Socialist	25	0	3.7
17	5	9	3.7	Communist	9	4	4.1
27	2	19	3.7	Praja Socialist	7	0	0.2
38	1	32	4.8	Swatantra	3	0	0.0
24	1	18	4.1	Republican		(with IND)	
6	1	5	0.7	Communist (Marxist)	3	0	0.2
				Bharatiya Kranti Dal	67	1	12.7
	(with IND)			Other Parties		(with IND)	
190	8	170	17.1	Independents	170	2	9.6
507	85	296			443	85	

The BKD decided to "go it alone" in the election. It had been in consultation with the three other parties which were eventually to form a triple alliance, the Jana Sangh, the SSP, and the Organization Congress but decided not to join that grouping. It also held talks concerning what was to become an alliance between the Ruling Congress and the CPI. As things turned out, it is conceivable that the latter alliance might have gained the BKD more than the one seat it won, although in pre-election guessing the triple alliance alternative seemed more attractive. The indecision was typical of the period for the BKD, which had led a ministry with Ruling Congress support and then had supported another led by the Organization Congress (ORG) which was also supported by the Jana Sangh and SSP.

One method of analysis is to look at the relative party strength in the five assembly seats comprising the parliamentary constituency and compare this result with the Lok Sabha results. In the 1967 election 59 of the 85 parliamentary seats were won by the same party winning a cumulative plurality in the underlying assembly seats. Eight of the "misses" were Lok Sabha seats won by independents who presumably ran without supporting candidates in the assembly constituencies. Table III:8 summarizes these data.

It would be suspected that a delay of two years between the assembly

TABLE III:8

The Relationship between Performance in Assembly Elections (1967 and 1969) and Performance in the Parliamentary Elections of 1971: Uttar Pradesh

"Winner"* Assembly Seats	Place in Lok Sabha Poll				Winners of Seats										
	0	1	2	3+	CON	JS	CPI	RPI	CPM	PSP	SWA	SSP	BKD	ORG	IND
1967 Data															
CON (65)	–	45	20	–	45	2	4	1	1	1	1	5			6
JS (14)	–	10	2	2	1	10	1			1					1
SSP (4)	–	3	1	–	1							3			
SWA (1)	–	1	–	–							1				
RPI (1)	–	–	1	–											1
Total (85)	–	59	24	2	47	12	5	1	1	2	1	8			8
1969-1971 Data															
CON (64)	4	57	3	–	57	2	2							1	2
BKD (13)	1	1	8	3	10		2						1		
JS (5)	–	2	3	–	3	2									
SSP (3)	–	–	2	1	3										
Total (85)	5	60	16	4	73	4	4						1	1	2

* The "Winner" referred to is the party which had the greatest support in the five assembly constituencies comprising each parliamentary constituency.

election and the Lok Sabha poll, coupled with the complications for analysis of two competing alliances (one containing a party—the Organization Congress—which did not exist in 1969), would weaken the correlation; but in 1971 a total of 60 seats were won by the party gaining a 1969 plurality in the underlying assembly seats. It was, however, very much the strength of the Congress which kept the correlation high. It "retained" 57 of the 64 pluralities it held, yielding two to the CPI under its alliance with that party. The Jana Sangh retained only two of its five pluralities and the SSP none of its three. The BKD, however, had achieved pluralities in 13 parliamentary units in 1969 but won only one seat in 1971. Clearly its vote had dwindled and returned to the Congress, which picked up ten of the 12 parliamentary constituencies "lost" by the BKD, while its CPI ally took the other two. Most crushing of all was the defeat of Charan Singh, who polled only 37% of the vote in Baghpat. In 1969 the BKD not only had a plurality but a majority in that constituency's assembly seats.

Overall the BKD contested only 67 of the 85 seats in 1971, although it had had some record in each in the 1969 poll. It increased its share of the vote in only 15 constituencies, while its vote dropped in 52. Its lone success was an incumbent who had been elected in 1967 as an in-

dependent. Also cast aside with Charan Singh was Prakash Vir Shastri, the leader of the BKD group in the Lok Sabha.

It is possible to suggest some reasons for the decline of the BKD. Not the least was the absence of an assembly campaign with its array of supporting candidates, a factor perhaps more important to a rural-based party like the BKD than to the Congress, which straddles both urban and rural areas. The appeal of Mrs. Gandhi, though clearly national, was particularly germane to U. P., her home state. She, like her father, was a familiar face whereas the leaders of the BKD, such as Charan Singh, had a strictly localized impact and, at best, a mediocre post-1969 record on which to run. To a discerning voter the national appeal of the Congress presumably would be of greater importance than the local appeal of the BKD, a party which on national issues differed little from the Congress. Perhaps had assembly elections been held alone, as they were in 1969, the same voter would prefer the BKD; but on national issues Indira Gandhi, not Charan Singh, represented stability and progress.

The performance of the BKD since 1969 gave little to support renewed confidence in the party. It had waffled between the Ruling Congress and the Opposition Congress-Jana Sangh-SSP combine. In its second ministry it did little to mark it as a party of progressive enlightenment in U. P. It had suffered numerous defections. Little seems to have been done to improve its organizational capacity other than taking over Congress groups in some areas. Losses in the national election do not necessarily mean a decline in future state elections, but it would be hard to conclude that the Lok Sabha poll was anything but a major setback for the BKD.

The rout of the opposition nationally applied to other parties in U. P. as well. The Jana Sangh tumbled from 12 parliamentary seats in 1967 to four in 1971; and its parliamentary leader, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, left U. P. for the shelter of the Gwalior seat in Madhya Pradesh. The SSP was eliminated, losing all its former eight seats. Party leaders Ram Sevak Yadav, seemingly unbeatable in Bara Banki, and Raj Narayan Singh were defeated, the latter in a hopeless effort against Mrs. Gandhi. The Opposition Congress won a single seat.

These three parties put together the triple alliance with high hopes of securing a majority of the parliamentary seats in U. P. and elsewhere and of being able to form a Government at the center. Seldom have hopes been so unfounded. In only 62 of U. P.'s 85 seats were the parties actually able to agree on a single candidate; in the other 23 two or more candidates of the alliance were on the ballot. The basic premise of the agreement was that both the Jana Sangh and the SSP would, at a minimum, hold their 1967 votes and that the Opposition Congress would then add the 1967 Congress vote (or a major share of it), making the combination unbeatable almost everywere. The facts are somewhat otherwise. In 34 of the 62

constituencies where a single candidate was agreed on, the alliance polled *less* than the combined Jana Sangh-SSP vote in 1967, indicating that the Organization Congress had a negative rather than a positive effect.

It is doubtful, however, that any force could have stopped the march of Mrs. Gandhi and the Ruling Congress to victory in the atmosphere then prevailing in the country. It seems more likely that the Ruling Congress need not have been so generous to the CPI, which won four seats, or to the independents it supported, who won two seats.

The BKD arrived on the scene in a successful move to unseat Gupta and the Congress and went on to its first election campaign to achieve more than moderate success by becoming the second party in India's largest state. The 1971 parliamentary poll throttled the success story, but it is too soon to say that it had been choked. The BKD represents an important rural force of peasant proprietors—especially in the western parts of the state—which is not likely in the near future to reconcile itself to upper-caste dominated parties like the Congress and the Jana Sangh. This force will continue to have importance in U. P. politics, perhaps increasing as the Green Revolution continues, and it will be heard whether as a separate party or as a faction within the Congress.

(Continued from front flap)

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