

PART THREE

Caste, Caste Alliances, and Hierarchy of Values in Aligarh District*

Discussion of problems of national integration and political development by both scholars and political leaders in India and in other newly independent states in the 1950s and early 1960s often stressed the presumed obstacles to national unity, political stability, and effective government posed by the existence of diverse social, cultural, religious, and linguistic groups. A related concern in the literature of that time emphasized the difficulties of instilling in the populations of a multiplicity of far-flung local communities a sense of loyalty to the institutions and procedures of the modern state. The attitudes of political leaders and scholars who wrote about these issues at that time tended to be hostile both to the political expressions of ethnic diversities and to the "parochialism" of local societies, both of which were seen as inimical to the prospects of the new states to maintain order and/or to achieve their desired goals. The political expressions of cultural diversity seemed to raise the fundamental problem of finding a basis upon which different and sometimes traditionally hostile social groups could live together in the same society and participate in the same political process without physical violence or threats of secession. The existence of a multiplicity of local communities accustomed to treating outside agencies with distrust seemed to raise another basic problem of establishing the legitimacy of the state institutions that were now in the hands of leaders of the independence movements, who promised to use them to build a new social and economic order with the participation of the ordinary people. Such

participation was to be brought about through elections and institutions of local self-government.¹

Political parties and elections were seen as critical to the outcome of both these processes of integration and state-building. They were seen as performing potentially integrative and disintegrative functions in the newly independent states. In some countries, of which India was the prototype, the governing parties had developed out of broadly based nationalist movements and had developed ways of either accommodating or transcending the differences among diverse social, cultural, and economic groups. However, it was also obvious, especially in India, that failure to resolve such differences could have catastrophic consequences. Moreover, it also was clear that political parties and elections could be used to exacerbate such differences as well as to resolve or transcend them. It was feared everywhere in the new states and especially in India that the very achievement of the goal of Independence and the consequent loss of that unifying appeal, combined with the extension of the franchise, would lead to the proliferation of political parties based on particular tribes or regions or language groups. Such parties were perceived by the dominant leaders of the ruling parties as threats to their own power and were condemned as threats also to the political unity of their countries. It was feared that, even at the local level, elections could precipitate violent social conflicts by sharpening existing social antagonisms when traditionally hostile social groups supported different candidates or when the candidates themselves appealed to such antagonisms to mobilize support. In India, sections of the electoral laws, that is, the Representation of the People Act, specifically outlawed such appeals, making their use by a successful candidate grounds for overturning the result. Such laws reflected the fears of the political leaders and revealed as well their true perception of their own societies, namely, as deeply divided by potentially violent cultural antagonisms that could be ignited easily by unscrupulous politicians manipulating elections to achieve political power for themselves. They feared the consequences of such antagonisms locally and nationally. Locally, they could precipitate violence. Nationally, they could precipitate violence and secessionist demands as well. The proper role of the nationalist politician in such situations was seen as one of eschewing any references

to cultural and ethnic differences, emphasizing those aspects of the cultures of the country that were common to different groups, and urging the voters to focus their political thinking on the economic development of the country, on their own social and economic well-being, and on which parties would best promote those desired goals.

Political parties and elections were seen as critical also in resolving or exacerbating the problem of overcoming the parochialisms of diverse social groups in the local communities and of building new loyalties to the larger society and to modern political processes. In fact, the legitimacy of the new institutions was seen as largely depending on the legitimacy of the parties themselves.² To the extent that the activities of the parties and party politicians were diverted toward "educating the voter and building up an association which transcends parochial loyalties,"³ they were contributing to the legitimacy of the entire political system. To the extent that the parties and the politicians did not perform these functions of education and broadening of associations, but rather were tied to parochial groups or were simply corrupt, they undermined the legitimacy of the entire system in which they operated.⁴ Political loyalties were also seen as affected by the kinds of issues raised in elections. Elections might focus on issues that transcend parochial loyalties—on issues of modernization and economic development—or they might focus directly on parochial issues and local social antagonisms.

Clearly, in this manner of framing the issues of national integration, political development, and legitimacy, which was prevalent in the 1950s and 1960s, there were pronounced tendencies towards dichotomization between the presumed goals and attitudes of the national leaders of the country and the natural tendencies of local politicians and the people themselves, between the desired goal of unity and the feared disintegrative consequences of diversity, between the long-term interests of the "nation" and the short-term needs of local communities. It was assumed, in effect, that the natural inclination of the people was towards inter-group hostility and the pursuit of local interest, that the natural tendency of local politicians was to exploit and manipulate both, and that the duty of national

leaders of these countries was to provide example and direction to guide people towards higher national goals.

At the same time, however, the same national leaders were committed to the enfranchisement of the entire adult population and to the introduction at the local level of institutions of self-government. By the early 1960s, in many states in India including U.P. such institutions had already been created at the local level. They included local village committees or *gaon sabhas*, block development committees or *kshetra samitis* for groups of approximately 100 villages, and district boards (*zila parishads*). It was felt then that these institutions were desirable not only because they would promote local self-government and local participation in national development activities, but because they would also serve as avenues for the recruitment of rural leaders into the political process and ultimately into state legislative assemblies and even into parliament. Although these institutions have since had a rather chequered history, they had been introduced in U.P. by 1962 when the research reported on in this paper was done. Moreover, the first elections had already been held for these local bodies.

In the course of my initial research in Aligarh district in 1962, which had been the year of the Third General Elections and in which local elections also had been held for the *gaon sabhas*, *kshetra samitis*, and *zila parishads*, I had collected data by polling station from the District Election Office, Aligarh, for the legislative assembly and parliamentary constituencies. I had also by chance been given the results of the *pramukh* (president of the *kshetra samiti*) elections for one *kshetra samiti* (Jawan Sikandrapur) that fell within the boundaries of the Khair Legislative Assembly constituency. The material provided to me included the caste of each voter, the voters being the *pradhans* (presidents) of the *gaon sabhas*, the caste of each of nine candidates, and the vote by single transferable ballot of each *pradhan* for the several candidates for whom he had voted. This body of data in itself was a unique source of information that provided me with a basis for making a precise determination of the relationship between caste and voting behavior at the local level. During my field research in Aligarh district, I also visited six villages within Khair Legislative Assembly that were also within the Jawan Sikandrapur Block. I visited four of the villages before

the General Elections and two of them before and after the elections. Finally, also during the year 1962, I obtained a copy of the village caste census of 1891 for Aligarh district that gave the exact number of members of the largest caste in each village in the district. Altogether, therefore, I had collected an extraordinary body of data centered in one area on caste and elections at four levels of the political system : village, block, legislative assembly, and parliament.

At the time, the existing theoretical literature on political parties and elections in developing countries provided little of value that could be used to generate hypotheses relevant to this richly detailed data. On the one hand, there was the dichotomizing and extremely general literature on national integration and political development summarized above. On the other hand, through the efforts primarily of Myron Weiner, a number of case studies of individual legislative assembly and parliament constituencies had been done for the 1962 elections by Indian and American scholars.⁵ These studies, valuable as they were in providing the first careful analyses of electoral campaigns and voting behavior in particular constituencies in India, generated only rather narrow statements on the relationships among caste, faction, party, and other ties in determining individual and group voting behavior.

In searching for an appropriate framework into which to place my Aligarh data, two sources seemed to provide a more useful start, as well as a more specific start than the national integration/political development literature and a more general start than the constituency case study literature. The first source was the famous statement of Madison in the tenth *Federalist Paper*, in which he argued that a major advantage of a republican form of government over a democratic form was its size, a

circumstance . . . which renders factious combinations less to be dreaded in the former than in the latter. The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and

execute their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other.⁶

Madison was concerned in this statement about the problem of tyranny, but it occurred to me that some more general statements might be developed from this quotation about the probable relationships between size and diversity, which could be used as hypotheses to apply to the analysis of the politics of diversity. Thus, one might argue in a similar manner that the strength of parochial social groups and their ability to dominate over other groups will decrease as the size of the constituency in which they operate is increased.⁷ Consequently, majorities in large constituencies will be formed only in one of two ways, either by complex political coalitions or by a broadening of the appeals and issues to transcend parochial loyalties and enlarge them. The converse statements should also be true. That is, the smaller the constituency the greater the strength of parochial forces and the less the need for political coalitions or broadening appeals.

The second source was an article on problems of Indian unity by M.N. Srinivas, in which it was argued that loyalties to "caste, village, region, state and religion . . . represent a hierarchy of values and . . . are not necessarily inconsistent with being a citizen of the Indian Republic." Srinivas continued as follows.

A man stands up for his village in relation to other neighbouring villages, his *taluka* in relation to other *talukas*, and so on. Similarly he is a member of a caste in relation to other castes and a Hindu in relation to non-Hindus. He is also an Indian in relation to non-Indians . . . Tensions and conflicts at a particular level maintain the identity and separateness of groups of the same order but these groups can and do unite at a higher level.⁸

Whereas Madison's propositions refer to the political consequences of social diversity in large and small units, Srinivas' statement concerning "hierarchy of values" refers specifically to the issue of identity at different levels and argues that identities are broadened in India at each higher level. Although Srinivas was making a specific statement here concerning the availability of a multiplicity of loyalties at different levels in India, the phenomenon of "nested" loyalties, of identities at a lower level being nested within broader loyalties at higher levels, has been observed elsewhere as well.⁹ The implications of Srinivas' argument are that, logically, one would expect narrower loyalties and social antagonisms to manifest themselves in local constituencies and broader loyalties and conflicts to appear in the larger constituencies. It should be noted, however, that, whereas Madison and the early political development literature presented dichotomous categories, "nation" and locality, large unit and small, Srinivas was arguing that there was no such "gap," but that the space between the nation and the locality was filled with a range of available identities and loyalties and that individuals could be expected to move up or down, toward broader or narrower identifications, depending on the political context.

What are the logical alternatives to this kind of reasoning? One would be that each individual has a single primary or terminal loyalty that he uses to structure his behavior at each level. If he is a nationalist oriented primarily to the Indian nation as a whole, his standard of judgment and action will be the good of the country whatever the context, implying a willingness to sacrifice local advantage and immediate benefits for the sake of either a larger future advantage for the whole country or for the sake of a greater need that exists elsewhere in the country. If the individual's primary loyalty is to his caste or village or language group, then the expectation concerning his political behavior, by this reasoning, would be that he would see the external larger units and constituencies as simply potential resources to be exploited and manipulated for local and group advantage. A second possibility is that parochial social groups may simply form political coalitions with other such groups in larger constituencies and hence project, by pyramiding, local loyalties and local antagonisms into higher levels of the political

process. In other words, there would be some broadening at the base, but it would not be a broadening of loyalties, merely the formation of alliances with other local groups for mutual convenience and advantage. The Srinivas notion of hierarchy of values implies the broadening of loyalties upward in an inverted pyramid, whereas the alternative might be a true pyramid, but one with loose and movable blocks at the base.

Aligarh district in 1962 provided sufficient social diversity and social antagonism to make it an especially important site to analyze the issues raised above. The town of Aligarh, in which the Aligarh Muslim University is located, was part of the parliamentary constituency to be discussed below. Aligarh town was in 1962, as it was before and has remained since, a site of intense hostility between Hindus and Muslims that periodically flared into the physical violence of communal riots and killings. One of the more severe of such riots had occurred in October, 1961, only three months before the General Election. Aligarh district has also been influenced to some extent by the Arya Samaj, an historic movement to broaden Hindu loyalties and overcome local caste affiliations that has had its greatest strength in the neighboring districts of Haryana and Punjab. There has also been a long history of attempts by the low caste Chamars in this district to improve their social status and economic well-being, which had reached a point of maximal political expression in the 1962 elections. Finally, Aligarh district, like other districts in the Gangetic plain, contains a great variety of Hindu and Muslim castes and clans.

The purpose of this paper was to make use of the extraordinarily rich data on caste and elections that I had obtained in 1962 to analyze, in this diverse and socially tense district, the issues of identity and loyalty raised above. Specifically, I attempted to use these data to determine whether individual citizens in India manifested politically only one primary identity and loyalty to only one group or whether they made use in politics of multiple layers of identification and loyalty as described by Srinivas. Did the political process and the appeals of political leaders for votes serve to broaden loyalties, especially at the higher levels and in the larger constituencies, and educate the voters to make their political decisions with reference to issues that were raised publicly by state and national leaders?

Or did the voters simply project and pyramid their local, primary loyalties upward, manipulating and exploiting for local advantage opportunities made available by the extension of the franchise and the availability of new resources to be extracted from politicians seeking office in the state and national legislature?

In exploring these questions below, the focus is upon four kinds of units within the Aligarh parliamentary constituency (which covers half the district): the parliamentary constituency itself; one of the component Assembly constituencies; a community development block within the Assembly constituency; and three polling stations, comprising six villages, within the above constituencies. Three kinds of data are used in the analysis of elections and voting behavior in these constituencies: comparisons of old census data on caste with current election results, actual recorded voting behavior by caste of individuals, and personal interviews with candidates, political workers, and village leaders.

I. Social Groups: Caste and Community in Aligarh District

The population of the various caste and community groups of Aligarh district must be estimated from a variety of different sources, compiled at different times. Current census volumes for Uttar Pradesh enumerate only religious groups and Scheduled Castes. According to the 1961 census figures, 88 per cent of the population of 1.8 million was Hindu and 12 per cent was Muslim.¹⁰ Scheduled Castes comprised 21 per cent of the population of the district, among whom Chamars or Jatavs were by far the largest category, with 65.5 per cent of the total.¹¹ A very large proportion of the Muslim population of the district (37 per cent) was concentrated in the towns, considerably more proportionately than the total urban population of the district (19 per cent).¹²

There is a great diversity of both Hindu and Muslim castes in Aligarh district. The Aligarh gazetteer noted that there were 64 Hindu castes and 62 Muslim castes in the district, not counting "subdivisions" ("clans" and "sub-castes"). Most of these castes, however, had few members. Ninety per cent of the Hindu population of the district was drawn from 18 castes;

the situation was similar among Muslims.¹³

The groupings referred to in the old U.P. gazetteers as Hindu and Muslim "castes" were really caste categories rather than the local endogamous groups or *jatis*. The gazetteer also recognized some groupings within caste categories as particularly important such as Rajput clans, for which they used the term "sub-divisions." The sub-divisions also were not necessarily endogamous *jatis*, though some of them might be. For the most part, the discussion of caste and politics in this paper will refer to these major caste categories and "clans," which turned out also to be the most relevant units politically at the levels analyzed below. The gazetteers also referred to various Muslim "castes," which some scholars and many Muslims consider to be an inappropriate way of sub-dividing the Muslim population. It is not necessary, however, to take up this issue here because the question of Muslim "sub-divisions" did not appear to be relevant politically in the contexts discussed below. I have, however, retained in the tables, where relevant, the categories, including Muslim castes, used in the Aligarh gazetteer.

Table 1 lists the larger Hindu castes (caste categories) of Aligarh district, as well as the major (former) proprietary castes and most important cultivating castes of the district of both religious communities. A comparison of the three columns in the table provides information about the past and present socio-economic structure in Aligarh district. The former proprietary castes are those castes which owned the land before the abolition of *zamindari*. The cultivating castes are those castes whose members actually tilled the land and have now, for the most part, become the actual owners of their land. Hence, the middle column lists the castes which were economically dominant before the Zamindari Abolition Act of 1952 and the last column lists the castes which are now the economically dominant castes in the district.

It is immediately apparent from the table that Brahmans, Rajputs, and Jats are the "dominant castes" in the district, that is, they are among the largest caste categories in the district and they owned in the past and are still the owners and cultivators of most of the land. It is also clear that *zamindari* abolition has reduced the rural importance of those castes whose members owned, but did not cultivate, land in the district—Baniyas,

TABLE 1
Caste and Community in Aligarh District

Numerical Rank Caste	Percent ^a	Proprietary Castes Caste	Percent ^b	Cultivating Castes Caste	Percent ^c
1. Chamars	21.6	Rajputs	24.3	Brahmans	20.2
2. Brahmans	12.7	Jats	20.0	Rajputs	18.2
3. Jats	10.4	Brahmans	14.4	Jats	16.9
4. Rajputs	8.8	Banias	13.1	Chamars	9.8
5. Banias	4.4	Pathans ^d	11.7	Lodhas	6.0
6. Lodhas	3.9	Muslim Rajputs ^d	5.1	Ahirs	5.4
7. Gadarias	3.5	Kayasthas	3.4	Gadarias	3.9
Total	65.3		92.0		80.4

Source: *District Gazetteers of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh*, Vol. VI: *Aligarh*, by H.R. Nevill (Lucknow: Govt. Branch Press, 1926), chap. iii. For convenience, the data have been taken from the gazetteer only. The numerical ranking and the percentages in the first column cannot have changed much over time, although the 1931 census lists slightly more Rajputs than Jats. The percentages of land cultivated by each caste have certainly changed with time, so that these percentages should be taken as a rough guide only. The most recent figures on ownership and cultivation of land by caste in the district may be found in the *Final Settlement Report of the Aligarh District*, by S. Ahmad Ali (Allahabad: Superintendent, Printing and Stationery, 1943). Although the latter source was not available to me at the time of writing, my notes from it list Brahmans, Rajputs, and Jats in that order as the leading cultivating castes in the district at that settlement also.

^aOf Hindu population.

^bOf land in the district owned before *zamindari* abolition.

^cOf land cultivated.

^dMuslim castes.

Pathans, Muslim Rajputs, and Kayasthas. On the other hand, *zamindari* abolition freed some of the large cultivating, but previously non-owning castes, from the domination of the former proprietary castes and gave them full economic control over their lands. The main caste categories in the district which benefited in this way are the Chamars, the Lodhas, the Gadarias, and also the Ahirs.

All the major caste categories of the district were classified in the Aligarh gazetteer into numerous "sub-divisions," which have usually been important in terms of social relations and sometimes also politically. A "sub-division" may be sufficiently separate from the larger caste to which it has been assigned by past census takers as to constitute in fact a separate, local, endogamous caste. Among other castes, sub-divisions may be less important. Among Chamars, for example, members of the major "sub-division" of the caste in the past, the Jatwa or Jatav, often referred to Chamars as a distinct caste and resented being called Chamars themselves. However, as a consequence of the general process of social mobility that has been taking place within this large caste category, the distinction has been down-played politically and the term "Jatav" has now become the preferred name of most members of the caste as a whole. Among Rajputs and Jats, local sub-divisions are often important politically. The Rajput sub-divisions or "clans" are particularly important for this study. The largest clans in the district are, in order, the Jadons, the Chauhans, and the Pundirs.

The status of the major castes in the district is far from fixed either in the district as a whole or in the villages.¹⁴ Brahmans and most Rajput clans, are considered elite castes. Jats are sometimes considered elite castes because of their locally dominant position in several parts of the district, but are also often referred to as middle or "backward" castes, of lesser social status than Brahmans and Rajputs. Also, many of the low and middle castes claim higher status than those above them are willing to grant. The conflicts engendered by disputes over status, which in turn usually reflect economic differences, are of great political importance in Aligarh district.

Especially important in Aligarh politics are the demands of the Chamars or Jatavs for greater status and for more political power. Chamar demands are of long standing. Chamars occupy very low, although not the lowest, positions in village hierarchies. Traditionally leather workers, they are now the main laboring class in the district, both in the fields and in urban menial occupations. However, many Chamars are cultivating owners of usually small plots of land. The rise of the Chamar caste in status and in political and economic power may well rank as one of the great caste movements in the history of

Hindu social order. Even three quarters of a century ago, it was noted in the Aligarh gazetteer that the condition of the Chamars was much improved from their previous state. It was said then of the Chamars that "they form the bulk of the labouring population, and though they are now in fair circumstances and in a few instances have attained considerable prosperity, they were not long ago regarded as mere serfs, tied to particular holdings to such an extent that no partition was considered complete until the sharer had allotted to his share a number of Chamars in proportion to his interest in the estate."¹⁵

As Table 1 shows, the Chamars at the turn of the century comprised more than a fifth of the population, but cultivated less than a tenth of the land. Their situation then was quite the reverse of the principal proprietary castes whose percent share of the land cultivated was nearly double their proportion in the population of the district. If Chamars as a group have been less well off than the leading proprietary castes as groups, they have nevertheless been better off economically than other Scheduled Castes in the district. For example, 42 percent of rural Chamars in Aligarh district in 1961 were classified as cultivators compared to 64 per cent of the non-Scheduled Caste rural working population, but only 24 percent for other Scheduled Castes. On the other hand, 25 percent of rural Chamar workers were classified as agricultural laborers compared to 15 per cent for other Scheduled Castes, who were more dispersed in non-agricultural occupations, and 8 percent for the non-Scheduled-Caste population.¹⁶ On the whole, therefore, Chamars as a group have stood in an intermediate position economically in the rural areas in relation to the dominant proprietary castes above them and other Scheduled Castes, who have been less well placed on the land than they. At the same time, small Chamar cultivators and landless laborers also provided the largest bloc of discontented rural poor in the Aligarh countryside in 1962.

Jatav social and political organizations in Aligarh district have been traced back to 1928, when the Jatav Mahasabha was formed primarily to gain official "recognition of the term Jatav as the name of the caste group" instead of Chamar.^{16a} The Jatav Mahasabha also sought political representation for its leaders in local bodies in the district and the educational advancement and social welfare of caste members generally. In 1945, a unit of

the Scheduled Caste Federation (SCF) of India, founded by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, was established in Aligarh district, which drew its leadership and supporters from the Jatav Mahasabha. After the 1957 elections, the SCF in India and in Aligarh district was renamed the Republican Party of India. In Aligarh district, the change was associated with a change also in the leadership of the movement, which was captured by B.P. Maurya. Maurya contested the Aligarh Parliamentary constituency in 1957, a double-member constituency, in which he placed third. He contested again in 1962 and won the Aligarh Parliamentary seat, even though it had been converted into a single-member, non-reserved seat.

Chamars in Aligarh district have been involved in movements of social protest as well as political action, which generally have taken two main forms—"Sanskritization" or the attempt to raise their status within the Hindu social order by adopting the religious practices of higher castes¹⁷ and religious conversion. Religious conversion has been an important form for the expression of Chamar protest in Aligarh district. It is estimated that there are 10,000 Jatav-Christians in Aligarh district¹⁸ and there are also some Jatav-Sikhs, converted in the 1930s. Buddhism is now the preferred religion. A mass conversion of Jatavs to Buddhism took place at a public meeting in Aligarh district in 1957.¹⁹ A prominent Jatav leader has stated that "it is not religion, but it is hatred of the Scheduled Castes for Hindu culture, which makes them embrace Buddhism."²⁰

The movement of the Jatavs is by far the most widespread and the most important movement of social, economic, and political protest in Aligarh district. However, other castes also are attempting to raise their status, primarily within the Hindu social order and, in many cases, through emulation of the dominant Rajput castes and through the claims of such aspirant castes for Rajput status. Thus, the Lodhas prefer to be called Lodhi Rajputs and the Gadarias prefer the name Baghel Rajputs. These movements affect politics and political alignments in the district at various levels in important ways.

All the major social groups of Aligarh district are well represented in the Khair Assembly constituency, which will be discussed below. Exact figures are not available, but the largest castes in the constituency are Rajputs (primarily of the Jadon

clan, with some Chauhan, and a few Rathaur and Pundir), Chamars, Brahmans, Jats, and Lodhas. In most of the villages in this constituency, one or another of these castes is numerically the largest. There are perhaps twenty or thirty villages in which the largest groups are Muslims, Gadarias, Ahirs, or other castes.²¹ The constituency is overwhelmingly rural, being comprised of 222 villages and one small town (Khair, 1961 population: 8,867).

II. The 1962 General Elections: the Parties, the Candidates, the Issues, and the Voting

The Policies of the parties. Among the parties, the leading contenders in the Khair Legislative Assembly constituency and in the Khair segment of the Aligarh parliamentary constituency, which will be discussed in this paper, were the Congress, Swatantra, and the Republican Party. The runner-up for Parliament, though an Independent, was an active member of the Arya Samaj, an important Hindu religious reform movement that also has for long had clear political views and many of whose members have been politically active. Ideological and policy differences among these parties and groups were clear and sharp. The Congress in 1962 was still led and dominated by Nehru. In his own public speeches and in the party manifestoes, the emphasis was on planning and the inauguration of the Third Five Year Plan, on "the promotion of national unity and emotional integration of all our people," on secularism, and on combatting "any display of casteism and communalism" within the Congress or outside of it.²² One of the Congress pamphlets distributed nationally before the 1962 elections made clear the view of the national leadership towards the electorate and the role that the Congress claimed to be playing in elevating the minds of the people. It is worth quoting at length.

Community and caste considerations have . . . deep roots in the minds of the people, particularly at the lower levels. The widening of the franchise has, therefore, brought on the electoral rolls voters who are particularly prone to think on communal and caste lines.

The Congress is wedded to the creation of an egalitarian

and non-sectarian society where caste and communalism do not exist. But to implement this, it is necessary that the Congress should obtain the support of the people. Even in this, the Congress has tried to eliminate communal and caste considerations and has laid down various criteria for ensuring that the selection of candidates for elections is made on the basis of merit. It must, however, be confessed that the elections do produce an atmosphere of group hysteria where an appeal to caste and communal loyalties tends to find greater favour. But with the growing maturity of the electorate these narrow loyalties which dominate at the time of the elections will eventually disappear.

The charge that Congress has distributed seats on caste and communal considerations is unwarranted.²³

In its policy statements nationally and in legislation enacted in U.P., the Congress had also attempted to establish a clear position in relation to rural society and rural social classes. The *zamindari* system had been abolished in U.P., all intermediaries between the peasant cultivator and the state had been removed, and most cultivators including previous tenants had been given legal rights to the lands they cultivated. Land ceilings legislation had been passed, but the ceiling established in 1961 was a very generous 40 acres per person and even this limitation was not effectively implemented. Various schemes had been adopted to assist the cultivators, to improve village life, and to bring the rural population more directly into the political process, including such programs as consolidation of landholdings, community development and national extension, and "democratic decentralization." Very little technological help or effective extension was provided to the cultivators in U.P. in the 1950s beyond the construction of new irrigation works. However, in the year 1961, with the financial support of the Ford Foundation, the Government of India inaugurated a new program, the Intensive Agricultural District Program (IADP), designed to bring advanced technology and intensified agricultural extension to a small number of districts, originally eight, which were considered ready for a production breakthrough if provided adequate assistance. Aligarh was one of the original eight districts selected. The IADP program had

already been inaugurated in the district by the time of the Third General Election.

Although the Congress policies were clearly designed to benefit or at least not harm the vast majority of the cultivating peasantry, including big farmers, some doubts had been created in the 1950s and some ambiguities had arisen concerning Congress attitudes towards the peasantry. There were discontents over agricultural prices, over the scarcity of inputs and essential commodities, and over talk if not action about land ceilings and redistribution of land. Moreover, in 1958, the Congress at its annual session at Nagpur, passed a resolution favoring the adoption of joint cooperative farming as the long-term solution to the problems of land scarcity and low productivity in Indian agriculture. Although the Congress made clear that the program was to be non-compulsory and that no land was to be taken away from the cultivators and although nothing but the most derisory efforts have ever been made to implement it, the issue was taken up by Charan Singh within the Congress in U.P. and it was exploited nationally by the Swatantra party, formed in 1959.

Nationally, Swatantra was a non-communal party. Its manifestoes did not preach national and emotional integration as did those of the Congress. In fact, Swatantra publications generally took non-committal positions on questions of caste, community, religion, and language, which were treated as private affairs on which party men were free to take their own stands. The primary concern of Swatantra was to point out the deficiencies and dangers of Congress policies on planning, socialism, and agrarian structure and to offer alternatives. It criticized centralized and directed planning and proposed a more consultative form of planning with greater scope for private enterprise. It argued for a complete reorientation of plan priorities away from the primary emphasis on heavy industries in favor of agriculture and consumption-oriented industries. It explicitly opposed socialism and favored free enterprise. It opposed land ceilings, land redistribution, and any form of cooperative farming.

The Republican Party of India, whose leadership and members come overwhelmingly from a few large "untouchable" or Scheduled Castes, in U.P. principally the Chamars, took

positions that were quite different from those of Congress at the time and quite opposite to those of Swatantra. While it claimed to be non-dogmatic on issues of planning and socialism, its focus was on poverty and on the problems of the poor, the small landholders and the landless, and the "weaker sections" of the population generally. The party had no specific policies to offer concerning industry beyond a general demand to increase production. With regard to agriculture and land reform, however, the party manifesto was quite specific and proposed a radical land reform, involving not only co-operative farming but the establishment of a rural economy based on large-scale mechanized collective farms.²⁴

The primary emphasis of the Republican Party, however, was on improving the social status and economic well-being of the "weaker sections," defined as "the Scheduled Castes, the Buddhist converts from Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes and the other backward classes," constituting "more than 60 per cent of India's total population."²⁵ To improve the lot of these people, the party manifesto emphasized higher education to make it possible for persons from these groups to compete successfully for elite posts in the administration and continued reservation of a proportion of such posts for them. The manifesto also complained that the "weaker sections" had gained no benefits from the Five Year Plans, but it offered no specific programs to rectify the situation beyond higher education. Although Muslims and other minorities were not included among the "weaker sections," the R.P.I. said it "would most vigilantly safeguard the interest of minority communities in every sphere of life." The strongest remarks in the manifesto were directed against "casteism," which was described as "an evil" and a "cancer," that was "based on graded inequality which produces in society an ascending scale of hatred and a descending scale of contempt and thus... a source of perpetual conflict." The manifesto called for the annihilation of castes by the "reconstruction" of the whole society or, alternatively, for raising "the lower classes to the level of the higher classes in the matter of education and economic condition."²⁶

In Aligarh district, the Republican Party was overwhelmingly a party of the Chamars or Jatavs. Although B.P. Maurya attempted to broaden its appeal to "other scheduled caste

groups" and to landless labourers and poor peasants of all castes," the Republican Party in 1962 remained in fact "totally dependent upon the party's connections with the Jatav caste."^{29a} Maurya also appealed very specifically to the antagonisms of lower caste groups to upper castes, particularly Brahmans. Although the Republican Party was open to members of other castes, including Brahmans, the latter were treated with considerable suspicion. In 1962 in Aligarh district, the Republican Party candidate in Khair Legislative Assembly constituency was a Brahman, but he was not a full member of the party, only an associate member. After three years, it was said then, he could be considered for full membership. When asked why the Brahman was given only associate membership, a prominent leader of the party gave the following reply.

We doubt the integrity of a Brahman. . . Brahmans are the leading exploiters. The Muslims we give full membership. Muslims basically are not bad. However, Brahmans may come to exploit the party and take the secrets of the party. Then, suppose we say something against the Brahmans, say in an election campaign, then a Brahman party member may not like it.

Although the Jan Sangh did not poll significantly in the Khair Assembly contest and did not have a candidate for Parliament, Independent I, an active member of the Arya Samaj, was supported by the Jan Sangh in the Aligarh parliamentary constituency and stood forth as a spokesman for some of the same positions as those held by the Jan Sangh. The Arya Samaj is an organization of religious reform in the Hindu community, which also has had clear political views on "national integration." It has stood for unity of the Hindu community and unity of the country as well. It has favored the elimination of the federal system and the establishment of a unitary state, the adoption of Hindi as the sole official language of the country, and the combatting of both "parochial" attachments to any "particular part of India" and "extra-territorial" loyalties. The latter obviously referred primarily to Muslims allegedly attached by feelings of loyalty to Pakistan rather than India. The Arya Samaj was in favor of some special efforts to improve the con-

ditions of the "backward" sections of the population, but opposed any reservation of places for their members in administrative services.²⁷

In the 1962 election, therefore, the Congress in the Khair Assembly and Aligarh parliamentary constituency was confronted by three major ideological challenges to its social and economic policies. Swatantra attacked its economic policies, particularly towards agriculture, and attempted to appeal to the general body of independent peasant proprietors. The Republican Party attacked the Congress for failing to achieve any significant improvements in the condition of the poor and landless and attempted to appeal to this most numerous segment of the population. The Arya Samaj candidate, supported by the Jan Sangh, represented a movement critical of the Congress for permitting fissiparous and disintegrative tendencies in the country and attempted to appeal to the general body of Hindus, but particularly to those of elite castes, by its disavowal of policies designed to give preferential treatment to non-elite castes.

The Candidates. There were a total of eight candidates in the Assembly constituency (Table 2), representing the Congress, Swatantra, the Republican Party, the Jan Sangh, the Ram Rajya Parishad, and three independents. Five of the candidates were Brahmans, two were Rajputs of the Jadon clan, and one was a

TABLE 2

Results in Khair Assembly Constituency in Aligarh District,
1962 Election

<i>Candidate</i>	<i>Caste</i>	<i>Votes</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Swatantra	Rajput (Jadon)	22,076	40.9
Congress	Brahman	14,766	27.4
Republican	Brahman	10,341	19.2
Jan Sangh	Brahman	2,265	4.2
Independent 1	Brahman	1,675	3.1
Independent 2	Kahar	1,355	2.5
Independent 3	Rajput (Jadon)	1,171	2.2
Ram Rajya Parishad	Brahman	266	.5
		53,915	100.0

TABLE 3

Results in the Khair Segment of the Aligarh Parliamentary
Constituency in Aligarh District, 1962 Election

<i>Candidate</i>	<i>Caste</i>	<i>Votes</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Republican	Jatav	15,236	28.0
Independent 1	Rajput	15,039	27.7
Congress	Muslim	9,941	18.3
Swatantra	Brahman	7,417	13.7
Independent 2	Jat	6,039	11.1
Ram Rajya Parishad	Not Known	664	1.2
TOTAL		54,336	100.0

Kahar. The constituency was won by the Swatantra candidate, a Jadon Rajput. Six candidates contested the parliamentary constituency (Table 3): two independents and four candidates representing the Congress, Swatantra, the Republican Party, and the Ram Rajya Parishad. This segment of the parliamentary constituency²⁸ was carried by the Republican Party candidate. The independent runner-up was supported by the Arya Samaj and the Jan Sangh.

The successful Swatantra candidate in the assembly constituency was a Jadon Rajput from a village in the constituency. He came from one of the leading Jadon families of *zamindars* in the district. He was educated in a chiefs' college in Rajasthan. He contested the 1957 election in the same constituency as an independent, but lost. He had been a member of the Executive Committee of the Uttar Pradesh Swatantra Party.

The Congress assembly candidate, a Brahman, had been elected from this constituency in the two previous elections. Originally born in a family of petty tenant farmers in a village in the constituency, the Congress candidate was one of the two or three most prominent Congressmen in the state. He had been a minister in the state government several times, but was out of office at the time of the election.

The Republican candidate, also a Brahman, was a primary school teacher in a village in the constituency. Little informa-

tion, beyond their caste, was available for the other assembly candidates, who did not poll significantly in any case.

For parliament, the successful candidate in this segment of the constituency and in the parliamentary constituency as a whole was B.P. Maurya, a Jatav and the most important Republican Party leader in the state. He was born in 1928 in the town of Khair, where his father was a field laborer. Maurya attended high school in Khair and the Aligarh Muslim University, where he joined the Faculty of Law as a Lecturer in 1960. In 1942, he became a member of the Congress Youth League. However, he later met Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, the famous "untouchable" leader and founder of the Republican Party, at a wedding reception in Delhi and became a follower of his from that time. Maurya had worked for the Jatavs since he began his political career. He joined the Scheduled Caste Federation of Dr. Ambedkar and had since led several agitations in Aligarh district and in other parts of the state for the satisfaction of Jatav demands and for the conversion of Jatavs to Buddhism. He had been jailed for his activities. Maurya had visited the villages of the district, investigating Jatav grievances concerning entry into temples and the like. He claimed that he had been beaten on occasion for his activities. He had also attempted to reform Jatav practices, urging the Jatavs, as he said, "to give up the evils of drinking and gambling," to avoid spending money "going to distant places to worship gods and take dips in the rivers," and to give up the practice of giving dowry.

Independent 1 was a Rajput and the candidate of the Arya Samaj. He had been active more recently in Arya Samaj activities outside the state. He had participated in demonstrations on behalf of the Hindi language and against Punjabi *subah* in the Punjab.

The Congress candidate, a Muslim, was an old Congressman who, however, had not been active in district politics in recent years. He was a lawyer in Aligarh town and the legal adviser to the Aligarh Muslim University. He was a non-communal, secular Muslim who had been opposed to the Pakistan movement and the partition of India. In Aligarh Muslim University politics, he was identified with the group variously called secular, progressive, or Communist and opposed to the policies of the group variously termed conservative, traditional,

or communalist. He claimed that Muslims, who were angry about the October, 1961 riots, were opposed to his accepting the Congress nomination. In short, Jarrar Haider was just the sort of candidate who fit Congress policies at the time, a man with a national, non-parochial, non-communal outlook, whom the national leadership of the Congress would have welcomed in Parliament. Insofar as Aligarh parliamentary constituency was concerned, his selection would seem to indicate that "communal and caste considerations" were not the basis for his selection. He was a Muslim in a predominantly non-Muslim constituency, a non-communal Muslim in an environment where Hindu-Muslim relations were antagonistic, and a man unattached to local faction groups. However commendable his selection by the Congress under the circumstances, his qualities were a certain recipe for a severe defeat.

The Swatantra candidate for Parliament was Vasant Rao Oak, a man from Bombay, active in national politics, but unknown locally. Independent 2, a Jat, came from one of the most prominent Jat families in the district. He was the *zamindar* of five villages in the district before *zamindari* abolition.

Issues and Factors. The issues and factors which candidates claimed to have most influenced the election outcome may be divided into four general categories: the personalities and qualifications of the candidates; factionalism in the Congress; caste; and religious communalism. It is generally believed and supported by the election results in this constituency that a candidate to succeed must be a local man, well known in the constituency, preferably with some ties to the land and to a village in the constituency. Among the serious candidates who suffered from the absence of one or another of these qualifications were three of the candidates for Parliament: the Swatantra candidate, who came from another state; the Congress candidate who was a lawyer from Aligarh town and was not well known in the rural areas; and Independent 1, who came from rural Aligarh, but had been active primarily in affairs outside the district. The two successful candidates came from either a village or a town within the constituency of Khair.

Factionalism in the Congress played a major role in the defeat of the Congress in many of the constituencies in Aligarh district in 1962.³⁰ However, Khair was one of the few assembly

constituencies in the district where the official Congress candidate did not have to contest against "rebel" Congressmen. Nor was there any antagonism between the Congress assembly candidate in this constituency and the parliamentary candidate. It was said that some of the opposition candidates in the assembly constituency, and it was fairly certain that one of the opposition candidates (Independent 1) in the parliamentary constituency, were supported by disgruntled factions in the Congress. Also, the Congress organization in the district was in general disarray as a result of violent factional conflict which had been going on for several years.³¹

Most candidates claimed that caste factors played a very important role in the campaign and in the voting. For example, one parliamentary candidate, in a letter written to another candidate asking him not to contest, remarked:

On the basis of experience gained in past elections, one could say that the voters mostly vote on the ground of caste and taking this into consideration I may inform you that the population of Jats is maximum in this area. Next come Brahmans, then Jadon, Chauhan, and Tomar, and then Jatavs and lastly the Muslims. I am a jat (*sic*) and I have large number of relations in the constituency, and I have very good relations with Chauhans, Jadon and Tomer (*sic*) and the Brahmans.³²

Similar statements were made by most candidates and others interviewed:

Had there been no Thakur [Rajput] candidate, nobody could beat me.

.....
One Jat candidate. . . stood for the MP seat; had he not been there, Jats might have voted for the Congress.

.....
Always in this district, the problem has. . . been Thakurs and Jats, on the one hand, and Brahmans on the other.

.....
The Jatavs are the most backward community and the most communally inclined. Anyone who talks big impresses them. When we were slaves [of the British], we were also slaves of

slaves [the *zamindars*,] but the Scheduled Castes were slaves of slaves of slaves. That is, the Brahmans and Thakurs were slaves of the *zamindars* and the Scheduled Castes were slaves of the Brahmans and Thakurs. So you can well understand their [the Scheduled Castes'] mentality. Then this Maurya emerged. He talks in such a way and boasts so much that the Jatavs think he is a very big man. . . . Maurya got the support only of the Jatavs among the lower castes and not of the backward classes, otherwise everybody [all Congressmen in the district] would have lost.³³

Caste and communal slogans were also used in the campaign, among them one reported to have been used by supporters of the Republicans, urging voters to "blacken the faces of Thakurs, Brahmans, and Lalas [Banias]."

The above statements imply that caste factors operated in two ways in elections in Aligarh district and in the constituency being analyzed here. First, members of the various castes were said to have supported candidates of their own caste. Second, it was implied that caste antagonisms also played a role. That is, it was not simply that caste solidarity was reputed to be a factor, but that caste conflicts were also involved, particularly in the attitudes of Jatavs and the elite castes towards each other.

Finally, caste factors were combined with religious communalism, especially in the parliamentary contest. The communal alignment in the parliamentary contest involved an alliance between Jatavs and Muslims behind the Republican Party, on the one side, and caste Hindus supporting Independent 1, on the other side. Jatav grievances have been noted. The Muslim alliance with the Jatavs was based upon resentment felt by Muslims as a consequence of the Hindu-Muslim riot, which broke out in Aligarh town in October, 1961, only a few months before the elections. In the riots, fourteen Muslims were murdered.³⁴ Analyzing the reasons for the Congress defeats in the 1962 elections in Aligarh district, a Muslim Congressman remarked:

Those unfortunate incidents i.e., the riots were responsible for the fact that Muslims, *en bloc*, didn't vote for the Congress. The Republican Party is only a passing phase. Insofar

as the Muslims are concerned, the feeling was there that we must defeat the Congress. . . . [Also, in those riots, this Maurya was very active, seeing the injured and doing relief work amongst the Muslims. Had there been no riot, this [the Congress debacle in the 1962 elections] would not have happened.³⁵

The Jatav-Muslim alliance was most effective in Aligarh city where the Republican candidate for the Assembly seat was a Muslim. In the Khair constituency, however, the Republican candidate for the Assembly seat was a Brahman, a factor which served to moderate Hindu-Muslim antagonisms as a force in the elections in this constituency.

Significantly absent as an influential factor in the campaign, according to those interviewed, were political and economic issues. The Congress candidate for Parliament expressed his disappointment at the absence of such issues as a major factor in the campaign:

It was not possible for the opposition to use political or economic issues to defeat the Congress candidates. So, the strategy was to play up caste and communal sentiments. There was an abnormally large number of persons put up against all the Congressmen in various constituencies on the basis of their caste and sub-caste. In the parliamentary contest itself, Independent 1 was a Thakur and Independent 2 a Jat. But, the main difficulty was in the Assembly constituencies because the main factor in the parliamentary contest is the number of votes secured by the Assembly candidates. So, the whole election campaign actually developed into a scramble for caste and communal votes. I thought the only way to win would be to invite top Congress people, hold mass rallies, and present the political and economic issues. However, for reasons which are not apparent to me, I got absolutely no help.³⁶

A second possible factor which no candidate or anyone else interviewed mentioned as important in the election was party affiliation and identification. The omission is understandable since a major feature of this election in the district as a whole

was the astonishing drop in support for the Congress from 45.19 per cent of the vote in contested constituencies in 1957 to 24.89 per cent in contested constituencies in 1962.³⁷ Moreover, there was hardly any well organized opposition to the Congress in the district before the 1962 election.

Voting Patterns. It is possible to demonstrate the overwhelming importance of both caste sentiment and inter-caste alliances in the Khair constituency and the relative unimportance of party identification by analyzing the results in individual polling stations. Table 4 lists the candidates who polled the highest number of votes in both the assembly and parliamentary contests and the percentages of the votes polled by them in 36 rural polling stations of the 96 stations in the constituency. All the polling stations in which particular castes have been numerically predominant have been selected.³⁸ In addition, four polling stations containing villages in which two or more castes or community groups have been heavily represented have been selected at random for comparison.

TABLE 4

Results in Selected Polling Stations^a For Assembly and Parliament
in Khair (Assembly)-Aligarh (Parliament) Constituency,
Aligarh District, 1962 Election

P.S. No.	Largest Caste	Assembly		Parliament		Remarks
		Candidate	Pct.	Candidate	Pct.	
6	Rajput (Jadon)	Cong.*	54.4	Cong.	38.9	*Home village
37	Do.	Swa.	66.9	Swa.	34.1	
39	Do.	Swa.	80.7	Ind. 1	39.5	
42	Do.	Swa.	77.6	Ind. 1	40.1	
85	Rajput (Chauhan)	Swa.	43.2	Ind. 1	47.4	
88	Jadon and Chauhan	Swa.	62.5	Ind. 1	47.2	
44	Chamar	Swa.*	79.4	Rep.	42.6	*Home village
55	Do.	Rep.	40.6	Rep.	46.0	
56	Do.	Rep.	49.2	Rep.	44.1	

table cont. 4.

P.S. No.	Largest Caste	Assembly		Parliament		Remarks
		Candidate	Pct. ^a	Candidate	Pct.	
58	Do.	Rep.	50.0	Rep.	55.6	
62	Do.	Cong.	45.4	Rep.	45.9	
64	Do.	Cong.	40.6	Rep.	36.0	
70	Do.	Rep.	50.6	Rep.	57.9	
73	Do.	Rep.	25.8	Rep.	43.9	
79	Do.	Cong.	37.0	Ind. 1	34.2	
80	Do.	Rep.	33.0	Rep.	39.3	
94	Do.	Swa.	42.1	Ind. 1	37.9	
<hr/>						
12	Brahman	Cong.	38.2	Ind. 1	43.0	
25	Do.	Cong.	33.8	Rep.	33.4	
27	Do.	Rep.	51.8	Rep.	50.1	
29	Do.	Cong.	50.0	Cong.	37.2	
30	Do.	Rep.	50.1	Rep.	39.4	
34	Do.	Cong.	67.5	Cong.	55.9	
50	Do.*	Cong.	50.3	Cong.	35.6	*Muslims 2nd largest
<hr/>						
10	Jat	Swa.	66.7	Ind. 2	61.9	
20	Do.	Swa.	59.5	Ind. 2	59.4	
21	Do.	Swa.	70.4	Ind. 1	30.8	
22	Do.	Swa.	67.2	Ind. 2	36.0	
35	Do.	Cong.	35.2	Ind. 1	43.6	
<hr/>						
67	Lodha	Swa.	72.5	Ind. 1	54.1	
75	Do.	Swa.	56.4	Ind. 1	55.2	
76	Do.	Swa.	33.4	Ind. 1	41.5	
<hr/>						
24	Mixed	Rep.	31.9	Rep.	32.2	Brahman- Jat-Rajput (Jadon)
48	Do.	Swa.	48.8	Ind. 2	27.1	Rajput (Jadon)-Jat
72	Do.	Swa.	47.2	Ind. 1	34.1	Rajput (Chauhan & Jadon)- Lodha- Chamar- Muslim
96	Do.	Swa.	59.4	Ind. 1	46.1	Jat-Rajput (Jadon)- Chamar

^aThe number of polling stations selected is 36 out of a total of 96. The mean number of valid votes cast in these stations was 583.

A comparison of the successful candidates for Assembly and Parliament in these polling stations should indicate clearly the relative unimportance of party-line voting in the elections. In only 14 of the 36 stations did the same party poll highest for both Assembly and parliament. Moreover, even in the 14 stations which were carried by the same party, the mean difference between the highest and lowest votes polled by the candidates of the winning party in the two constituencies was 9.0 percent and in one case, polling station 37, was as high as 32.8 percent. Clearly, party-ticket voting and hence party identifications played only a secondary role in the elections in Khair.³⁹

On the other hand, the table reveals a very clear association between the distribution of the important castes in the villages of the constituency and the distribution of support for candidates in the same villages, such that villages dominated numerically by particular castes supported candidates of the same caste or the party identified with the interests of the caste. The table also suggests very strongly the importance of inter-community alliances and hence of co-ordination between assembly and parliamentary candidates of different communities to maximize ethnic group support. To elaborate these propositions, it is worth examining the patterns of voting in detail, first in terms of the castes and then in terms of patterns of support for the candidates. The patterns revealed by the data are as follows.

The Rajput candidates for Assembly (Swatantra) and Parliament (Independent 1) overwhelmed all other candidates in most of the polling stations where Rajputs of either major clan were predominant. Support for the Jadon Rajput assembly candidate was strongest in four of the five polling stations in which Jadon Rajputs were the largest caste. In the fifth, which also happened to be the Congress assembly candidate's home village, that local tie prevailed and the Congress candidates carried the polling station in both the assembly and parliamentary election. In the sixth Rajput-dominated polling station, in which Chauhans are the largest caste, the Jadon assembly candidate carried the polling station, but with a much smaller percentage share of the vote. Although the Rajput candidate for Parliament carried four of the six Rajput-dominated polling stations, he did so with much lower pluralities than the Jadon assembly

candidate, with the exception of one polling station. Moreover, he failed to prevail or polled very considerably below the Jadon assembly candidate in three of the Jadon-dominated polling stations. Although there most probably was some ticket splitting in these six polling stations that made it possible for the Independent Rajput candidate for Parliament to prevail over his Swatantra Brahman rival, it is also clear that the strongest tie was in the assembly contest between the Jadon-dominated villages and the Jadon assembly candidate.

Chamars constituted the largest caste in 11 polling stations in this constituency. The Republican candidate for Parliament, B. P. Maurya, carried 9 of them. However, his subordinate candidate for the Assembly, a Brahman, carried only 6, all but one of them with smaller majorities or pluralities than those of B. P. Maurya. Congress carried three of the assembly polling stations in which Chamars were the largest caste. The Congress did better in this respect only in the Brahman-dominated polling stations. Consequently, even in 1962, when the Republican party cut severely into Congress strongholds, a traditional, and a recurring, pattern of Congress support in areas of Chamar and Brahman numerical preponderance was revealed.

In the seven Brahman-predominant polling stations, all were carried by the Brahman candidates for the assembly seat, either by the Congress or the Republican Party candidates. For parliament, 6 of the 7 were carried by Congress or the Republican Party. Republican strength in three of the polling stations probably arose from the transfer of some of the Brahman support for the Brahman Republican candidate to his parliamentary ally. Support for the Congress in the other 3 Brahman-dominated booths probably reflected traditional Brahman support for the Congress. That inference is strongly reinforced by the fact that only one of the 36 polling stations in which the Congress parliamentary candidate received a plurality of votes contained the Congress assembly candidate's home village. It should be noted also that there was obviously considerable ticket-splitting in these polling stations. Although 5 of the 7 polling stations were carried by the same party for both Assembly and Parliament, there was a considerable discrepancy in the size of the majority or plurality polled by the same party for Assembly and Parliament in 4 of them.

There were no Jat candidates in the assembly contest in Khair. Four of the 5 Jat-dominated polling booths were carried by the Rajput assembly candidate and one, with only a plurality vote, by the Congress Brahman candidate. Three of the five polling stations were carried by the Jat candidate for Parliament, the other two by the Rajput. The Jat candidate for Parliament, Independent 2, carried only one other of the 36 polling stations, which also contained a Jat-predominant village (polling station no. 48). The results in these Jat-predominant polling stations indicate not only a preference for the Jat candidate for Parliament and for the Rajput candidates for both the Assembly and Parliament, but a distinct aversion to Brahman candidates of any party. Despite the fact that Swatantra carried four of the five assembly-level polling stations with large majorities, that vote was not transferred to the Swatantra candidate for Parliament, who was a Brahman. Although the Congress Assembly candidate carried one of the Jat-dominated polling booths, he did so with a plurality only. Moreover, it is likely that his plurality here came not from Jat voters, but from other castes in the village. Once again, therefore, there was clearly considerable split-ticket voting in these polling stations. Moreover, the vote for the Jat candidate for Parliament in three of these polling stations very likely represents an assertion by Jats in the higher level constituency of a caste loyalty that could not be manifested in the assembly contest, where no Jat candidate was available. Finally, the avoidance by most voters in these Jat-predominant villages of Brahman candidates most probably reflected the hostility of Jats to the elite Brahman castes generally and their identification of the latter with the ritual and status hierarchy of the caste order, which many Jat political and social leaders have traditionally resented and against which they have protested by participating in such movements as the Arya Samaj. Independent 1, who carried two of the Jat-predominant polling stations was a leading figure in the Arya Samaj.

The three Lodha-dominated polling stations show a clear pattern. Rajput candidates carried all three for both Assembly and Parliament in these villages where the dominant castes aspire to Rajput status. There is clear evidence here also of split-ticket voting. As in the Jat-predominant booths, support

for the Swantantra assembly candidate could not be transferred to the Swantantra candidates for Parliament.

Finally, patterns revealed in the mixed polling stations are consistent with those in the single caste-predominant booths. Support for the Republican candidates in booth no. 24, which contained one Brahman-predominant village, is consistent with the results in the wholly Brahman-predominant villages. The low plurality of the Republican candidates here is consistent with the fact that the other villages are Jat- and Rajput-predominant and probably did not give many of their votes to the Republican Party. Support for the Swantantra assembly candidate in polling stations 48, 72, and 96, where most of the villages are dominated by Rajputs, Jats, and Lodhas is clearly consistent with the patterns of support for Swatantra in polling booths dominated by these castes exclusively. The same remarks apply to support for the Rajput Independent 1 for parliament. The low plurality for the Jat Independent candidate for Parliament in polling station no. 48 is consistent with the inclusion of a Jat-predominant village within it. The smallness of the plurality is consistent both with the inclusion of a Rajput-predominant village in the polling station and with the contradictory pulls in Jat-predominant villages towards both Independent 1 and Independent 2.

The patterns of caste voting support the following general conclusions. When there is one candidate of a particular caste, he is likely to get overwhelming support in villages in which his caste fellows are numerically predominant regardless of his party. However, the data from the Brahman polling stations suggest that caste solidarity may break down when more than one member of the caste contests. That is, it is sentiment rather than organization which is involved in caste voting here. The third conclusion is that inter-caste alliances, while important, are likely to be only partially effective. Maurya carried 2 polling stations for Parliament in which Chamars were the largest caste but his Brahman partner in the assembly contest carried only 6. In fact, it is highly likely that the Brahman vote was only partially mobilized for the Republicans in both the assembly and parliamentary contests.

Patterns of support for the candidates provide further evidence for the general conclusion reached in another study

that the candidate most likely to win in an ethnically diverse constituency is the candidate who can draw support from diverse groups.⁴⁰ The successful Swatantra candidate won the assembly election by drawing support from three large castes primarily: Rajputs of both major clans, Jats, and Lodhas. The successful Republican candidate won on the basis of overwhelming support from his own community of Chamars and partial support from the Brahmans. Independent 1 (Parliament), who ran a very close second in this constituency, combined the votes of Rajputs and Lodhas. If there had not been a Jat candidate for Parliament, Independent 1 probably would have won this segment of the parliamentary constituency and probably the constituency as a whole.

There was not much evidence that religious communalism played a significant role in Khair, although it is possible that some caste Hindus voted for Independent 1 for reasons of religion rather than caste. However, it seems clear that the primary factor in Khair was the pattern of caste alliances. Party loyalty played a role, but only a minor one. Split-ticket voting was commonplace and it is even arguable that some of those who did not split their tickets did not do so because there was no reason to do so, that is, because there was no member of one's caste contesting on whose behalf the ticket might be split.

None of the candidates interviewed mentioned the issues of co-operative farming, land ceilings, or rural class conflict as factors that influenced the election outcomes. One parliamentary candidate quoted above expressed his dismay at the absence of any serious discussion or debate of economic issues during the campaign. The statements of the candidates and the polling station results indicate that cast loyalties, caste antagonisms, and caste coalitions were primary. At the same time, it deserves to be noted that the polling station results aggregate into a pattern that suggests the existence in 1962 of widespread disaffection from the Congress among the dominant peasant proprietor castes of both elite and backward caste status. A glance down the columns of table 4 reveals clearly that nearly all polling stations in which Rajputs, Jats, and Lodhas were predominant were carried by the Swatantra candidate for the Assembly and that nearly all were carried by Independent 1

or 2 for Parliament. Among villages in which one of the proprietary communities was predominant, only the Brahman-predominant villages deviated from the pattern. Congress successes in the Khair assembly contest in the polling stations listed in table 4 were confined, aside from the candidate's home village and one Jat-predominant village, to villages in which Chamars or Brahmans were the numerically largest caste. Congress successes in the parliamentary contest in the Khair segment in the polling stations listed were confined, again leaving aside the Congress assembly candidate's home village, to villages in which Brahmans were predominant. Moreover, the polling stations results as a whole reveal a broader pattern in which nearly all villages in which non-Brahman proprietary castes were predominant were carried by Swatantra or Independent candidates whereas nearly all villages in which Brahmans or Chamars were numerically predominant were carried by either the Congress or the Republican Party. In later elections in U.P. generally, as indicated elsewhere in this volume, the discontent of the non-Brahman proprietary castes, particularly of the backward castes, was taken up by the BKD/BLD/Lok Dal whereas the Congress succeeded in reabsorbing the Chamars and combining their support with their persisting support among Brahmans. In effect, therefore, it is possible, with the benefit of hindsight, to view the 1962 election results in Khair as the expression of economic discontent on the part of the non-Brahman proprietary castes through the medium of local caste loyalties.

III. The Block Development Committee Election

Under the programs of community development and national extension that were implemented in India in the 1950s and 1960s as part of the Five Year Plans, most of the country was divided into community development blocks of approximately 100 villages each. In U.P., among other states, a program of "democratic decentralization" or *panchayati raj* was inaugurated under which local committees in the villages, in the community development blocks, and in the districts were established with limited, but still considerable power over the allocation of resources under the plans. In U.P., the block development committees or *kshetra samitis* are composed of the *pradhans* (presi-

dents) of the *gaon sabhas* (village assemblies) in the block, who then elect a block president or *pramukh* from amongst themselves. The election is thus indirect. The system of voting followed in the election of the *pramukh* is that of the single transferable vote.

Although the original act establishing the Kshetra Samitis provided them with an extensive list of "powers and functions" in agriculture, cottage industries, education, social welfare, planning, and public works, many of the functions listed were under such vague headings as "promotion," "dissemination," and "supervision." Moreover, the *kshetra samitis* received very little direct development grant funding, which continued to flow primarily from the state government departments through the block administration, and very little taxing power. However, there were some powers that are of considerable significance locally such as "providing primary education," establishing local health centers, and most especially "distribution of grants to the Gaon Sabhas."⁴¹ The principal political significance of the *kshetra samiti*, and most especially of the office of *pramukh* or president of the *kshetra samiti*, is the informal influence that the *pramukh* acquires by his position in relation to the administrative officers at the block level. It also places him in a strong intermediary position between the local MLA and the village leaders in a large part of a legislative assembly constituency. Most legislative assembly constituencies in U.P. contain between 2 and 3 blocks.

The *kshetra samiti* of Jawan Sikandrapur in 1962 contained 105 *gaon sabhas*, most of them within the Khair constituency. The distribution of the 105 *pradhans* by caste was as follows: Chauhan Rajput, 26; Jadon Rajput, 11; Brahman, 22; Lodha, 17; Gadaria, 5; Jatav, 5; Jat, 5; Kathik, 2; Vaish, 2; others, 7; unknown, 3. Nine candidates from among the four largest castes contested the election for *pramukh* in 1962: three Chauhan, one Jadon, three Brahmans, one Lodha, and one not known.

Under the system of single transferable voting used in this election, voters are entitled to exercise as many preferences as there are candidates. A majority of the valid first preference votes cast is required for election on the first count. If no candidate receives a majority on the first count, the candidate with the lowest number of votes is dropped and his ballot papers are

examined for second preferences, which, if there are any, are added on to the votes of the candidates who received them. This procedure is carried on for as many counts and including as many preferences as are necessary until a candidate either achieves a majority of the votes cast or until there is only one candidate remaining. In Jawan Sikandrapur, the election was won by one of the Brahman candidates through the process of elimination, with 33 votes on the eighth count. The runner-up was a Chauhan, who received 30 votes on the seventh count; third was the Lodha, with 13 votes on the sixth count; fourth was the Jadon, with 11 votes on the fifth count; fifth was another Chauhan with 7 votes on the fourth count; sixth was the third Chauhan with 6 votes on the third count; seventh was a second Brahman with 3 votes on the second count; eighth was the third Brahman, with 1 vote on the first count; one candidate, whose caste is unknown, received no votes.⁴²

The political parties were not involved officially in this election, which was held after the general elections. It was said that one of the Brahman candidates was associated with the Congress Assembly candidate. However, the general feeling among politicians about these elections in 1962, a feeling which was expressed here also, is that it was not wise to become involved in these elections because one can only alienate potential supporters by helping a particular candidate. For example, one of the Assembly candidates remarked, with some exaggeration no doubt, that he did not take part in the block election "because all the candidates were my men and I didn't want to antagonize anybody."⁴³ Caste sentiment dominated voting patterns in the block even more completely than in the general elections. Not only did caste dominate voting patterns, but divisions within and among castes which did not affect the general elections were of decisive importance in the block election. Table 5 shows the first preference vote of the *pradhans* by caste for the various candidates, who are also classified by caste. The table and the results mentioned above indicate that there are both similarities and differences in the patterns of voting in the block election and in the general elections. There are three apparent similarities. First, as in the general elections, members of a caste voted in overwhelming proportions for candidates from their own caste. Second, the winning candidate could not

rely only on the votes of his own caste, but required broader support. The winning Brahman candidate received 33 votes, but there were only 19 valid votes cast by Brahman *pradhans*. There were also important differences in voting patterns in the

TABLE 5

First Preference Vote by Caste For Pramukh Jawan Sikandrapur Block, Aligarh District, 1962

Caste	Valid votes	Pradhans by		Candidates by caste					
		Chauhans (3)		Brahmans (3)		Lodhi (1)		Jadon (1)	
		No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.
Chauhan	25	21	84.0	3	12.0	—	—	1	4.0
Jadon	10	3	30.0	1	10.0	—	—	6	60.0
Brahman	19	2	10.5	17	89.5	—	—	—	—
Lodha	12	1	8.5	—	—	11	91.5	—	—
Others	26	11	42.3	12	46.2	2	7.7	1	3.8
Total	92	38	41.3	33	35.9	13	14.1	8	8.7

two elections. First, the two major Rajput clans were divided in the block election. Second, there was no evidence of caste coalitions. The winning candidate won essentially by the chance exercise of individual preferences and the elimination of successive candidates. Third, Chamars, who played such an important role in the general elections, played no important role in the block election because of the process of indirect election. Only five Chamar *pradhans* were elected in the entire block, there were no Chamar candidates for *pramukh* (although there was one for *up-pramukh* or vice-president, who was defeated), and villages with large numbers of Chamars were often represented by members of elite castes. To point out the significance of the last point, it is worth looking again at polling stations 56 and 70 (Table 4), each of which contains a single village in which Chamars are the largest caste and both of which produced Republican successes for both Assembly and Parliament. In the block election, however, one of these villages was represented by a Brahman and the other by a Chauhan. The conclusion seems clear that not only do parochial social forces operate even more forcefully in the smaller constituency,⁴⁴

but the prospects for social and political change are reduced. Or, as Madison might have put it, the Brahman and Chauhan dominant castes can "more easily" maintain their "oppression" of the lower castes and prevent the effective exercise of their franchise in the smaller units than in the larger.

IV. The Polling Stations

The broad patterns of voting which prevailed in the general elections and in the block election in this area have been examined. It remains to compare the explanations suggested by the data with the explanations offered by some of the voters themselves about voting behavior in Khair. Three polling stations, comprising six villages, will be discussed. The interviews recorded below were carried out during visits to the villages in September, 1962, seven months after the election. I made two visits to two of the villages, one before the election in the company of the Congress assembly candidate and the second in September. Those interviewed were the *pradhans* and other village leaders or others who happened to be present during the conversations.

Table 6 lists the largest caste in each of the villages visited and the voting in the three polling stations in the assembly and parliamentary contests.

Polling Station 97. Polling station 97 contains most of village A, a large village (1961 population: 2,257), approximately six miles from the town of Aligarh and just off a main road. The largest caste in the village, comprising approximately 60 per cent of the population, and the predominant land-owning caste is Chauhan Rajput. Before *zamindari* abolition, four Chauhan families owned all the land in the village. After *zamindari* abolition, the large landholders among the Chauhans lost much of their land, but retained enough to maintain their economic and political dominance in the life of the village. The *pradhan* in 1962 came from one of the Chauhan families of *zamindars*. The previous *pradhan* was also a Chauhan and the cousin of the then *pradhan*. On the village *panchayat* (council) of 20 members, 6 were Chauhans, 5 were Gadarias, 3 were Jatavs, 2 were Kahars, and the remaining 4 were from other castes. Chauhans were clearly the dominant caste in the village in numbers and in political and economic power.

TABLE 6
Results in three Polling Stations in Khair Constituency, 1962
General Elections

P.S. No a	Vil- lages	Largest caste	Percentages of votes polled by three leading candidates for					
			Assembly			Parliament		
			Swa.	Cong.	Rep.	Ind. 1	Cong.	Rep.
97	A	Rajput (Chauhan)	43.2	33.6	11.6	47.4	20.1	17.8
98	A ^b	Rajput (Chauhan)						
	B	Muslim						
	C	Lodha	46.2	20.8	21.4	17.1	13.4	48.2
99	D	Aheriya						
	E	Rajput (Pundir)						
	F	Gadaria	23.8	46.9	22.4	24.8	19.2	33.1

aIn order to preserve the anonymity of the village and the voting behavior of villagers, the numbers are fictitious.

^bVillage A was divided between polling station 97 and 98.

In terms of social structure, village A is thus a not untypical Rajput-dominated village. In terms of its external relations, however, it is not a typical village. The village is flanked on one side by a Glaxo factory (baby food) and on another side by a dairy farm run by the Uttar Pradesh Government, in both of which people from the village were employed. The village had had a basic primary school managed by the Zila Parishad (District Board) since 1957.

At a campaign meeting held in the primary school on behalf of the Congress candidate for the assembly seat, three kinds of issues were discussed: caste, village problems, and economic development. The issue of caste arose in a peculiar and humorous way. The Congress candidate began speaking to a group of between twenty to twenty-five people assembled in the primary school, but was soon interrupted by a speaker from the floor and by an agitated discussion involving four or five people. One of the villagers, apparently hard of hearing, thought he heard the Congress candidate say that Jatavs should get preference over Rajputs and took offense at the idea. The issue is clearly a sensitive one in this area, where Jatavs have been attempting to

raise their status and economic and political position.

A second category of issues which arose was the general one of economic development. As noted above, Aligarh district was one of eight districts in the country which were initial participants in the "Intensive Agricultural District Programme."⁴⁵ In this village and in all the villages which he visited, the Congress candidate spoke of this program and of the benefits which villagers would derive from it.

By far the most important category of issues which arose at the campaign meeting, however, were issues relating to problems of villagers and their relations with people outside the village. The major village complaint was against the Glaxo factory for failing to hire workers from the village. The factory employed then about a hundred workers, of whom only four came from the village. The villagers were angry because the factory employed people from other places, even from other districts. The villagers also complained to the Congress candidate about their dealings with the local cooperative society, which covered about twenty villages in the area. The villagers claimed that they were not getting money at the proper time and that dishonest dealings were taking place. In a later visit to the village, villagers interviewed raised similar issues: the condition of irrigation facilities in the village and the snobbish attitude of irrigation engineers to suggestions from villagers on their proper construction or the need for a middle school in the village to accommodate older village children who had to go five or six miles away to school.

Thus, villagers in village A displayed concern primarily over two kinds of issues: issues relating to the needs and problems of the village and its inhabitants and issues relating to caste. In conversation, village problems took precedence over issues of caste. In voting behavior, however, caste considerations were predominant. In the election for president of the block development committee, the *pradhan* exercised three preference votes. His first two preference votes were cast on behalf of Rajput candidates of the same clan (Chauhan) as himself. His third preference vote was cast for a Rajput of another clan (Jadon). In the exercise of his third preferential vote, the *pradhan* might have voted for still another Chauhan candidate—there were three—but voted instead for a Rajput of another clan, a grudging

move upward in his hierarchy of values, but a move upward nevertheless.

In the assembly and parliamentary elections, village A inhabitants voted in two polling stations. Polling station 97, which contained most of the village, was carried with a plurality of 43 per cent of the total vote by the Rajput Swatantra candidate in the Assembly contest and with a plurality of 47 per cent of the total vote by the only Rajput candidate in the parliamentary contest. Polling station 98, which contained part of village A and two other villages, one predominantly Muslim and one predominantly Lodha, was carried by the Swatantra candidate for the Assembly with a plurality of 46 per cent and by B. P. Maurya in the parliamentary contest with a plurality of 48 per cent. Notes from a discussion with the *pradhan*, the Panchayat Mantri⁴⁶ and a few villagers on the voting behavior of the village in the general elections are given below.

The Panchayat Mantri said that the Swatantra candidate got the most votes for the Assembly from the village. When asked why, he replied that it was all casteism [*jatibad*]. However, it was also said by the villagers that it was the opinion of the whole village to give the votes to the Swatantra candidate. For Parliament, B. P. Maurya got the most votes, they said. When asked why, the villagers said that there was a pact between Muslims and Jatavs. . . . Later, when the *pradhan* arrived, he was asked for whom he voted in the Assembly. He said he had voted for the Congress assembly candidate, but then there was considerable joking over his reply, with everybody saying that he had really voted for the Swatantra candidate. [Before, his brother had admitted voting for the latter.] Nevertheless, the *pradhan* went on to say that it was harmful that the Congress candidate could not win the election; if the Congress candidate had been elected, some schemes would have more easily come here, for example, the package scheme.⁴⁷

In the last statement, the *pradhan* was either continuing his good-humored joke or was complaining about not being able to have his cake and eat it too. That is, he would like to be able to vote according to caste sentiments, but he would also like to have the

winner be a man who could do things for the village. None of the villagers made any mention of the broader issues which had been part of the campaign: the issues raised by Congressmen of economic development and the Hindu-Muslim communal issue. Villagers were aware of the pact between Muslims and Jatavs for Parliament and the Chauhans probably voted overwhelmingly for Independent 1 for Parliament, but the vote for the latter may have been merely a caste vote.

In terms of the problems posed at the beginning of this chapter, the main conclusion which emerges from this analysis of voting behavior in village A is that, at least as far as the dominant Chauhans are concerned, the elections did not broaden the horizons of villagers very much. The issues that most concerned the Chauhan leaders of the village were parochial ones and their voting was influenced primarily by caste sentiments. Nevertheless, the fact that Chauhans voted for Rajputs of other clans is not without significance. In the village, it is a particular Rajput clan which is dominant. In the block, Chauhans also are dominant and the *pradhan* remained loyal to his clansmen in the election for president of the block committee. In the elections for the Assembly and Parliament, there were no Chauhan candidates and the dominant Chauhans in village A voted for Rajputs of different clans from their own.

Polling Station 98. Polling station 98 contains a portion of village A, already discussed, and the two smaller villages referred to as B (population : 1,041) and C (population : 684), somewhat further from the roads than village A and accessible only by jeep or cycle.

Village B. Village B is an overwhelmingly Muslim village, containing only about ten non-Muslim families of Bhangis (Sweepers) in the village proper and a small population (estimated 20 families) of Brahmans and two other smaller castes in a hamlet nearby. The *pradhan* of the village was a Muslim and had been elected twice unopposed. The interviewer asked if there were no factions in the village. The *pradhan* replied that there were two factions in the village, which were divided over questions of land distribution. However, he said that he was neutral about the factions, that he wanted cooperation among the villagers, that the people liked him, and that was why he was elected *pradhan*. The village *panchayat* contained 18

members, of whom 16 were Muslims, 1 was Brahman, and 1 Bhangi.

Village B had fewer physical facilities and amenities than village A. There was no school in the village which meant that village children had to go to school at village A. The *up-pradhan* (vice-president) remarked that the people of the village wanted their children to get an education, but he complained that most children were not getting an education because the schools were too far away. There was no tubewell in the village in 1962 and there was great scarcity of water.

Nevertheless, the *pradhan* of village B voted for the Congress. He was himself a primary member of the Congress and said he was wholeheartedly pro-Congress. He described his own voting behavior and that of his fellow villagers in the following way:

I voted for Mohan Lal Gautam and Jarrar Haider [the Congress candidates for the Assembly and Parliament]. Most of the people in the village gave their votes to the Congress [this is certainly an exaggeration], but some were in favor of Swatantra and the Republicans. Before this election, all were in favor of the Congress, but this year the votes were divided. This year, the canvassing of other parties was very good. Also, the Swatantra party is a new party and there was much canvassing for the Swatantra party this year... [Also], some people in the village were unhappy with Gautam because they had gone to see him one time and they were told by Gautam's *chaprassi* [messenger] that 'hey could not see him because he was sleeping.

In response to a question as to why he had voted for the Congress, even though nothing was being done for the village, the *pradhan* remarked :

This party [Congress] is comparatively better than other parties and is doing well for the country. The difficulty is that the government officials are lazy in their work. I suggested something to the officers of the canal department to increase the water available to the village, but they did not listen.

There is a marked difference in the nature of the remarks by the *pradhan* of village B about his reasons for voting as he did and the remarks made by the Chauhan leaders of village A. In both villages, there were problems for which their inhabitants wanted external, government assistance. In both villages, the MLA was expected to help the village when he could. In village B, it was even said that some villagers retaliated against the Congress candidate for the insult they felt they had received when they went to visit him. However, according to the *pradhan* none of these factors influenced him. What was decisive in the *pradhan's* explanation of his vote was his loyalty to the Congress party and his belief that the Congress was "doing well for the country." It should be noted that the *pradhan's* behavior was exceptional in his village. The election statistics for 1957 and 1962 do not support his assertion that most of the villagers remained loyal to the Congress in 1962. In 1957, the Congress candidates for the Assembly and for Parliament polled between 65 and 70 per cent of the total vote in the polling station in which village B was situated. However, in 1962, the Congress candidate for the Assembly polled only 21 per cent of the vote and for Parliament only 13 per cent. The vote for the Congress parliamentary candidate (a Muslim) is especially important to note here as another point of contrast with village A. In village A, caste sentiment was predominant, whereas Muslims in village B did not vote for the only Muslim candidate presented to them. In this polling station, B.P. Maurya polled 48 per cent of the vote for Parliament. Although there are some Chamars in Villages A and C in this polling station, Maurya's support here must have come primarily from the Muslims of village B (and perhaps from the Brahmans also). Thus, it appears that most Muslims in village B voted not on the basis of attachment to a candidate of their own community, but in response to a political coalition based partly upon the broader issue of Hindu-Muslim antagonisms.

Village C. The largest caste in village C are Lodhas, who aspire to Rajput status and prefer to be called Lodhi Rajputs. Lodhas form approximately one-third of the population of the village, but they own more than two-thirds of the land. There are two other large castes in the village, Jatavs and Gadarias, and there are also some families belonging to seven other castes. The

elections for *pradhan* had been hotly contested here. The first elected *pradhan* of the *gaon sabha* of village C (which includes also village F discussed below) was a Lodha, but the then *pradhan* was a Chauhan. In the last election for *pradhan* there had been two other candidates, a Gadaria from village F (whose nomination was declared invalid) and the incumbent *pradhan* at the time. The current and previous *pradhans* had led two factions in the village. Asked how he had been successful in the election for *pradhan* when there were so many Lodhas and so few Chauhans in the *gaon sabha*, the *pradhan* replied that "both [candidates] got the votes of different communities, that is, all the communities were divided amongst themselves." The representation from village C on the *gaon panchayat* included 12 people, of whom 4 were Lodha, 4 were Jats, 2 were Gadaria, 1 was a Chauhan, and 1 a Nai. There was no discussion of the role of the Jatavs in village life, but the Jatavs of village C, like the Jatavs elsewhere in the area, had for long been attempting to raise their status. In village C, some of the Jatavs had converted to Sikhism.

In responding to questions, the *pradhan* of village C did not always give reliable answers. When the villagers interviewed were together calculating the population of the village by caste and community, one man mentioned Muslims, but the *pradhan* said to him that there was only one family and he did not mention the Muslim family in his remarks to me. Asked how he voted for president of the block development committee, he said he voted for the winning Brahman candidate. In fact, the official record shows that he exercised three preferences, the first two for Chauhan candidates and the third for a Jadon Rajput.

Although the *pradhan's* replies were, therefore, not wholly reliable, his comments on his own voting behavior and that of the village are given below because the explanations given are nevertheless valuable both for what they imply and what they leave out about how people do vote and should vote.

Who got the highest number of votes in the assembly contest from the village?

Chetanya Raj Singh (Swatantra) got the highest.

How did you vote?

I voted for the Congress.

Why?

Because it is the Government; the Government whether good or bad, men should not worry about that.

Why did Chetanya Raj Singh get more votes than Gautam?

The people were not pleased with Gautam because he did nothing for the village and they voted for others in the expectation that a newcomer would do something.

How did the other Chauhans vote?

I cannot say about them.

How did the village vote for Parliament?

Shastriji [Independent 1] got the highest number of votes in the village and I also voted for Shastri.

But Shastri was not Congress.

The candidates were quite new and Shastri was more deserving.

The statement contains one familiar explanation of voting behavior and two explanations not encountered in the other two villages. The familiar explanation is that the villagers voted according to their assessment of what the candidates would do for the village. However, the *pradhan* claimed that he gave one vote for "the Raj" and one vote because of the qualifications of a candidate. (Whether or not he actually voted as he said he did, the explanations which he considered it legitimate to express are important in themselves.)

As has been mentioned, the polling station as a whole was carried by Swatantra in the assembly contest and by B. P. Maurya in the parliamentary contest. It is likely that the Swatantra candidate achieved his plurality here on the basis of the votes of the Chauhans of village A and the Lodhas of village C. This, at any rate, was the pattern of caste voting in the constituency as a whole. The Swatantra candidate also claimed that he received support from Lodhas generally in the constituency. It is not at all clear, however, why Independent 1 polled so poorly in the parliamentary contest from this station, since Lodhas also voted for Independent 1 in the constituency as a whole.

A picture of incredible complexity emerges from the analysis of both the explanations of voting and the actual patterns of voting in this single polling station, in contrast to polling station 97 where both the explanations and the patterns of voting

were fairly clear and easily understood. The interviews and my own inferences suggest the following summary. Stated explanations for voting included the following: party loyalty, the contribution of a party (the Congress) to the welfare of the country, the attitude of the candidates toward villagers and village problems and their ability to do something about village problems, respect for Government, the qualifications of a candidate. The actual patterns of voting suggest the following inferences. Chauhans from village A and Lodhas from village C probably voted for the Swatantra candidate and made possible his success in the polling station. However, in the parliamentary contest, the Muslims of village B (and perhaps the Brahman families also) and the Jatavs of the other villages made their influence felt by voting for B. P. Maurya. It is probable that the Muslim vote went to the Swatantra candidate in the assembly contest. In general, the probable voting patterns indicate that, even in a single polling station, candidates may require multi-caste coalitions to win.

Polling Station 99. Polling station 99 contains three whole villages: village D (1961 population: 890); village E (1961 population: 692); and village F (1961 population: 252)

Village D. My informant and I were directed to this village, with some reluctance, by a villager from village F, who advised us not to see the *pradhan* of village D who, he said, was a Jatav and an illiterate. We were advised instead to see the *up-pradhan*, a Brahman, who "does all the work." With some eagerness, we proceeded to the house of the *pradhan*, who was working in the fields when we arrived. The nephew of the *pradhan*, a Master's degree student at the Barahseni College in Aligarh town, spoke to us while we waited for the *pradhan* and remained throughout the interview.

According to the voting register of the village, Jatavs were the fifth largest caste group with 39 voting members. The largest castes in the village, according to the register, were Aheriyas (120), Brahmans (76), Gadarias (52), and Gosains (43). There were also nine other smaller castes in the village. Aheriyas were the largest caste in the village, Brahmans were economically dominant, owning nearly 75 per cent of the land. The Aheriyas together and the Jatavs together each owned only about eight acres of land. The Jatav *pradhan* himself owned only a quarter

of an acre of good land and another acre or so of uncultivated land, which he was trying to plow. He was not able to support himself and his family from his land and so sought work in Aligarh town as a laborer and sometimes on the fields of village Brahmans.

The Jatav *pradhan* related a tale of caste discrimination and caste conflict in the political life of village D. He claimed that there were actually 55 or 56 qualified Jatav voters in the village (instead of 39), but that five Jatav families were purposely excluded from the voters' list by the Panchayat Mantri, who "favors the high castes." In contrast, some Brahmans who were not of age were allegedly included in the voters' list.⁴⁸ Direct conflict between Jatavs and Brahmans had also occurred in the village. It was said, for example, that the brick lane beside the *pradhan's* house had been built three or four years before. A Brahman had objected to the building of the lane at that place because, he claimed, when it rained, the water flowed onto his land from the lane and damaged his crops. When the Jatavs were building the lane, the Brahman came there and objected. He charged that the Jatavs beat him and took the matter to court. Litigation was going on at the time of the visit. The Jatavs claimed they did not beat him.

The interviewer was given the following account of the *pradhan's* election.

There were three other candidates originally—two Brahmans and the Gosain. The latter withdrew. The two Brahman candidates were A and B. After some time, both Brahmans made a pact on a caste basis and B began to tell people to vote for A. However, the present *pradhan* won, with 180 votes against 140 for A and 7 for B. On the whole, Gosains, Aheriyas, Bhangis, Dhobis, and Gadarias voted for the present *pradhan* and Brahmans, some Aheriyas, Kumhars, Kathiks, Nai, Dhimar, some Gadarias, and some Gosains voted for A. However, no Brahmans voted for the present *pradhan* and no Jatav voted for A. There is much casteism in the village between Jatavs and Brahmans.

Why?

The Brahmans refuse to allow the Jatavs to enter temples or to fetch water from any well. The previous *pradhan* was [a

Brahman]. However, because the Brahmans were not good for the public, they [villagers] tried to elect a new *pradhan* of the Jatav community.

The *pradhan's* comments on political conflict in village D point to a pattern of conflict which is based upon caste antagonisms, but in which only two of the castes in the village were the major protagonists. Most of the other castes were said to have been divided in the conflict. The Brahmans of village D were in a more precarious political position in their village than the Chauhans of village A. Despite the fact that the Brahmans of village D were overwhelmingly dominant economically, they simply did not have the numbers to maintain their dominance easily in village politics. In all the other villages discussed above, the economically dominant caste was also the largest caste. The victory of a Jatav in the election partly reflects the relative political weakness of the Brahmans in the village, but it is also another reflection of the political consciousness of the Jatavs in this area and their determination to use modern politics to achieve the position and status denied them in the traditional society.

The Jatavs of village D consciously sought to extend the influence of their caste by supporting Jatavs from other villages. Thus, in the *pramukh* election, the *pradhan* of village D said he voted for the winning Brahman candidate⁴⁹ for *pramukh* and for a Jatav candidate for *up-pramukh*. The *pradhan* gave two reasons for voting for the Brahman in the *pramukh* election. First, it was "the opinion of the village" that the *pradhan* should vote for the Brahman and the Jatavs agreed. The second reason was that the Brahman had told the *pradhan* that if the *pradhan* voted for him, he (the Brahman) would in turn support a Jatav for *up-pramukh*. The *pradhan's* vote in this case was both parochial and opportunistic. It was meant simultaneously to serve a purpose in the village and to promote the interests of the Jatav caste in a broader area,⁵⁰ but the interests of the block as a whole and how they would be affected by the election of the Brahman *pramukh* had no place in the decision of the *pradhan* to cast his vote for the Brahman.

Similar factors influenced the *pradhan* and the Jatavs of the village in the voting for Assembly and Parliament. It was said (and supported by the actual results) that most of the votes in

the village went to the Congress candidate for the Assembly and to the Republican candidate for Parliament. The *pradhan* himself said he voted for the Congress Assembly candidate and for the Republican parliamentary candidate, but that the other Jatavs voted for the Republican Party for both Assembly and Parliament. Asked why he voted for the Congress Assembly candidate, the *pradhan* replied that he did so "because the Congress party took an oath from me." Someone else remarked that, in addition, the *pradhan* "wants to please even the Brahmans because his post is such that he must mix up with all the people, so he wanted to please the Brahmans of this village." Asked why they liked the Republican Party, the Jatavs present said that the "Party truly represents the backward group, the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes." Again, the same motives were given for the voting for Assembly and Parliament as for the block election—the symbolic importance of the *pradhan's* vote for the Brahman Congress Assembly candidate for village unity and the identification of the Jatavs with the Republican Party as a party which truly represented their caste and the low castes in general. The *pradhan* also claimed that he voted for Gautam in fulfilment of a pledge made, which is of no particular importance for the analysis.

As a final note on voting behavior in the village, the Jatavs claimed that the Brahmans voted for the Congress candidate for the Assembly and for Independent 1 for Parliament. The polling station results do not contradict the claim. The logical explanation for the Brahman vote would be that the Brahmans were willing to vote for the Congress candidate for the Assembly, since he was a Brahman, but not for the Congress candidate for Parliament, a Muslim. Whether the Brahmans voted for Independent 1 as an expression of solidarity with the Hindu community in general is not known.

Village E. The situation in village E was not a normal one on the day of the interview. The arrival of the interviewers, without warning, was at first greeted with suspicion. After some questioning as to the reasons for the suspicion, it was discovered that there had been a murder in the village that morning and it was suspected that the interviewers were policemen. For reasons which were not made fully clear, but which involved past conflict between Lodhas and Thakurs, a Thakur had fatally wounded a

Lodha with a javelin.

Village E, even more clearly than village D, lacked a truly dominant caste. Before *zamindari* abolition, five Rajputs owned all the land in the village. In 1962, approximately two-thirds of the village land was divided among three castes—Lodhas, Brahmans, and Rajputs—and the rest was owned by people from the nine other village castes. The largest castes in the village, in order of size were Rajputs (of the Pundir clan), Dhobis, Lodhas, Jatavs, Brahmans, and Kathiks.

The *pradhan* of the *gaon sabha* was a Kathik, serving his second term. He was 36 years old, could write and read a little, but was not literate and had had no formal education. The *pradhan* had twice defeated a Rajput candidate, who was once the *pradhan* of the village. The *up-pradhan* was a Lodha.

The *pradhan* was not able to vote in the *pramukh* election because of a technical error. In the general elections, he said that he voted Congress for both Assembly and Parliament. When asked why, a Jatav interrupted and said, "because he is the *pradhan* of the Congress." The *pradhan* denied the charge and simply said that he was in favor of the Congress party and that the Congress could not harm him if he did not vote for the party. The Jatav insisted, however, and said that if the *pradhan* supports the Congress, then the Congress MLA will help the *pradhan*. The Jatav (who sat on the ground in the place appropriate to his status in the village,⁵¹ but who spoke with the self-confidence appropriate to an owner of 15 *bighas* (or more than 9 acres of land) said that he voted for Maurya for Parliament and for "the Hathi" (elephant, symbol of the Republican Party) for the Assembly. Asked why he liked "the Hathi," he said, "because it is an impartial party." In the village, as a whole, it was said that Maurya got the most votes for Parliament and the Swatantra candidate got the most votes for the Assembly. The presumed voting pattern would be that Maurya got most of his votes in the village from the Jatavs, whereas the Swatantra candidate won support from the Rajputs and probably the Lodhas also.

The explanations of voting patterns here imply two kinds of motivations—the charge by the Jatav that the *pradhan* voted Congress because he either feared reprisal if he did not or expected favors if he did and the explanations of the Jatav of

his own behavior, which involved attachment to the Republican Party as a party.

Village F. Village F is a small village, which formed part of the *gaon sabha* of village C. In village F, much of the interview was conducted with the *pradhan* of the Chakbandi (Land Consolidation) Committee, a Pundir Rajput, as well as with other assembled villagers; (those who participated in the conversation were Pundir and Chauhan Rajputs). Before *zamindari* abolition, this village was owned by three *zamindars* from other villages. In 1962, the main landowning caste and the overwhelmingly predominant caste numerically were Gadarias, who preferred to be called Baghel Rajputs.

The interviewer had visited this village before the election with the Congress Assembly candidate, who had spoken to a group of about 20 villagers; in his speech, he mentioned the virtues of the package plan, tube wells, and how villagers would soon be able to increase greatly their yields in wheat. As we left the village, a villager came up to sing a parting song to the Congress candidate, in which he extolled the Congress for activating the country and doing good work and declared that the people must vote for the Congress candidate. Also, as we left, the Congress candidate had a brief huddle with the *pradhan* of the Land Consolidation Committee. It was explained afterward that the situation in the village was abnormal. It was said that, as in every village, there are factions in village F, but here some people had said that the Congress candidate had sided with one party. Hence, one party did not come to the campaign meeting.

When I visited the village again, I remarked that there had been factions in the village before and I asked what were the reasons for them. It was said that there had been some factions because of the election of the *gaon panchayat*. There were two factions. The defeated Lodha candidate was supported by the Lodhas and the Gadarias. Everyone else was said to be in the other group.⁵² Asked why the Lodhas were in one group, the villagers replied that it was only because of casteism, because "they want to make themselves Rajputs." Asked if they took meals together with the Lodhas, the Chauhans and Pundir Rajputs present said they did not, but that they treated the Lodhas with brotherly feeling and would take *pakka khana* (clean,

cooked food) from them. The relationship between the Chauhans and Pundirs and the Gadarias was said to be the same. Apparently, the Chauhans grant the Pundirs equality, but grudgingly. At one point, the interviewer remarked that there were so many different kinds of Rajputs in the village and asked which Rajputs were highest. One of the Chauhans said that the Chauhans were highest, but the Pundir said there was no difference. The Chauhan then retracted a bit and said, "some time ago, the Chauhan Rajputs were superior."

The villagers interviewed in village F displayed considerable frankness in talking of caste in village life and of its role in village politics. Yet, caste was not mentioned as an important factor in explaining voting behavior in the village. The following account of voting behavior in village F was given by the *pradhan* of the Land Consolidation Committee and the others present. Asked how he voted for Assembly and for Parliament, the *pradhan* replied, "I voted for Gautamji and for the Mussalman." It was then said that those present gave both their votes to the Congress. They voted "not for a particular man, but for the pair of bullocks" (the Congress symbol). Asked how the Lodhas of village C had voted, it was said that

some voted for Gautam and some for Chetanya Raj [the Swatantra candidate]. Those who voted for Gautam [in general] were mainly people in service in the Dairy Farm and in Aligarh.

Why did these people vote for Gautam?

Gautam helped them to get permanent posts. They were not being made permanent and, after some time, they were laid off. But Gautam asked the manager why he treated them like this and they were made permanent.

Why did some Lodhas vote against Gautam?

Some other party men told them that Gautam is not deserving and they thought they should give their votes to the other man.

Which candidates came to the village?

Only Gautam came here.

Why?

Because we declared that our votes would certainly go to Gautam, so the other candidates did not come here.

Why do you like Gautam so much?

People like Gautam so much because he helped them financially by allocating lakhs of Rupees when he was a minister for rural uplift and now they can find financial assistance for bullocks, seeds, fertilizer.

The questions here were designed to find out if the caste and factional quarrels of the *gaon sabha* influenced voting behaviour in either village F or village C. The responses indicated the contrary, that different factors were involved in the general elections than in village elections. Two motivations seemed to predominate in the explanations given: party loyalty (the vote for the pair of bullocks) and the familiar vote as a return for favors received. There was no evidence in the replies that internal quarrels were projected into the general elections.

Summary

The purpose of this analysis of voting patterns in six villages and of the explanations of those patterns given by villagers has been to examine the kinds of loyalties which affect the decisions of Indian voters in elections and to see if there are any differences in the attitudes of voters toward voting decisions in constituencies at different levels in politics. The voting behavior of villages and villagers in four different kinds of constituencies have been examined—the village itself or the *gaon sabha* elections for *panchayat* president, the block elections for *pramukh*, and the general elections for both Assembly and Parliament. At this point, it will be useful to present a scheme by which the breadth or narrowness of an individual's loyalties may be measured. Srinivas' "hierarchy of values" mentioned above is suggestive, but it must be modified to take account of the politically relevant choices that are actually available.

There may be an element of arbitrariness in establishing a hierarchy, but it seems logical to order politically relevant loyalties in the following manner, embracing loyalties to : 1) country, province, or relevant constituency; 2) party; 3) community—clan, caste, religion; 4) locality; 5) group within a locality; 6) individual self-interest in descending order of generality. The significance of these six categories will become

clear as they are applied in ordering the data that have been analyzed above.

Turning first to politics within the villages themselves, the first four categories are irrelevant. There is no reason to expect candidates for election to the presidencies of village councils to campaign on the basis of what they can do for the country; the constituency here is the same as the locality; the category community is meant to apply to supralocal social groups; finally, there is no evidence that party is a factor of any consequence in the politics of the villages analyzed here. The only considerations which reasonably can be expected to be of concern in village politics are the good of the village itself, of particular groups (families, castes, or factions) within the village, or of individuals. It is also possible that no such considerations may enter politics at all because of the dominance of a particular caste or family group within the village. The latter case applies to the situation in village A where the dominance of a family has been maintained, with no evidence of (open) conflict. The case of village A is unique among the six villages analyzed here. In all the other villages visited, those interviewed gave evidence of the existence of internal conflicts within the village.

Conflicts within the villages were based characteristically on a combination of caste and factional disputes. In village B, it was said that two factions existed in the village, that the leaders of the two factions came from the same family, and that they differed over questions of land distribution. The *pradhan* here, however, was elected because of his neutrality and he, at least, expressed his interest in seeking "cooperation among the villagers," presumably for the good of the village as a whole.

In village C and village F, in village D, and in village E, however, the elections for *pradhan* were contested and villagers spoke of both caste and factional disputes. In village C and village F, there was evidence of caste conflict between the middle castes of Lodhas (in village C) and Gadarias (in village F), on the one hand, and the Chauhan and Pundir Rajputs, on the other hand. However, it was said that divisions existed within all communities and that voting did not strictly follow caste lines. In village D, conflict centered around disputes between Jatavs and Brahmans, with other castes divided. In village E, the apparent lines of conflict were again between the

middle castes of Lodhas (and Kathiks also) and the previously dominant Pundir Rajputs. Once again, therefore, it deserves to be noted here, from the perspective of 20 years later, that there was evidence in 1962 of elite-backward caste conflicts at the village level in Aligarh district that became, in the later 1960s and 1970s, the predominant line of conflict in elections in most parts of the state. It is not possible, however, to say anything more about the lines of internal conflict in these villages on the basis of one or two visits. What is of most concern here is whether and to what extent village divisions were projected into elections at higher levels,⁵³ or whether other factors were predominant in the explanations given, which have been reported above.

It has already been demonstrated that parochial forces were strongest in the block elections, with most *prodhans* voting for members of their own local caste groups. The concern at this point is how the *pradhans* of the villages analyzed here voted and how they explained their votes. In village A and village C, as has been seen, the Chauhan *pradhans* gave their first two preference votes to Chauhans and their third to a Rajput of a different clan. No information on the reasons for the village A *pradhan's* vote in this case was taken and the *pradhan* of village C did not give reliable information. However, the loyalties involved are evident without further information. The important point to note from these two cases is that the primary community loyalty of voters is to their local caste unit (here the "clan") and only secondarily to the larger caste group (here Rajputs in general). Anthropologists have known for some time that one effect of modernization of communications and transportation facilities in India has often been to strengthen and broaden caste loyalties in the sense that members of castes sharing the same name and similar status in their local communities can now be brought together.⁵⁴ Modern electoral politics has the same effect. However, the block election indicated that the local caste group was still the effective political unit at lower levels in the political system in 1962.

Village F was part of the *gaon sabha* of village C: The *pradhan* of village E was not eligible to vote in the block elections for technical reasons. The vote of the village B *pradhan* was rejected, but he said that he voted for the winning Brahman

candidate because of the candidate's qualifications. Such a vote may be interpreted as a vote which has the interests of the block as a whole in mind, although admittedly there was no candidate of the *pradhan's* community to cause him a conflict of loyalties. The most interesting statement about voting behavior in the block elections came from the Jatav *pradhan* of village D, who said he voted for the successful Brahman candidate because of his desire to promote village unity and secondly to promote the interests of his caste.

In summary, the predominant motivations in voting for *pramukh* were caste motivations. Only one *pradhan* voted in a way which might have indicated that his primary interest was in the welfare of the block as a whole. Significantly absent were any considerations of party, and even more interesting, of the interests of the villages. None said he voted for a particular candidate because the candidate promised to help his village.

The explanations given for voting in the general elections provide an interesting contrast to the patterns revealed in the block election because they partly show a downward movement in the villagers' hierarchy of values as well as an upward movement. The downward movement comes in the persistent importance given to village problems and the ability of candidates to do something about them in the general elections, contrasted with the lack of reference to village problems in the block election. The basic reason for this change is probably that villagers had become accustomed to dealing with their MLAs, whereas the institution of the Block Development Committee and elections in it were relatively new and the functions to be performed by the Committee and its *pramukh* were not yet clearly defined. In any case, it is significant that a predominant motivation, if not the predominant stated motivation, in voting in the general elections in these villages was what the candidates could do for the villages. The responses indicated that Uttar Pradesh voters in 1962 were, in this respect, like Orissa voters in 1959, and that what Uttar Pradesh voters wanted were what Orissa voters wanted:

Their MLA is not the representative of a party with a policy which commends itself to them, not even a representative who will watch over their interests when policies are being

framed, but rather a man who will intervene in the implementation of policy and in the ordinary day-to-day administration. He is there to divert the benefits in the direction of his constituents, to help individuals to get what they want out of the Administration, and to give them a hand when they get into trouble with officials.⁵⁵

There was some evidence also of even more parochial considerations affecting attitudes, if not voting, in these villages. Thus, in village F, one village faction refused even to attend the election meeting of the Congress candidate because it was rumored that he had favored an opposing faction. In village D, the Jatav *pradhan* voted for a Brahman Assembly candidate to please the Brahmans in the village and thus promote village unity. In village E, it was suggested, but denied by the *pradhan*, that the *pradhan* had voted for the Congress in the expectation that he personally would be helped if the Congress candidate won. Finally, there was some evidence that local caste conflicts may have influenced voting behavior in some cases, although probably not decisively. For example, the dispute in village A, when it was thought that the Congress candidate had said that Jatavs should get preference over Thakurs, indicates that there was resentment in this area among the high castes over the special treatment accorded to the low castes by Congress governments.⁵⁶ There was certainly resentment among the elite castes over the aspirations of the Jatavs in the area for higher status and for political power. However, this resentment was not expressed directly as a reason for high caste voting against the Congress. It is not clear whether the Jatav vote for the Republican Party should be considered an extension of village conflicts. It might be more accurate to consider the Jatav vote as a turning outside the village for position and prestige which are not generally available through the processes of village politics and hence a broadening and an extension of the whole basis of politics in the countryside.

If there was some downward movement in terms of the hierarchy of values established here, there was also some upward movement. One move upward was in the focus of community loyalty. Thus, Chauhans voted for Chauhans in the block elections, but for a Rajput of another clan in the Assembly election, and for a Rajput whose clan was not generally known

and whose campaign appealed to the loyalties of Hindus generally in the parliamentary contest. There was no evidence that identifiable subdivisions played a political role among Jatavs. It can only be said that Jatavs generally voted as a community not only for candidates of their own community but many also voted for candidates of other castes and communities with whom the Republican Party had electoral pacts. Here again, it becomes difficult to characterize the nature of the loyalties involved. In a sense, electoral pacts may reflect merely the pyramiding of local loyalties to higher levels through the formation of alliances of mutual convenience. At the same time, it is also true that Jatavs did ally with other castes, a move which represents a different kind of, and in a sense a deeper, involvement in modern political processes than the mere casting of a vote for a candidate of one's own community.

The second kind of move upward made by a few of the villagers interviewed was toward identification with a particular party. The preeminent case in these villages was the Muslim *pradhan* of village B, who proclaimed his wholehearted support for the Congress as a party. Something similar may have been involved, although it is not so clear, in the case of the villagers of village F who voted for "the pair of bullocks." Similarly, in village D and village E, the Jatavs proclaimed their loyalty to the Republican Party. The expressions of Jatav loyalty to the Republican Party are especially interesting because of the fact that it was mentioned as a prominent factor in Republican success by some Congressmen that the Jatavs "worshipped" B.P. Maurya. The Jatavs may, in fact, worship him, but they said they voted for the Republican Party because they liked the Party.

Finally, even the broadest kind of reference, that to the good of the country, found a place in the election campaigns and to a modest extent in the behavior of voters. The Congress candidates spoke of practical matters relating to local and village affairs, but they tended to place such matters into the broader context of economic development, planning, socialism, and secularism. In one village, a man sang of the work being done by the Congress for the country and presumably he at least voted Congress party for this reason. However, only one man, the *pradhan* of village B, explicitly said that he voted Congress because of the good the Congress is doing for the country. It is

a moot question whether interviews with the mayors and other prominent figures in six small towns in rural America would uncover more people who would explain their voting behavior in this way.

V. Conclusion

At first sight, it may appear that there is some discrepancy between the conclusions arrived at on the basis of constituency-wide analysis and those reached on the basis of interviews with village leaders. The constituency analyses indicated that caste factors were of primary importance and that other factors played only a secondary role. The interviews with villagers revealed a persistent emphasis on the services provided or promised to the village as a factor in voting. The writer is inclined to rely more heavily on the constituency analyses than on the interviews in assessing the relative weight of these two factors for three reasons. First, most of those interviewed clearly represented a biased sample. The respondents were village leaders who might be expected to be subject to different kinds of influences than most of their fellow villagers. It is especially logical to expect village leaders to be concerned with village problems. Second, there was a noticeable reluctance on the part of some respondents in talking of caste as a political or even a social force. The fact is that most villagers had been subject to years of propaganda on the part of national leaders against "casteism" and, perhaps even more important, there are legal restrictions upon certain kinds of caste-motivated behavior in various aspects of life, including election campaigns. Finally, it is also true that in a sense, there is nothing incompatible in voting on the basis of caste and explaining the vote in terms of services expected, for no one is more likely to help a villager and his village more than his own caste fellow.

Whatever the relationship may be between caste-influenced voting and village-influenced voting, it is clear that both kinds of influences lie in the middle of the scale of values which has been set up here. Villagers in Aligarh district were not motivated primarily by individual self-interest or by internal quarrels within the villages in exercising their votes. Those who seemed primarily village-centered were, however, operating on a princi-

ple of politics which (even though it is far from absent from politics in Western societies) reflects their lack of integration into the political process except on their own terms. That is, such voters do not seek to become part of a larger society; they seek merely to manipulate an alien system for local advantage. Caste voting, however reprehensible it may appear to some national leaders, is of a higher order of generality than village-centered voting and involves a deeper commitment to the political system in that it means an association with others to work within the system for one's ends. There are two additional reasons why caste-based voting may reflect greater commitment. The first is that voting based on caste in the general elections in itself involves a broadening of identifications and is likely to lead to political coalitions with other social groups. Second, caste-based voting does contain the possibility of being transformed into party voting. When Jatavs vote for the Republican Party because that party best stands for its interests, not simply because it presents candidates of one's own caste, a transformation of political values and a deepening of political commitment is involved.

It is significant also that there was evidence that some people, a minority to be sure, voted on the basis of party sentiment. It is especially significant in view of the fact that the election involved a huge shift in support from the Congress to opposition parties. Yet, party loyalty in Aligarh in 1962 was very far from being the kind of force it has been historically in most Western democracies.⁵⁷ Even though there were some Aligarh voters in 1962 who had party attachments, it could not be said then that such attachments moderated the impact of caste and caste antagonisms in the politics of the district.

In short, the political parties and the electoral process in general did not serve as instruments of voter education in Aligarh in 1962 and they did not bring the broad economic and political issues into the forefront of the campaign. There was indeed a broadening of loyalties in the electoral process, particularly at the higher levels, but the election results in the block and in both the assembly and parliamentary contests were determined primarily by opportunistic alliances of mutual convenience among caste and community groups. These alliances were by their very nature unstable and it did not appear likely

in 1962 that the patterns would be repeated, anymore than the patterns in a kaleidoscope can be repeated. The second of the two possibilities mentioned at the outset as possible political effects of increased social diversity was thus the predominant effect. There was more pyramiding of parochial loyalties into the political process than broadening.

Yet, it should be recognized that there were also important social forces operating in the politics of Aligarh district in 1962 which could not be satisfied by mere political opportunism. Hindu-Muslim conflict was the most dangerous of these forces in terms of social integration. The movement of the low castes for power and status was the more widespread and was a factor which has continued to play a great role in Aligarh politics since then.

The question of the aspirations of the low castes also leads back to the argument of Madison in the Tenth Federalist paper. The question may be phrased as follows: does the evidence of voting patterns and voting results in 1962 at the several levels examined above suggest that movements on behalf of oppressed or disadvantaged minority groups are likely to be more successful in larger constituencies than in smaller ones? The interviews at the village level did reveal one case where a Jatav succeeded in getting elected as *pradhan* in a direct contest with a Brahman in a village in which Brahmans were the most influential caste. He succeeded with the solid support of his own caste fellows in the village combined with support from other low and backward castes. At the block level, however, Jatavs provided no candidates for the office of *pramukh*, which remained an affair entirely of the dominant castes of the area. There was no Jatav candidate for the Assembly, where the Republican candidate set up a Brahman candidate who polled third. In the Khair segment of the Aligarh parliamentary constituency, however B. P. Maurya prevailed here as he did in the constituency as a whole. He succeeded, however, by methods similar to those followed by the Jatav *pradhan* in village D, namely, by coalition with other groups, in this case Muslims and some Brahmans, in a close contest with a person of elite caste status. The Jatav-Muslim pact was the decisive factor in Maurya's success, but it has never been repeated in a major way since 1962. Consequently, in so far as elections are concerned, it cannot be said that

it is easier for a movement of social protest to succeed by its own efforts, in a larger constituency than a smaller in a society so socially diverse and fragmented, with multiple levels of loyalty.

What can be said on the basis of the voting evidence from different levels in Aligarh district is that it is easier for the dominant castes to prevent effective lower caste participation and representation in smaller units than in larger units when opportunities for such lower caste political expressions are available simultaneously at different levels. Chamar votes were able to carry some polling stations for assembly and parliamentary candidates of the Republican party in villages where Chamars were politically subordinate locally to dominant Brahman and Rajput castes. However, as I have noted in several other essays in this volume, low caste candidates are almost never serious candidates for elections in assembly and parliamentary contests in general constituencies. In this respect, the 1962 elections in Aligarh district were exceptional. If, however, we limit the definition of effective political expression by low castes to the ability to carry a large number of polling stations for a candidate or party of their choice, then the 1962 Aligarh elections were, on the contrary, a significant political watershed in contemporary north Indian political history. Since 1962, at any rate, the Congress especially has adopted a succession of programs to improve the condition of the low castes and has, as a consequence, become the preferred party of most Scheduled Caste voters in U.P. Those efforts have come from above, from a party and a national leadership seeking to aggregate votes and power in the larger political units of the Indian federal system.

EPILOGUE

After the 1962 elections, political parties operating in Aligarh district and in other large parts of the state where the divisive issues of Hindu-Muslim tension, low caste political mobilization, and caste antagonisms also had been evident had three alternative opinions for dealing with them. One option was to pursue the line of the Congress manifestoes, of Nehru's appeals, and of the Congress parliamentary candidate in Aligarh in 1962 by continuing to raise the great political and economic issues and the issues of socialism and economic planning in an effort to

transcend the parochial loyalties and social conflicts in the local societies. The second option was to integrate the demands of particular social groups and, even more effective, to absorb their leadership into one or another of the major political parties. The second way was a path by which parochial loyalties might have been transformed into party loyalties. The third option was for the parties, and especially the Congress as the major party, to try and split such social forces by offering positions of power, patronage, and privilege to a few leaders without attempting to solve the underlying social antagonisms or satisfy the social demands.

In the two decades since this piece was written, all three options referred to in the previous paragraph have been exercised by the leading political parties in the district, state, and country, with consequences for local political patterns. The first option, the effort to transcend local loyalties and social conflicts, has been enforced in parliamentary elections since 1971 when the parliamentary elections were "delinked" from the legislative assembly elections. Mrs. Gandhi's objects in "delinking" the assembly and parliamentary elections were to establish a national political base for herself and to free her and the national Congress organization from dependence upon powerful state party bosses. In the process, she sought also to nationalize issues in the parliamentary electoral campaigns and to win the support of broad categories of voters through specific programs and symbolic appeals. Her programs and appeals were directed especially towards the Muslim minority, the poor, the landless, and the Scheduled Castes.

The Congress also has used the second option, integrating the demands and absorbing the leadership of particular social groups. Insofar as Aligarh district is concerned, the most significant move of this type was the absorption of B.P. Maurya into the Congress⁵⁷. As I have indicated above, the Congress has in the process also integrated the demands of the poor and the low castes increasingly into its programs and appeals, with such slogans as *garibi hatao*, by dramatizing and sometimes distorting local incidents of violence into atrocities against Harijans and blaming them on opposition parties and their supporters, and also by implementing specific programs for the rural poor.

The leading opposition to the Congress in north India, the

BKD/BLD/Lok Dal, also has participated in the process of nationalizing issues and broadening appeals to large categories of voters. The BKD/BLD/Lok Dal in several elections has criticized the entire Nehru-Mrs. Gandhi approach to economic development for the country and proposed an agriculture and peasant-based alternative. It has attacked Mrs. Gandhi's leadership, the role of her sons in national politics, and her authoritarian tendencies revealed most strikingly during the Emergency period between 1975 and 1977. The BKD and the Lok Dal especially have appealed to the interests of the middle-sized peasant castes of intermediate or "backward" caste status which, in Aligarh district, mean especially the Jats.

The consequences of these opposing appeals have been some broadening of loyalties, but also a curious "parochialization" of the parliamentary electoral process. Some broadening of loyalties has taken place in the sense that the solidarity of some caste categories in support of particular political parties in constituencies across the whole state or large parts of it has increased. Thus, Brahmans everywhere in U.P. tend to support the Congress, other things being equal, and Jats and Yadavs (Ahirs) tend to support the party of Charan Singh, irrespective of the caste of the candidates put forth by the opposing parties. This kind of solidarity represents a broadening in several senses. It involves identification with caste category rather than *jati*. It involves large numbers of persons, spatially dispersed and not in direct contact with each other, voting the same way. It involves voting for a national party or a national leader rather than for a person known by caste and residence in the locality or in a neighboring area. On the contrary, it may involve ignoring unpleasant information about the caste and other affiliations of the local candidate for the sake of the broader interests of the community.

On the other hand, the kind of communal solidarity that has been expressed by some categories of voters can be interpreted somewhat differently as a form of "parochialization" of the national, parliamentary electoral process. Many Brahman voters vote for the Congress because they recognize the Nehru family as Brahman and because the local Congress organizations have, in fact, often been Brahman-dominated. Similarly, Jats and Yadavs vote for the party of Charan Singh because they

identify him as a man of their caste who will protect their interests and promote their aspirations for political and economic advancement in competition with elite castes.

This Brahman and backward caste solidarity, it should be noted, is somewhat different from the voting behavior of Muslims and Scheduled Castes. Muslim voting in U.P. has shifted in different elections and has varied regionally somewhat. It has often been different in rural and in urban areas in the same district, including Aligarh. Muslim voting has varied in these ways depending upon specific events in the broader environment, particularly Hindu-Muslim riots, on government policies affecting Muslim interests and values, and on the influence over the community of prominent personalities who have attempted to assess the interests of the community as a whole and to persuade its members to vote for one party or another on the basis of such an assessment. Although these several influences on Muslim voters have sometimes converged sufficiently so that most Muslims in U.P. in particular elections have voted for one party, there is no identification of Muslims as a community with a single party or leader as there is with most Brahmans, Jats, and Yadavs. Rather, there is a closer and more specific examination that takes place in each election of the interests of Muslims and of which party will best serve those interests. Although Muslim voting behavior does, therefore, tend to be different from that of some other categories of voters, the level of identification is similar to that of Brahmans, Jats, and Yadavs. The thinking involved is not simply local, but refers to the broader interests of the community of which one is a part and in which one's own personal and local interests cannot be viewed in isolation.

The voting behavior of Scheduled Castes in U.P. and in Aligarh district has been closer to that of the Muslims than to that of Brahmans, Jats, and Yadavs. However, there is a difference here also between the voting of Scheduled Castes and Muslims in the sense that one party, the Congress, has established a clear record of providing specific benefits to low caste persons through programs that have continued or through new programs introduced year after year. Largely because of the record of the Congress in providing programs that have benefited the Scheduled Castes, it has been difficult even for the

national Scheduled Caste leader, Jagjivan Ram, to draw voters from his own caste category of Chamar away from the Congress. Only in 1977, when there were many other factors at work, were there large-scale defections of Scheduled Caste voters in a national election from Congress to another party. For the most part, the Scheduled Castes in U.P. are considered by Congressmen and non-Congress party men to constitute a "committed" bloc of votes for the Congress.

Since the 1962 elections, therefore, there have been important changes both in the identifications of particular categories of voters with specific parties and in the relationship of categories of voters to the voting process itself, which have been manifested in Aligarh as well as in other parts of U.P. Whereas, in 1962 in Aligarh especially, Muslims and Jatavs generally voted against the Congress, Jatavs now generally vote for the Congress. The voting behavior of Muslims has become somewhat more problematic than that of the Jatavs, especially in Aligarh town, and varies from election to election. On the other side, the BKD/BLD/Lok Dal displaced the Republican Party and other non-Congress parties as the principal opposition to the Congress at all levels in the district from the Block to the parliamentary constituency. Since 1969, the party of Charan Singh has been able to count upon the support of the Jats and some other backward caste voters in its competition with the Congress. Thus, since 1962, a fairly persistent coalition pattern has developed in Aligarh district in which the Congress at the parliamentary level assumes the support of Brahmans and Jatavs and attempts to secure its hold on the Muslim vote as well, while the BKD/BLD/Lok Dal assumes the support of the Jats, strives to broaden its base among non-Brahman peasant proprietor castes generally, and tries to direct some Muslim support away from the Congress.

This basic coalition pattern leaves out the Rajputs, the third large and dominant landed caste of the district besides Brahman and Jats. As a result, therefore, the Rajputs have become the major swing element in the continuing struggle between the Congress and the party of Charan Singh. As noted elsewhere in this volume,⁵⁸ Rajputs have become the preferred candidates of both the Congress and the BLD/Lok Dal in the Aligarh parliamentary constituency as each side seeks the support of the

several Rajput clans for a margin that will provide a victory over its opponent. Insert attached.

On the whole, therefore, despite the continuing complexity of coalitional patterns, the volatility of some categories of voters such as the Muslims, and the lack of stable commitment of others, such as the Rajputs, a persistent structuring of electoral competition has emerged in Aligarh district at the parliamentary level that has its counterpart in many other districts in north India. Moreover, this structuring has involved a broadening of loyalties for some groups and a commitment to particular parties and leaders across time and space. At lower levels, there is now, as there was in 1982, greater diversity of voting patterns and more emphasis on local loyalties. than is the case at higher levels. It is also possible, as I have indicated, to interpret some of the voting behavior in parliamentary elections as motivated by parochial considerations of caste loyalty transferred upward to the highest level of political identification. However, the structuring of conflict between elite and backward castes, between the Congress and the party of Charan Singh, also extends downwards nowadays to the assembly and block level. The structuring is "imperfect" and the boundaries between elite and backward castes are often crossed as some elite castes vote for the Lok Dal and backward castes for Congress, but there is also a fundamental line of conflict in the north Indian countryside and a political struggle for control of economic resources between the elite and backward castes that has manifested itself in large parts of the state and at different levels of the political process. Were it not for the continuing hold of caste sentiment and political interest that keeps the Brahman proprietary castes with the Congress and the diversity and social fragmentation that remain characteristic of the social order in the north Indian countryside, a different kind of structuring might emerge that would pit the self-sufficient peasant proprietor castes against the big ex-landlords and commercial farmers, on the one hand, and the landless and dwarf landholders, on the other hand. The clear articulation and differentiation of such economic interests in party politics in north India is, however, prevented by the continuing hold of caste sentiments and caste antagonisms that cut across economic divisions and by the necessities of coalition building in this diverse and

complex society.

NOTES & REFERENCES

*The original version of this manuscript was completed on July 10, 1965, but never published. It has been revised specifically for this volume and includes a new Epilogue. It is, however, based primarily on interviews and data collected during my original field research in Aligarh district in 1961-62. In revising this manuscript, I have benefited from comments made on it years ago by W.H. Morris-Jones and Frank Conlon.

¹For some general analyses of the problems of national integration and political development as they were seen at that time in the new states, see Leonard Binder, "National Integration and Political Development," *American Political Science Review* LVIII, No. 3 (September, 1964), 622-631 and the collection of papers edited by Karl von Vorzys, "New Nations: The Problem of Political Development," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* CCCLVIII (March, 1965).

²This analysis has been influenced by the work of F.G. Bailey, *Politics and Social Change: Orissa in 1959* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963).

³*Ibid.*, p. 154.

⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 66-68.

⁵Myron Weiner and Rajni Kothari (eds.), *Indian Voting Behavior: Studies of the 1962 General Elections* (Calcutta: Firma K.L. Mukhopadhyay, 1965).

⁶James Madison, *The Federalist Papers*, No. 10. This quote has often been used to develop propositions and insights into American political processes. See, for example, E.E. Schattschneider, *Party Government* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1942), chap. ii and Grant McConnell, *The Decline of Agrarian Democracy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953), chap. xv.

⁷It may be noted in passing that it is precisely such a relationship between size and diversity which was presumed by the actions of many governments in Africa at the time, particularly in French Africa where, in order to eliminate party opposition which was regionally or tribally based, the number of constituencies was reduced (and hence their size enlarged), so that, in some states, there were only two, four, or six constituencies in an entire country. In a few states, the whole country became "a single constituency." See Immanuel Wallerstein, *Africa: The Politics of Independence* (New York: Vintage Books, 1961), p. 157.

⁸M.N. Srinivas, "The Nature of the Problem of Indian Unity," *Economic Weekly* (April 26, 1958), p. 577.

⁹See especially Raoul Naroll, "On Ethnic Unit Classification," *Current Anthropology*, V (1964), 288 and Michael Moerman, "Ethnic Identification in a Complex Civilization: Who Are the Lue?" *American Anthropologist*, LXVII (1965), 1224.

¹⁰Percentages derived from *Census of India, 1961, District Census Handbook, Uttar Pradesh 20—Aligarh District* (Allahabad: Superintendent, Printing and Stationery, 1966), Table C-VIII, pp. 132-133. There were also small numbers of persons, less than 1 percent, who belonged to other religious groups.

¹¹*Census of India, 1961, Aligarh District Census Handbook*, p. 135.

¹²*Ibid.*, p. 5 and 133.

¹³*District Gazetteers of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh*, Vol. VI: *Aligarh*, by H.R. Nevill (Lucknow: Govt. Branch Press, 1926), pp. 76-83.

¹⁴For an analysis of the social structure of an Aligarh village, see McKim Marriott, "Little Communities in an Indigenous Civilization," in McKim Marriott (ed.), *Village India: Studies in the Little Community* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), pp. 174-191.

¹⁵*Aligarh Gazetteer*, p. 77.

¹⁶Calculated from *Aligarh District Census Handbook, 1961*, pp. 14-15, 136.

¹⁷R.I. Duncan, *Levels, The Communication of Programmes, and Sectional Strategies in Indian Politics*, with Reference to the Bhartiya Kranti Dal and the Republican Party of India in Uttar Pradesh State and Aligarh District (U.P.), unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Sussex, 1979, p. 266. The other information on the Jatav Mahasabha and the SCF in this paragraph is drawn from pp. 264 to 270. This dissertation, which was written in the years between the first draft and the revision of this paper, raises similar issues concerning political behavior at different levels in Indian politics. I am grateful to Dr. Zoya Hasan for drawing it to my attention.

¹⁷For analyses of attempts by Chamars in an eastern Uttar Pradesh district to "Sanskritize" their practices, see the articles by Bernard S. Cohn, "The Changing Status of a Depressed Caste," in Marriott, pp. 53-77 and "Changing Traditions of a Low Caste," *Journal of American Folklore* LXXI, No. 281 (July-September, 1958), 413-421.

¹⁸Interview with Jatav leader in Chicago, June 28, 1963.

¹⁹*Ibid.*

²⁰*Ibid.*

²¹Data in this section on the largest castes in each village have been taken from the *Census of India, District Census Statistics, N.-W. Provinces and Oudh, Meerut Division* (Allahabad: North Western Provinces and Oudh Government Press, 1896). To the writer's knowledge, the 1891 census is the only census which provides such data. For an explanation of its continued usefulness and for other election analyses based upon it, see Paul R. Brass, *Factional Politics in an Indian State: The Congress Party in Uttar Pradesh* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965), pp. 155-164, esp. 158.

²²*Nehru's Appeal* (New Delhi: Congress Party in Parliament, 1961) and Indian National Congress, *Questions and Answers*, 5 (New Delhi: All India Congress Committee [AICC], n.d.), p. 12.

²³*Ibid.*, pp. 13-14.

²⁴*Election Manifesto of the Republican Party of India* (RPI) (New Delhi: RPI [1961]).

²⁵*Ibid.*, p. 9.

²⁶*Ibid.* p. 13.

^{26a}These quotes from pages 272 and 275 of the dissertation by Duncan confirm my own observations in 1962.

²⁷Ghanshyamsingh Gupta, *National Integration and Arya Samaj* (Delhi: Sarvadeshik Press, 1962).

²⁸A parliamentary constituency in Uttar Pradesh comprises five assembly constituencies.

²⁹Interview in Chicago, June 28, 1963.

³⁰A detailed analysis of factionalism in the Congress organization in Aligarh district and its effect upon the 1962 election there is given in Brass, *Factional Politics*, chap. v.

³¹*Ibid.*

³²Letter dated September 2, 1961.

³³From interviews in Lucknow and Aligarh on April 19, September 13, and September 25, 1962.

³⁴See Brass, *loc. cit.*

³⁵Interview in Aligarh on September 13, 1962.

³⁶Interview in Aligarh on September 17, 1962.

³⁷One constituency was uncontested by the Congress in 1962 because of the untimely death of a Congress candidate.

³⁸On the basis of village caste data from the 1891 census; see n. 21 above. The 1891 village census data on caste provide the exact number of members of the largest caste in each village. The percentage of the total population comprised by the largest caste in each case has a very considerable range. Nor do we know anything about the name and size of the next largest caste. In many, if not most cases, where the largest caste was one of the main proprietary communities, that caste is probably also now the "dominant caste" in the village, owning the major share of cultivated land. However, since there is no way of making such a determination on the basis of the available data, the polling stations in which one caste is numerically the largest will be referred to as "Rajput-predominant" or "Brahman-predominant," meaning only that the caste referred to had in 1891 at least a plurality of numbers in the village or villages that comprised the polling stations in 1962.

³⁹The difference between the highest and lowest votes for Assembly and Parliament of the three major parties in the constituency as a whole (Tables 2 and 3) are as follows: Swatantra 27.2, Congress 9.1, Republican Party, 8.8. This difference is called the "split-ticket-voting ratio" in voting behavior studies terminology. On its uses (among other devices) in American voting studies, see the article by Walter Dean Burnham, "The Changing Shape of the American Political Universe," *American Political Science Review* LIX, No. 1 (March, 1965), 7-28.

⁴⁰Rather than the candidate of the largest community. See Brass, *loc. cit.*

⁴¹The Uttar Pradesh Kshetra Samitis and Zila Parishads Adhiniyam, 1961, Schedule II.

⁴²The results of this election and the voting of the *pradhans* examined below became available as a result of an election petition filed by one of the losing candidates.

⁴³Interview in Lucknow on October 23, 1962.

⁴⁴In some respects, the block is an even narrower constituency than the villages which compose it. It is, of course, a general consequence of indirect elections to narrow the constituency at higher levels rather than broaden it.

⁴⁵The program was jointly sponsored by the Ford Foundation and the Government of India to introduce into selected rural districts an increased staff of agricultural experts and a "package" of improved practices and agricultural implements in the hopes of increasing agricultural yields dramatically. The program was popularly called the "package scheme."

⁴⁶Secretary of the village council, a paid government official not born in the village.

⁴⁷On the package scheme, see n. 45 above.

⁴⁸For reasons which are not known to the writer, but which add further weight to the complaints of the Jatav *pradhan*, the 1951 census listed *no* Scheduled Castes in village D. This error was corrected in the 1962 *District Census Handbook* for Aligarh, which listed 157 Scheduled Caste persons, 23 percent of the total population of the village.

⁴⁹According to the record, however, he voted for a Chauhan. It is possible, since he is uneducated, that he cast a wrong vote.

⁵⁰It may appear unsympathetic to call the Jatav *pradhan's* vote parochial and opportunistic or it may be unrealistic to expect any other kind of action under the circumstances. However, no value judgments are intended. Blacks in the United States who vote for a candidate *only* because of the candidate's stand on civil rights would also be acting in a parochial way. Although both the Jatav movement and the civil rights movement have a general significance in terms of fundamental human values, the only consideration relevant to the present analysis is the framework into which demands are put by *individuals*.

⁵¹The physical arrangement of the interviews usually involved two *charpoy*s placed opposite each other, on one of which the interviewer and his informant sat, while village leaders sat on the *charpoy* opposite. Other villagers present sat on the ground.

⁵²However, see the analysis of the same election given by the villagers in village C above.

⁵³The question is whether villagers viewed the broader electoral process as merely a field in which to continue local conflicts or whether they perceived the conflicts in the election as separate from village conflicts. The distinction is one elaborated by Bailey, esp. p. 93.

⁵⁴For example, G.S. Ghurye commented some time ago that "the community-aspect of caste has...been made more comprehensive, extensive, and permanent" by new caste organizations which unite various

"sub-castes" or local caste groups. See his *Caste and Race in India* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1932), p. 179. Actually, caste organizations of the sort discussed by Ghurye were not very important in U.P. politics in 1962. In Uttar Pradesh, the process of broadening of identifications had barely begun.

⁵⁵Bailey, p. 25.

⁵⁶Bailey has demonstrated that resentment of this kind was an important factor in voting in his village of Bisipara, pp. 45ff.

⁵⁷In the light of the article by Burnham, esp. p. 27, perhaps one should say European democracies. Burnham suggests that the "wide-spread ticket splitting" which occurs in the United States also reflects a relatively low level of party affiliation (compared both to Europe now and the United States in the nineteenth century), which in turn indicates "political alienation." This is just the point made above.

^{57a}In "Congress, the Lok Dal, and the Middle-Peasant Castes."

⁵⁸Maurya contested on the Republican party ticket and lost the parliamentary seat from Hapur in Bulandshahar district in 1967. He joined the Congress in December, 1970 and contested and won the same seat on the Congress ticket in 1971. He ran again on the Congress ticket in the same constituency in 1977 and lost, after which he joined the Lok Dal. He did not contest the 1980 Lok Sabha election. After that election he resigned from the Lok Dal and joined the Congress once again. In 1984, he joined the DMKP and contested his old constituency of Aligarh, which he lost. Although the details concerning his decisions to resign from the Congress and join the Lok Dal/DMKP and vice-versa in 1980 and 1984 are not available at this writing, Maurya's general pattern appears to have been to join the party that offers him a ticket to contest an W.P. seat and to resign if it is not offered in the next election and join the other side.

The Congress defeated Maurya and won the Aligarh seat in 1980 for the first time since 1957.

Class and Community Voting in Kanpur City*

Kanpur, with a population of 947,000 according to the 1961 census, is the largest city in Uttar Pradesh and one of the major industrial cities in the Indian Union. Second only to Bombay as a textile centre, Kanpur has also a wide variety of large and small factories in almost every sphere of industrial production, the most important in ordnance, leather goods, iron and steel, chemicals, metal products, engineering, and food and tobacco. In 1953, there were 273 factories in Kanpur, providing employment to 68,832 workers; the textile industry provided the bulk of this industrial employment, 28 factories providing employment, to 51,084 workers.¹ In the earning population of the city, industrial workers constitute the largest category, accounting for 22.25% of the total workforce. Manual workers in general, both industrial and non-industrial, account for 30.02% of the earning population. The next largest category of earners, 20.64%, are those engaged in trade and commerce—13.43% as petty traders and hawkers and 6.57% “with a considerable business turnover.” Also included in the commercial population of the city are the middemen (2.48%) and the shop assistants (4.95%). Other important economic categories in the city are the white

*Research for this article was carried out during the tenure of a Foreign Area Training Fellowship granted by the Ford Foundation. Many people in Kanpur gave me their time and their help; I wish to acknowledge particularly the assistance of Mr. Arjun Arora, MP, who read and criticised the first version of the article. However, the responsibility for the statements, opinions, or any errors in the article is entirely mine.

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collar workers—scribes typists, and stenographers—(8.81%), liberal professions (5.16%), artisans (11.92%), and the “executive, managerial, and technical” class (2.59%).²

Ethnically, the population of the city is predominantly Hindu, although Muslims constitute a large minority, with over 20% of the population of the city. Scheduled Castes are only a little over 5%, according to the census. A large proportion of industrial and manual labour comes from the Muslims and the Scheduled Castes. Among caste Hindus, Brahmins predominate, with Baniyas, Thakurs and Rajputs, Kayasthas, and Khattris following in descending order.³ Baniyas and Khattris, of course, provide a large proportion of the shopkeeping and trading class, but no generalisations can be made about other castes. Most of the high castes are spread over the city and do not dominate (numerically) any particular geographical area, although there are some concentrations of Khattris, Baniyas, and Kayasthas in a few sections of the city. The same is more or less true of the Scheduled Castes, but there are large concentrations of Scheduled Castes in a number of industrial areas of the city. The Muslim population of the city is partially scattered; but, in many areas, Muslims are in an overwhelming majority and, in others, they constitute a very large minority. Kanpur has also a highly localized population of Sindhi and Punjabi refugees in two or three areas of the city.

Kanpur City, with its extended area, forms one discrete electoral unit, comprising one parliamentary and five assembly constituencies. The city is further divided into thirty-six wards for corporation elections. Below the wards are the various mohallas or chaks, each with its own special character and most dominated by one or another of the important sections of the population of the city—labourers, shopkeepers, wholesale dealers, the educated middle class, Hindus, Muslims, Scheduled Castes, or refugees.

Kanpur lies on the southern bank of the Ganges River. The main concentrations of factories and industrial workers stretch from the northern part of the city on the bank of the river to the central, western and southern portions of the city; these areas comprise three of the five assembly constituencies. Here also are concentrated a large proportion of the minority communities and “depressed classes” of Kanpur—Muslims,

Scheduled Castes, and refugees. Industrial labour forms an important part of a fourth of the five assembly constituencies also—the central east constituency, the heart of the city, containing the central business section. This is a mixed constituency, partly business; here also, Muslims form a large percentage of the total population, both of industrial workers and businessmen (shopkeepers and wholesale dealers). The last assembly constituency is also a mixed constituency, but of a different sort; this constituency extends from the eastern business section of Kanpur out into the countryside, including a large number of villages of Kanpur tehsil which are included within the limits of the Kanpur Municipal Corporation. This constituency is, thus, a primarily non-industrial, partly urban business, and partly rural constituency.

My concern in this article will be with the parliamentary contest in Kanpur City. However, to gain a better understanding of the motivations of groups of voters in Kanpur and of the interrelationship between the parliamentary and assembly contests, references to the assembly contests will also be necessary. Although it is true, as one local political leader in Kanpur said to me, that five assembly constituencies do not make a parliamentary constituency and that the parliamentary constituency has a personality of its own, it is still impossible to understand the nature of the forces at work in the parliamentary contest without knowing what is going on in the assembly contests. Moreover, to the extent that the parliamentary contest develops a character of its own, the behaviour of various groups of voters will vary in the two election contests.

That the parliamentary constituency in Kanpur City has developed a "personality" of its own cannot be denied. The city has seen five parliamentary contests since the first general election in 1952—three general elections and two bye-elections. The history of these five elections has given the parliamentary contest a character of its own, setting loose forces which do not operate at all in the assembly contests. For reasons which will be explained below, the parliamentary contest has, in the last three elections—the second bye-election and the 1957 and 1962 general elections—resulted in a thoroughgoing polarization of Congress and anti-Congress sentiment, with disastrous results for the Congress. This polarization was

maintained in the 1962 election despite the same fragmentation of opposition forces in the parliamentary contest as in the assembly contests, where no polarization has yet developed. One of the important things that has to be explained is how this polarization has developed in the parliamentary contest in isolation from the opposite tendencies in the assembly contests. A glance at Table I, which gives the results of the five parliamentary contests and the percentage of votes polled by the Congress and the main opposition candidate will give an indication of the development of this polarization. Although there has been a decline in the percentage of the total vote polled by the two main candidates since the second bye-election, none of the other four candidates polled significantly in 1957 and only the Jan Sangh candidate polled significantly (7.86%) in the 1962 election, although not enough to distract attention from the main contest and not enough to retain his security deposit.

TABLE I

Comparison of Congress and Main Opposition Vote (in percentages): In Parliamentary Elections in Kanpur City

<i>Election</i>	<i>Congress</i>	<i>Main Opposition</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>No. of Candidates</i>
1952	64.91	12.89	77.80	8
1st bye-election	42.92	32.10	75.02	4
2nd bye-election	43.70	55.30	99.00	3
1957	40.11	49.49	89.60	6
1962	30.97	53.21	84.18	10

In the 1952 election, the Congress candidate was the late Hariharnath Shastri, one of the early leaders of the labour movement in Kanpur and a respected and popular figure in Kanpur politics. With the death of Hariharnath Shastri, the Congress lost a very popular parliamentary candidate and a great deal of its hold over the labour vote in Kanpur. The Congress hold on the labour vote was seriously weakened in the first bye-election when, against two strong opposition leaders, Raja Ram Shastri on a PSP ticket and Sant Singh Yusuf on the Communist ticket, the Congress set up one of the leading

cloth merchants of Kanpur—an active and important Congress leader of Kanpur, but one with no work in the labour movement. Although there were four candidates in this by-election, the fourth received an insignificant number of votes; for practical purposes, the contest was a triangular one. The runner-up was Raja Ram Shastri, the PSP candidate, who polled 32.1% of the total vote; the Communist candidate, Sant Singh Yusuf, polled, 22.1%. Together, the two defeated candidates polled 55.2% of the total vote.

The first bye-election was held in April, 1954 at the time when the bitter controversy over rationalization in the textile industry was gathering force. The successful Congress candidate publicly opposed the official Congress and Government policy on rationalization during the campaign and resigned less than five months after his election, allegedly because of his disagreement with the Government and the party on this issue. In the summer of 1954, between the first and second bye-elections, the Suti Mill Mazdoor Sabha—a united front of the five Independent, Socialist, and Communist textile workers' unions in the city (and including some leaders of the INTUC union) was formed to fight rationalization in the city's textile industry. This united front was carried into the second bye-election of February, 1955, in which Raja Ram Shastri ran again on the PSP ticket, with Communist support this time, and defeated the Congress candidate, Chail Bihari Dixit "Kantak" by 14,000 votes. The Congress candidate in this bye-election also was not from the labour movement and had contested the 1952 election as an Independent, running third.

The opposition alliance was maintained during the 1957 election, with the Communists, the PSP, the Socialists, and some disgruntled Congressmen supporting S. M. Banerji, who ran as an Independent. Banerji was then the leader of the Defence Employees' Union in Kanpur and had been dismissed from Government employment in 1956 for participating in the famous 80 days' general strike in the textile industry, led by the Suti Mill Mazdoor Sabha in 1955 on the rationalization issue. The Congress candidate in 1957 was the only prominent INTUC leader in the textile industry who remained out of the Suti Mill Mazdoor Sabha and who did not participate in the 80 days' strike. The Congress candidate lost to Banerji by over

16,000 votes, while the percentage of the total vote polled by the Congress declined still further.

Although S. M. Banerji ran as an Independent, he openly calls himself a Communist sympathizer, voted consistently with the Communists in Parliament, and participated in walk-outs only with the Communist group in the House. Banerji's sympathies were not unknown in 1957, but his persistent association with the Communists in Parliament and, on the other side, the growth of virulent anti-Communist feeling as a result of the Chinese aggression signalled the end of opposition unity in this last election in Kanpur City. Banerji was opposed by nine candidates—both the PSP and the Socialist candidates from the labour movement—and was left with the support only of the Communists. Banerji's Congress opponent was Vijay Kumar Sinha, an old revolutionary of Kanpur and an associate of Bhagat Singh. Sinha had been out of Kanpur for over fifteen years and was brought into Kanpur to contest against Banerji largely on the recommendation of one of the important factional leaders of the City Congress. Despite the breakdown of opposition unity in this election and the existence of ten candidates in the field, the contest became from the beginning a straight fight, in which Banerji achieved an impressive victory, unexpected in its proportions—polling the highest number of votes and one of the largest majorities in the Parliamentary elections in the whole of the state.⁴

Banerji could not have won this election without the support of the Communists, but the Communists could not have won this seat without Banerji. The Communists put up only three assembly candidates in Kanpur and won only one assembly seat. In the assembly constituency in which the Communist candidate was successful, Banerji outpolled the supporting Communist candidate by 14,000 votes. Although Banerji had some workers from the Bank and Defence Employees' unions and from a number of educated, middle class people who are leftist independents, he had no real organization of his own; his campaign was completely in the hands of the Communist party. What Banerji brought with him to the contest was the admiration of most industrial workers, particularly in the ordnance factories, but not exclusively, for his service to the

labour movement in the city; the attraction of a powerful personality; excellent oratory; and a record of hard work and vigorous opposition in the parliament, as well as accessibility to his constituents; and last, but not least, the image of previous success against the Congress, which drew to him all those from all walks of life who have become discontented with Congress policies or Congress administration or both for widely different reasons and who want to see an effective opposition in Parliament as a check on Congress rule.

The Candidates and the Campaign

In an urban parliamentary constituency, the personality and the oratory of the candidate are important factors. Banerji clearly had the edge throughout the campaign in both respects. Banerji has been active in the labor movement in Kanpur since 1946, particularly amongst ordinance workers, bank employees, and to some extent textile workers. He has been to jail twice since independence for his participation in strikes and he was dismissed from Government employment for his participation in the 80 days' textile workers' strike of 1955 in Kanpur. In contrast, Vijay Kumar Sinha, although born in Kanpur and associated with the revolutionary movement and its leaders there in the late 1920's has never been part of local politics and had been out of Kanpur and out of politics since his release from prison in 1945. He was selected by the State Congress Parliamentary Board largely on the recommendation of one of the factional leaders of the local Congress. He was chosen without reference to the mandal poll of Congress workers, which gave the largest number of votes to a local Congressman in opposition to the nominee of the dominant group in the City Congress; and, without reference to the wishes of the INTUC leadership.

In addition to the advantage of continuous participation in local politics, Banerji had a definite superiority in speaking ability over Sinha. Banerji is quite an impressive and eloquent speaker and holds his audience in rapt attention. Sinha, in contrast, is a very poor speaker and failed to hold on to his audiences. Banerji invariably drew larger and more attentive audiences throughout the campaign.

Banerji had the additional advantage of a well-nursed constituency and a reputation for accessibility to his constituents.

As an example of his accessibility, both his opponents and his supporters pointed to the prodigious number of certificates he had signed in his five years as an MP. There are a wide variety of applications, including applications for student concessions, forms certifying that a man is a member of a Scheduled Caste and is entitled to whatever privileges are being requested, attestation certificates for jobs, applications for the allotment of houses, and the like, which can be signed only by an MLA, an MLC, an MP, or a gazetted officer. Banerji's detractors argued that he had no scruples about signing these applications and never bothered to inquire into the accuracy of their contents. His supporters claimed that he signed such applications without charging any fees, as others are alleged to have done. In either case, both his supporters and his opponents agreed on the great number of such applications which Banerji had signed and on the advantage which this gave him in the campaign.

One apparent disadvantage which Banerji faced in the campaign was the allegation against him that he was a *chupa hua* or crypto-Communist. In the early part of the campaign, Banerji and his supporters tried to emphasize the need for a strong opposition to the Congress to watch over the administration and to check corruption and they pointed to Banerji's record in parliament in this regard. The Congress speechmakers answered by accusing Banerji of being overcritical and neglecting the real progress the country had made under the Plans. However, gradually the speeches, pamphlets, and posters began to concentrate more and more on the accusation that Banerji was a Communist and on its rebuttal. Banerji mentioned the charges against him in every speech and put himself in the same position as Krishna Menon in Bombay. He argued that those people who were saying that he and Menon were Communist were really themselves pro-American. Against the charge that a vote for him would be a vote for more Chinese aggression, Banerji claimed that his young son would be the first to go to the front in any war with China.

There is no way of measuring the impact of this kind of "issue" on the outcome of the campaign except through public opinion surveys. Given Banerji's popularity, it is likely, as one local Communist said to me, that the charge against Banerji had little effect on the campaign, but helped the Communist

party in general, since the people would reason that if Banerji was a Communist, then the Communists must be very nice people. Among the leftist, but anti-Communist, independents from the educated middle class, some rejected the charge as Congress propaganda; others argued that even if Banerji were a Communist, the need for an effective opposition to the Congress was so great that they would vote for him anyway.

During the campaign, many in the Congress camp were expecting a close contest in which the massive Congress organization and its financial resources, combined with the breakdown of opposition unity, would neutralize Banerji's admitted popularity, leaving the decision to the "floating" voter. The Congress organization remains massive and its financial resources infinite in Kanpur City, but most of its resources were concentrated in the assembly contests. It was even charged that the dominant group in the City Congress was only lukewarm in its support for Sinha, considered a nominee of the opposing group. In contrast, the Communists concentrated most of their energies on Banerji and hoped that one or two of their assembly candidates might come in on Banerji's coattails.

Neither the Congress nor the Communists were short on workers. If the Communists had fewer workers, they made up for the difference in numbers by the intensity of their campaigning. The Banerji camp was pinched for funds, but managed to maintain at least a visible equality with the Congress in posters and pamphlets; the Congress did have twelve cars to the Banerji camp's five and probably had more loudspeakers, but these disadvantages were equalized by the differences in the allocation of resources between the parliamentary and assembly contests by the Congress and the Communists. Sufficient publicity is an essential element in this kind of constituency, especially for an Independent candidate who must make his symbol known, and Banerji had sufficient publicity.

Some argued that despite Banerji's successful meetings and processions, despite his posters and pamphlets, the whole campaign would fall apart on polling day because of the inability of the Banerji camp to put *shamianas* or tents in every polling booth, with workers to help fill out the voter's registration card and, at the same time, give him the final and crucial push in the right direction. The Banerji camp did lack the resources

TABLE 2
Vote for Banerji and the Congress (in percentages) in
Muslim majority areas of Kanpur City, 1957 and 1962

Consti- tuency	Chak No.	Name	Vote for Banerji		Congress		% of Muslims*	Type of Area
			1957	1962	1957	1962		
IV	99	Begamganj	68	78	24	11	87	Labor
III	90	Anwarganj	61	77	31	14	78	Labor
III	97	Talak Mohal	71	76	33	12	91	Labor
III	44	Butcher Khana	73	72	21	18	91	Commercial
IV	88	Chamanganj	61	67	23	20	81	Labor
III	89	Dalelpurwa	51	66	37	23	57	Labor
II	17	Kursawan	**	63	**	24	58	Mixed
V	Civil	Faithfulganj						
	6 & 11	Khapra Mohal	71	60	23	29	66	Labor
I	20	Chatai Mohal	46	59	46	27	63	Commercial
	39	Maida Bazar						
	40	Naya Chowk						
III	41	Farrash Khana						
	94	Farrash Khana	59	57	33	30	58	Commercial
	42	Bisati Bazar						

*According to 1951 census.

**No correspondence between 1957 and 1962 polling stations.

to put up these tents in most polling booths, but the intelligence and subtlety of the urban voter was underestimated. On polling day, the Congress tents were, in most places, the busiest; but, obviously, a very large number of voters accepted the help of the Congress workers and voted for Banerji.

The breakdown of opposition unity was considered still another disadvantage for Banerji. In 1957, Banerji had the support of the Communists, the Socialists, the PSP, and several Independents. In some of the assembly constituencies, he had the support of more than one candidate. Banerji was accused of double-dealing in this respect in 1957. However, an astute assembly candidate, or his worker, does not have to have an electoral pact or expect reciprocal support, to ask for one vote for himself and one vote for a popular parliamentary candidate. This is the Indian version of the coattail phenomenon and it cuts across party lines. It would be too much to expect of an energetic borker, canvassing for an assembly candidate and observing a trend in favor of a popular parliamentary candidate, not to try to cash in on the parliamentary candidate's popularity in this way. A similar strategy is what the General Secretary of the Kanpur PSP called "pirating." The PSP Secretary's charge was that Communist workers, in the two constituencies where the Communists had no candidate in this last election, were soliciting votes for the PSP assembly candidates and then asking for a second vote for Banerji. How much of this pirating went on is not known, but it was not needed, since Banerji outpolled both these PSP candidates even in their strongholds. A really effective electoral pact of this sort, whether formal or tacit, will reveal itself in the election results. One or two of these pacts were quite effective in 1957 in restricted areas; but, in 1962, Banerji's support crosscut the support of almost all assembly candidates. Any benefits derived from such pacts were certainly mostly one way, that is, the benefit was to the assembly candidate who attached himself to Banerji's coattails and not vice-versa.

Analysis of the Vote

Muslims. The Congress and the Banerji workers knew throughout the campaign where their strengths and weaknesses lay. Banerji was known to have strength among labourers

generally and among Muslims and Scheduled Castes in particular, who make up the bulk of industrial labour force of the city. In fact, Banerji's greatest strength was in the Muslim majority areas, among all economic classes of Muslims. Table 2 compares the vote for Banerji and the Congress in some of the Muslim-majority areas of the city (selected at random)- Banerji polled well above his citywide average in all of these areas in 1962 and in all but one in 1957; his percentages in Begamganj, Anwarganj, Talak Mohal, and Butcher Khana in 1962 were among his best in the city. Despite an already very high poll in most of the Muslim-majority areas in 1957. Banerji's vote increased sharply in all but three areas in the sample from 1957 to 1962. In only one area did Banerji's vote decline significantly, whereas the Congress vote declined in all but one of these areas.

The Muslim vote has been the subject of a great deal of speculation since independence, particularly in U. P., where the Muslim League had a very strong base. The Communist party in Kanpur still has a hard core of support in the Muslim areas, which it owes largely to its pro-Pakistan policy in the late '30s and early '40s. However, in most of the Muslim areas where Banerji's vote increased in 1962, the Communist vote in the assembly contests declined; nowhere did the Communist vote or that of any other party approach Banerji's poll in the Muslim areas.

A number of campaign workers both for the Congress and for Banerji gave a simple formula to describe the voting tendencies of Muslims in the city. The formula is that if the Congress alone puts up a Muslim candidate, Muslims will vote for the Congress; if a leftist party alone puts up a Muslim candidate, then Muslims will vote for the leftist; if both the Congress and a leftist party put up Muslim candidates, then the Muslim vote will be split; finally, if there is no Muslim candidate at all, Muslims will vote leftist. The implication of the formula is that Muslims have a tendency both for bloc voting for candidates of the community and for leftist candidates generally, in about equal proportions. The formula reflects more accurately the voting in the assembly contests in Kanpur than in the parliamentary contest. In the parliamentary contest, the only Muslim was the Socialist candidate, who polled insignificantly everywhere in the city, including the Muslim areas. It should

not be assumed that leftism took precedence over communal voting in the parliamentary contest. There is certainly a core of genuine leftism in the Muslim vote for Banerji, since many of the Muslims in the city are factory labourers living in some of the worst slum areas of the city; but this alone does not explain the high poll for Banerji. The alleged leftism of the Muslim voter is largely an expression of traditional anti-Congress sentiment which grew up during the tensions of prepartition days.

Labour. It is not surprising that an active and popular leader should be able to sweep the polls in most of the predominantly labour areas against a non-labour candidate, as Banerji did in the labour areas of Kanpur (Table 3). What is more important is the question to what extent Banerji's success in the labour areas reflects only his personal popularity or a real Congress-weakness in the labour areas of the city. Banerji polled 51% or

TABLE 3

Vote for Banerji and the Congress (in percentages) in Selected*
Labour areas of Kanpur City, 1957 and 1962

Constituency	Chak No.	Name	Vote for			
			Banerji		Congress	
			1957	1962	1957	1962
I	10	Khalasi Line	51	74	41	22
II	133	Juhi Hamirpur Road	62	69	24	18
I	12	Gwaltoli	65	61	28	28
II	121	Shastri Nagar	**	58	**	28
I	4&5	Purana Kanpur	52	58	33	25
III	85	Lakshmi Purwa	57	57	37	32
II	14	Fazalganj, Anwarganj, & Northern Railway Quarters	**	57	**	29
IV	103	Colonelganj	43	56	52	36
I	9	Macrobertganj	61	56	28	30
II	119	Darshanpurwa	51	52	39	33
II	—	Armapur	47	51	49	35

*Random selection, excluding Muslim labor areas.

**No correspondence between 1957 and 1962 polling stations in these areas.

better in all eleven areas in the sample in 1962 and in all but two in 1957; he secured a higher percentage of the total vote than his citywide average in all but two of the labour areas in the sample both in 1957 and in 1962. The Congress candidate in 1962 was not able to poll above 36% in any of these areas; in 1957, even with a labour candidate, the Congress polled a majority in only one area.

In general, the Congress position in the major labour colonies is poor, but no party has the influence which Banerji has personally in the labour areas. The trade union movement as a whole is quite weak in Kanpur, largely as a result of inter-party struggling and manoeuvring for position. Every industry suffers from multiple unionism and every major political party, except the Jan Sangh, has some following among the labourers. Broadly speaking, the Communists are strongest in the textile industry whereas the Congress is strongest in government-run industries, such as the defence industry and the railways. What is most impressive about Banerji's support is that it comes from all categories of labourers. For example, in the areas in the Kanpur City II (South) constituency listed in the table, the successful Communist candidate polled better than his Congress opponent in the assembly contest in the predominantly textile labour colonies—Juhi Hamirpur Road, Shastri Nagar, and Darshanpurwa; whereas the Congress candidate polled better in the assembly contest in the railway and defence employees' colonies—chak no. 14 (railway employees) and Armapur (defence employees). In contrast, for parliament, Banerji polled 57% of the 1962 vote in chak no. 14, compared to a mere 20% for his supporting Communist candidate, and 51% of the vote in Armapur, compared to only 15% for the Communist candidate in the assembly contest.

Some of the Congress labour workers expressed discontent at the ticket selection this year, particularly at the fact that no INTUC leader had been given a ticket either for parliament or the assembly. They argued that, traditionally, with the exception of the two parliamentary bye-elections, INTUC nominees have been given the parliamentary ticket and one assembly ticket. In fact, factional considerations have always dominated the ticket selection for the Kanpur Congress candidates. INTUC was completely unrepresented in the ticket distribution this time because

INTUC no longer has any leaders from the city who have real influence in party factions either in the local Congress or at the State level. There were two potential Congress candidates from the labour movement for the parliamentary ticket, but one had no factional backing and, thus, was never really in the running. The other aspirant was a non-INTUC labour leader who had recently rejoined the Congress, after a long separation, specifically to fight the parliamentary election. He was identified, however with one of the factional groups in the City Congress and lost out in the final selection. Another Congress labour worker was being considered for the South (II) assembly seat, but he too fell a victim to the factional quarrels of the City Congress. Both major groups expressed the desire to give one assembly ticket to a Congress labour worker—as long as the ticket given fell within the domain of the opposite factional group; neither group was willing to give ground, with the result that no INTUC candidate received a nomination. The selection of the INTUC worker considered for the city South constituency probably would have made no difference to the outcome (the seat was lost to a Communist); it was admitted to me by one of the older INTUC leaders in Kanpur that the man had no “mass” support and would not have made a popular candidate in this predominantly labour constituency. Either of the other two Congress labour leaders might have polled better than Vijay Kumar Sinha in the parliamentary contest, but it is possible that any local man would have done so. In fact, there is no other labour leader in Kanpur who could have polled well among all sections of industrial workers, as Banerji did both in 1957 and in 1962.

Scheduled Castes. Scheduled Castes constitute a high percentage of the industrial labour force and are in a large minority in most of the important labour colonies—particularly in the Khalasi Line, in the Juhi Hamirpur Road area, in Gwaltoli, Lakshmi Purwa, and Purana Kanpur. Only in the Colonelganj chak No. 103, however, are Scheduled Castes in a majority. The vote for Banerji in this area increased from 43 to 56% and for Sinha declined from 52 to 36% (Table 3). The vote in one chak does not provide sufficient evidence to distinguish the Scheduled Caste vote from the labour vote in general, but most Congress workers felt that the Scheduled Castes, particularly the Chamars,

were not with the Congress. The Republican party, which is the political expression of militant anti-Congress sentiment among the Scheduled Castes, put up Scheduled Caste candidates in two assembly constituencies. The Republican candidates polled poorly in both constituencies, but had pockets of strength in areas where Scheduled Castes are concentrated. In the Colonelganj chak no. 103, the Scheduled Caste candidate (a Chamar) outpolled all other assembly candidates, with 38% of the vote against 33% for the Congress candidate; in the parliamentary contest in this chak, Banerji polled 56% against 36% for the Congress. A highly splintered assembly vote was transformed into a majority vote for Banerji in the parliamentary contest. Banerji acted with the Scheduled Castes, as he did with Muslims, as a channel for the expression of anti-Congress sentiment which, in the assembly contests, found only a parochial outlet.

Caste Voting. In general, most local politicians claim that caste is an important factor in voting behaviour even in an Industrial city like Kanpur. It is said of industrial workers that they remain factory workers only at the mill gates; when they go to their homes, they become subject to the influences which operate in their mohallas. Among these influences, which include local rivalries, the money-lending nexus, or simply personal influence—for example, of local shopkeepers in a predominantly labour area—caste is an important element. Its influence can be seen clearly in the voting statistics in the assembly contests in the few mohallas which have large concentrations of a particular caste. In one constituency in particular (No. IV, Central West), traditional rivalry between Brahmins and Kayasthas was a major factor in election politics for the assembly contest. Banerji is a Brahmin and Vijay Kumar Sinha a Kayastha, but both are Bengalis by origin and have little relationship with the local castes. There was no detectable bloc voting by caste for either Banerji or Sinha, but it would not be correct to say that caste had no influence in the parliamentary contest. However, the influence of caste voting was certainly much less in the parliamentary contest than in the assembly contests and was not a determining factor in the election outcome.

Educated Middle Class. Among the educated, professional middle classes in Kanpur, the issues of the campaign had most

importance. It was among these people that the question of Banerji's affiliations with the Communist party was most hotly debated. To many, the idea that Banerji might be a *chupa hua* Communist was unpleasant, but there was a strong feeling that the need for an effective opposition to the Congress was so great that Banerji should be given the benefit of the doubt. Among others, anti-Banerji feeling was virulent and some argued that Banerji was engaging in deception, which was considered worse than an open avowal of Communism. To these people, the Kanpur election was a miniature North Bombay and Banerji and Krishna Menon were lumped together as hidden Communists. Thus, among the educated middle classes, there was a conflict between the desire of most to see an effective opposition to the Congress and the dislike of most for Communists and their sympathizers. A comparison of the vote for Banerji and the Congress in 1957 and 1962, however, indicates that most opted for effective opposition; the results of the poll in the middle class residential areas are given in Table 4.

TABLE 4

Vote for Banerji and the Congress (in percentages) in Middle Class Residential Areas of Kanpur City, 1956 and 1962

Constituency	Chak No.	Name	Vote for			
			Banerji		Congress	
I	18	Arya Nagar	1957	1962	1957	1962
I	14	Civil Lines	49	52	41	31
I	15	Civil Lines	39	50	54	38
I	16	Civil Lines	38	50	54	38
	37	Mall Road	**	50	**	40

**No correspondence between 1957 and 1962 polling stations in this area.

Commercial Middle Class. Banerji's worst poll and Sinha's best generally fell in the predominantly Hindu commercial and trading areas of the city—particularly in areas like Generalganj, where the big wholesale cloth merchants are located; in Hatia, a centre for steel trunks and utensils; in Collectorganj, a grain, cotton, and oilseeds market (Table 5). In the Generalganj

area, Banerji's vote declined rather sharply from his 1957 poll. Banerji's drop had nothing to do with any of the issues in the campaign, but reflected purely organizational differences between the 1957 and 1962 campaigns. In the Generalganj Ward (Chaks 48, 49, 51-57)—the big wholesale cloth market of Kanpur—Banerji's vote declined from over 50% to just over 40% of the vote polled here in the two elections. However, Banerji's high poll in 1957 was due entirely to a particularly effective pact with one of the Independent candidates for the Assembly in this constituency, who had his stronghold in the Generalganj area, which he now represents on the Corporation.

TABLE 5

Vote for Banerji and the Congress (in percentages) in Commercial Areas of Kanpur City, 1957 and 1962

Constituency	Chak No.	Name	Vote for			
			Banerji		Congress	
			1957	1962	1957	1962
V	48	Generalganj	51	43	41	39
	56	Shatranji Mohal				
	49	{ Generalganj				
	51	{ Ram Ganj				
	52	{ Naya Ganj				
V	53	{ Naya Ganj	51	41	41	44
	54	{ Naya Ganj				
	55	{ Naya Ganj				
	57	{ Shatranji Mohal				
I	28	Filkhana	36	38	52	43
III	32	Purana Sabzi	**	34	**	47
	47	Hatia				
III	73	Collectorganj	**	29	**	56

**No correspondence between 1957 and 1962 polling stations in these areas.

The commercial middle class forms the hard core of support for the Congress in Kanpur. Many of the early leaders of the nationalist movement in the city came from this class and have continued to occupy prominent positions in the City Congress. The poll for Sinha in all of these areas was well above his city-

wide average, although even here he polled a majority vote only in one chak.

Refugees. Kanpur has a small, but highly localized, population of Sindhi and Punjabi (mostly Hindu, but some Sikh) refugees, concentrated primarily in the Govind Nagar and Kaushal Puri areas in the Kanpur City South (II) constituency. It was only in these two areas and particularly in the middle class areas of Govind Nagar that the Jan Sangh was able to make a show of strength in the parliamentary contest, although much less so than in the assembly contest. In the assembly contest, the Jan Sangh candidate polled highest in 13 polling stations in the constituency—12 of them in Kaushal Puri and Govind Nagar. In contrast, in the parliamentary contest, the Jan Sangh candidate polled highest in only 3 of these polling stations (all in the middle class areas of Govind Nagar); in all the rest, Banerji secured the highest number of votes. In polling station number 58, which falls in the Govind Nagar labor colony, the Jan Sangh assembly candidate polled 49% of the vote against 30% for the Communist candidate; in this same polling station, the Jan Sangh parliamentary candidate polled only 19% and Banerji polled 60% of the vote, just double the percentage poll of his supporting assembly candidate. In the Kaushal Puri area taken as a whole (eight polling stations), Banerji polled 52% of the vote; in the assembly contest, there was a three-way split among the Communist (35%), the Congress (30%), and the Jan Sangh (29%) candidates. As with the Scheduled Castes and Muslims, the voting behaviour of the Hindu refugees was different in the parliamentary contest again, a splintered vote in the assembly contest became a majority vote for Banerji in the parliamentary contest; and again, parochial and communal sentiments failed to make themselves felt in the larger constituency. In the entire parliamentary contest, it was only in the middle class refugee areas of Govind Nagar that the polarization seriously broke down and that a three-way splintering of the vote appeared.

Conclusion

Since the second bye-election of February, 1955, the parliamentary constituency in Kanpur has been the main arena of

election politics for the city and has provided the voters of Kanpur with the rare opportunity to make a meaningful electoral choice. The Parliamentary constituency acquired its unique character by chance, simply because a bye-election was held at a moment of trade union unity in the city's major industry and a time when the city's most serious political and economic conflict of the post-war period was breaking out. The rationalization issue was the catalyst which brought about a brief period of trade union unity. However, the polarization of voting which developed in the parliamentary contest in the second bye-election has survived the final settlement of the rationalization issue and the process of disintegration which began years ago in the textile industry's trade union movement. The Suti Mill Mazdoor Sabha continues to exist as a facade of trade union unity, although many of its original leaders have left and although those who remain are fighting among themselves. Though the trade union leaders are working at cross purposes and though industrial labor in Kanpur splintered into dozens of trade unions, the majority of industrial workers in all segments of Kanpur industry have maintained a surprising unity of voting behavior in the parliamentary elections. Since industrial workers remain divided in their patterns of voting in the assembly contests, as has been shown, their voting behavior in the parliamentary election must be seen partly as a response conditioned by the historical circumstances which have given to the parliamentary constituency a separate "personality."

But it was not only industrial labor which voted for Banerji. Banerji polled well almost everywhere in the city, among most economic classes and most ethnic communities. There was a general feeling, voiced particularly by the educated middle classes, that the need for effective opposition to the Congress was acute; Banerji's record of hard and vigorous criticism in parliament overshadowed the allegation against him that he was a Communist. Banerji's success was largely a personal success; in his work in the city's labor movement and in his five years in parliament, he has created an image of himself as a hardworking and accessible representative from whom anyone in the city with a grievance might expect to receive sympathetic attention and active consideration. One of the major points in his campaign speeches against the Congress candidate was that the latter had

been out of Kanpur for fifteen years and that there was no guarantee of his being in Kanpur if he were elected. It was this image of himself as an accessible and a sympathetic politician that drew to Banerji those at the bottom of the economic and status ladder of the community—laborers in general and Muslims and Scheduled Castes in particular.

Despite the heavy defeat of the Congress in the parliamentary election in Kanpur, the Congress is still the strongest force in the city. Both the Communists and the Jan Sangh have a base in the city as well. The moderate left declined sharply as a force in the city's politics, both in the parliamentary and the assembly constituencies. No party now has the kind of influence over the community as a whole that Banerji has as an individual. Banerji's victory represents less a victory for the Communist party than a defeat for the Congress. However, Banerji's victory has not altered the basic disunity, which remains the dominant feature of party politics in Kanpur City—in the form of factionalism in the Congress, in fragmented opposition, and in a splintered labor movement.

NOTES & REFERENCES

¹D. N. Majumdar, *Social Contours of An Industrial City : Social Survey of Kanpur 1954-56*, (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1960) pp. 51-52.

²*Ibid.*, pp. 111-114.

³*Ibid.*, p. 67.

⁴Banerji polled a majority vote in the constituency as a whole and the congress lost in one assembly seat for the first time—to a Communist in the City South constituency, who won with a small plurality in a triangular contest.

POSTSCRIPT

The 1984 Parliamentary Elections in Uttar Pradesh**

The 1984 Parliamentary elections produced a stunning majority for the Indian National Congress under its new leader, Rajiv Gandhi. The results were all the more stunning for not having been anticipated by either Congress or opposition politicians and, with one notable exception,¹ by most observers. Most impartial observers expected a bare majority for the Congress in the country as a whole. No Congressmen whom I met in an election tour through U.P. in December, 1984 expected the Congress to win more than 60 seats in U.P. The more general calculation was that the Congress would win 50 to 55 seats. Opposition politicians and dissident Congressmen confidently predicted that the Congress would win no more than 30 or 40 seats. Instead, the Congress won nearly all but two of the seats from U.P. 83 out of 85, with a 50 per cent vote share.

How did the Congress achieve such a huge victory? How could seasoned politicians have been so far off the mark? What are the implications for our understanding of Indian voting behavior? I propose to discuss these questions in this postscript with respect to U.P. by identifying elements of continuity and discontinuity between the 1984 parliamentary elections and previous elections in this state.

Continuities

It was widely reported that Rajiv Gandhi and his advisors had dropped a large number of incumbents, particularly those

TABLE 1

Parliamentary Election Results in 10 Selected Constituencies of Uttar Pradesh, 1980 and 1984

Constituency		(Turn out)				
No.	Name	Year	%			
				Valid		
Candidates	Caste/ Community	Party	Votes Polled	%	Candidate Background	
32	Balrampur 1984	(54.15)				
	Deep Narain Ban Mahant	Not Known	INC	128,207	32.23	Incumbent MLA
	Fazlul Bari	Muslim	IND	119,551	30.06	2nd pl. '80 assembly
	Satya Deo Singh	Rajput	BJP	85,273	21.44	3rd pl. '80 parl.
	12 Others			64,743	16.27	
	Total valid votes			397,774	100.00	
32	Balrampur 1980	(43.97)				
	Chandra Bal Mani Tiwari	Brahman	INC	110,767	35.84	
	Sharda Prasad Dwivedi	Brahman	JNP	89,781	29.05	
	Aqbal Hasan	Muslim	JNP (S)	62,855	20.34	
	5 others			45,617	14.77	
	Total valid votes			309,020	100.00	

33 Gonda 1984	(51.88)					
Anand Singh	Rajput	INC	260,112	67.54	Incumbent MP	
Deep Narain Pandey	Brahman	LKD	94,136	24.44	3rd pl. '80 assembly	
7 others			30,856	8.02		
<i>Total valid votes</i>			<i>385,104</i>	<i>100.00</i>		
33 Gonda 1980	(35.18)					
Anand Singh	Rajput	INC	125,196	52.29		
Kaushalendra Datt	Brahman	LKD	52,270	21.83		
Satya Deo Singh	Rajput	JNP	38,849	16.23		
7 others			23,106	9.65		
<i>Total valid votes</i>			<i>239,421</i>	<i>100.00</i>		
40 Padrauna 1984	(52.36)					
Chandra Pratap Narain						
Singh	Sainthwar	INC	189,209	47.70	Incumbent MP	
Siraj Ahmad	Muslim	LKD	112,831	28.45	2nd Pl. '80 assembly	
Govind Prasad Rai	Not Known	BJP	30,926	7.80	New candidate	
9 others			63,709	16.05		
<i>Total valid votes</i>			<i>396,675</i>	<i>100.00</i>		
40 Padrauna 1980	(49.85)					
Chandra Pratap Narain						
Singh	Sainthwar	INC	119,734	35.51		
Siraj Ahmad	Muslim	JNP (S)	96,758	28.69		
Malti Pandey	Brahman	JNP	92,369	27.39		
6 others			28,356	8.41		
<i>Total valid votes</i>			<i>337,217</i>	<i>100.00</i>		

<i>Candidates</i>	<i>Caste/ Community</i>	<i>Party</i>	<i>Valid Votes Polled</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Candidates Background</i>
41 Deoria 1984	(55.44)				
Raj Mangal Pandey	Brahman	INC	239,708	55.71	Incumbent MLA
Ramdhari Shastri	Sainthwār	LKD	94,607	21.97	2nd pl. '80 parl.
Ram Pravesh	Not Known	IND	34,145	7.94	
Devi Singh	Not Known	BJP	24,466	5.69	
6 others			37,353	8.67	
<i>Total valid votes</i>			430,279	100.00	
41 Deoria 1980	(46.68)				
Ramayan Rai	Bhumihar	INC	110,014	32.83	
Ramdhari Shastri	Sainthwar	LKD	109,937	32.81	
Ugra Sen	Rajput	JNP	81,337	24.27	
5 others			33,823	10.09	
<i>Total valid votes</i>			335,111	100.00	
42 Salempur 1984	(47.93)				
Ram Nagina Misra	Brahman	INC	152,231	39.73	Incumbent MP
Janeshwar Misra	Brahman	LKD	91,695	23.93	New candidate
Hari Kewal	Not Known	JNP	82,383	21.50	
Durga Prasad Kushwaha	Koiri	BJP	19,444	5.07	
8 others			37,390	9.77	
<i>Total valid votes</i>			383,143	100.00	

42 Salempur 1980	(51.07)					
Ram Nagina Mishra	Brahman	INC	121,340	34.30		
Ram Naresh Kushwaha	Koiri	JNP (S)	105,386	29.79		
Dr. Panchanan Misra	Brahman	JNP	104,639	29.58		
4 others			22,426	6.33		
Total valid votes			353,791	100.00		
65 Kanpur 1984	(56.74)					
Naresh Chandra						
Chaturvedi	Brahman	INC	214,160	56.92	New candidate	
Sayed Shahabuddin	Muslim	JNP	76,791	20.41	New candidate	
Somnath Shukla	Brahman	BJP	37,451	9.95		
Shyam Misra	Brahman	LKD	23,439	6.23		
35 others			24,375	6.49		
Total valid votes			376,216	100.00		
65 Kanpur 1980	(51.28)					
Arif Mohammad Khan	Muslim	INC	163,230	45.49		
Maqbool Husain Kureshi	Muslim	JNP	88,049	24.54		
Bhagwati Prasad Dixit	Brahman	IND	51,717	14.40		
Manohar Lal	Yadav	JNP (S)	42,795	11.93		
14 others			13,057	3.64		
Total valid votes			358,848	100.00		
75 Hathras (SC) 1984	(50.61)					
Puran Chand	Jatav	INC	165,387	44.51	Incombent MLA	
Bangali Singh	Dhobi	LKD	120,749	32.50	Ex-MLA	
Devraj Singh	Aheriya	BJP	46,771	12.59		
9 others			38,637	10.40		
Total valid votes			371,544	100.00		

<i>Candidates</i>	<i>Caste/ Community</i>	<i>Party</i>	<i>Valid Votes Polled</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Candidates Background</i>
75 Hathras (SC) 1980 (49.86)					
Chandra Pal Sailani	Jatav	JNP (S)	136,293	40.15	
Dr. Dharam Pal	Jatav	INC	101,440	29.88	
Ram Prasad Deshmukh	SC	JNP	73,644	21.70	
7 others			28,069	8.27	
<i>Total valid votes</i>			<i>339,446</i>	<i>100.00</i>	
76 Aligarh 1984 (55.17)					
Usha Rani	Jat	INC	216,329	54.33	New candidate
Budhpriya Maurya	Jatav	LKD	114,098	28.65	Ex-MP
Indra Kumari	Rajput	BJP	45,418	11.41	Incumbent MP
17 others			22,363	5.61	
<i>Total valid votes</i>			<i>398,208</i>	<i>100.00</i>	
76. Aligarh 1980 (50.22)					
Indra Kumari	Rajput	LKD	128,353	38.49	
Ghanshyam Singh	Rajput	INC	110,375	33.10	
Sangram Singh	Rajput	JNP	61,158	18.34	
23 others			33,613	10.07	
<i>Total valid votes</i>			<i>333,499</i>	<i>100.00</i>	
80 Meerut 1984 (64.70)					
Mohsina Kidwai	Muslim	INC	238,236	50.36	Incumbent MP
Manzoor Ahmad	Muslim	LKD	141,718	29.95	Incumbent MLA
Brahm Pal Singh	Not Known	BJP	55,728	11.78	
30 others			37,427	7.91	
<i>Total valid votes</i>			<i>473,109</i>	<i>100.00</i>	

80 Meerut 1980 (62.29)

Mohsina Kidwai	Muslim	INC	179,004	42.15
Harish Pal	Not Known	JNP (S)	121,787	28.67
Kailash Prakash	Baniya	JNP	101,219	23.83
11 others			22,697	5.35
<i>Total valid votes</i>			<i>424,707</i>	<i>100.00</i>

81 Baghpat 1984 (63.48)

Charan Singh	Jat	LKD	253,463	53.72	Incumbent MP
Maresh Chand	Not Known	INC	167,789	35.56	Incumbent MLA
Raj Narain	Rajput	IND	33,664	7.14	Ex-MP
16 others			16,898	3.58	
<i>Total valid votes</i>			<i>471,814</i>	<i>100.00</i>	

81 Baghpat 1980 (70.34)

Charan Singh	Jat	LKD	323,077	65.21
R.C. Vikal	Gujar	INC	157,956	31.88
9 others			14,434	2.91
<i>Total valid votes</i>			<i>495,467</i>	<i>100.00</i>

with unsavory reputations for corruption and criminal connections, and had given Congress tickets to many new persons of character and probity. In fact, there was much more continuity than discontinuity in the selection of candidates. The Congress candidates, for the most part, were either incumbents or MLAs who had won convincing majorities in the 1980 Legislative assembly elections. Some former Congressmen who had gone into opposition during the Sanjay Gandhi period and whose defection had caused a significant loss of support for the Congress in their local areas also were reintegrated into the Congress and given tickets. For example, in 10 U.P. constituencies that I selected for detailed analysis,² four of the Congress candidates were incumbents (see Table 1). In the remaining six constituencies, the Congress had won three and lost three in the 1980 elections. One of the incumbent candidates had died and was replaced with a locally powerful former Congressman. Another incumbent, by his own choice, preferred to switch to another constituency and was replaced by a new candidate with a clean reputation. The third Congress incumbent was dropped because he did not have the support of the acknowledged leader of the Congress organization in the district; he was replaced by an incumbent MLA. All the Congress candidates who had lost in 1980 were denied a second chance in 1984. Two were replaced by incumbent MLAs and the third by a new candidate. Overall, therefore, the Congress chose proven vote-getters above all, incumbent MPs or MLAs (7 out of 10), and seasoned Congress or former Congress politicians.

There was not much difference in the way in which the opposition chose its candidates. Most of the opposition candidates were either incumbent or former MPs or MLAs or had placed second or third in the 1980 Lok Sabha or Legislative Assembly elections. There were a few new candidates and, occasionally, an incumbent M.P. was dropped in preference for a candidate considered to have a better chance in 1984.

A second element of continuity was in the caste of the candidates. As in 1980, most of the Congress candidates in the non-reserved constituencies were either Brahmans or Rajputs. In a few constituencies with large Muslim voting populations, the Congress nominated Muslim candidates. Only rarely, and usually in constituencies where the backward castes are very

strong and highly politicized and where the Congress had previously lost and stood little chance with a Brahman or Rajput candidate, did the Congress select a person from a backward caste. In some cases, as in Padrauna constituency in Deoria district, the backward caste candidates were from substantial, even princely landed families. The Congress, therefore, made no significant effort in this election in U.P. to make a broader appeal to the backward castes. It remained content to rely principally on candidates from the elite castes, who constitute less than 20 per cent of the total population of the state, and from the dominant land controlling castes generally.

As in previous elections, the BJP also selected most of its candidates from the elite castes of Brahmans and Rajputs, with only an occasional backward caste candidate. Also as in the past, the Lok Dal candidates came from a broader spectrum of castes, including many Brahmans, more backward caste candidates than any other party, and even a low caste, Jatav candidate in the Aligarh parliamentary constituency.

On the whole, therefore, there was nothing unusual about the candidate selection process for the parliamentary elections in U.P. for either the Congress or the opposition. Most of the candidates were familiar to the voters because they were either incumbent MPs or MLAs, ex-MPs or ex-MLAs, or had been strong contenders for parliament or legislative assembly in previous elections. Moreover, in interviews with local politicians and with voters, the assessments that were made of the candidates and their prospects were similar to those made in the past. Candidates were assessed by local politicians and judged by the voters with regard to their personal reputations and their willingness and ability to do things for people in their constituencies. Incumbent candidates were judged according to whether or not they took bribes, whether or not they helped people, whether or not they had built new houses since becoming MPs or MLAs (an indication of corruption), whether or not they had new roads constructed in their constituencies. New candidates were judged according to whether or not anything negative could be discovered about them, whether or not they had taken an interest in the problems of the people before, and whether or not they were local candidates.

Moreover, the structure of conflict in the parliamentary

contests in most U.P. constituencies appeared to be quite consistent with previous elections. Whatever the castes of the leading candidates, there was the usual widespread division between the elite and backward castes. Everywhere, it was still assumed that the predominant tendency among the elite castes, particularly the Brahmans, was to vote Congress or BJP and for the backward castes, particularly Jats and Yadavs, to vote for the Lok Dal/DMKP. Candidates and their political workers continued to estimate their chances in relation to caste calculations concerning the combinations and coalitions of caste groups likely to support them and their rivals and concerning the proportions of persons from specific caste groups that would be drawn away from the leading candidates by the hordes of independents set up just for these purposes. The Congress was still presumed to have a basic "committed" vote of Brahmans, other upper caste groups, and Scheduled Castes, but there was some doubt about the Muslim commitment to the Congress this time. The Lok Dal, aware that its base among the middle castes is not sufficient to carry most parliamentary seats, selected many of its candidates with a view towards building coalitions with elite castes, with Muslims, and with Scheduled Castes. For example, in the 10 constituencies I selected for detailed examination, the Lok Dal contested nine, of which 8 were non-reserved constituencies. In those 8 constituencies, the Lok Dal ran backward caste candidates in only two, of which one was the constituency of Chaudhury Charan Singh himself. In the remaining 6, there were 3 Brahman, 2 Muslim, and 1 Jatav candidates.

An example of the kinds of caste calculations that were made is that for Aligarh constituency. The Congress had not won this seat since 1957. It had been won by the BKD/BLD/Lok Dal in the previous three elections. Since 1957, the Congress had attempted to win the seat either with a Muslim (1957, 1962, and 1967) or with a Rajput candidate (1971, 1977, and 1980). The BKD/BLD/Lok Dal had won the constituency with a Rajput candidate in the past three elections. The constituency had, in effect, become a Rajput constituency. In 1980, all three leading candidates were Rajputs.

However, in 1984, both the Congress and the Lok Dal decided to try a change in tactics. The Congress selected a new candidate, an elderly Jat woman from a former landlord

family, whereas the Lok Dal selected a Jatav, B.P. Maurya, who had won the 1962 election on the Republican Party ticket, but had since then not contested an election in Aligarh district. The calculations on both sides were obvious from their selection of candidates. The Congress hoped to wrest this seat at last from the Lok Dal by running a Jat candidate who, it was presumed, would draw 40 to 50 percent of the Jat vote away from the Lok Dal. If the traditional Congress "committed vote" remained, the Congress would get the votes of Brahmans, Scheduled Castes, Muslims, and most Rajputs as well, giving it an easy victory in the constituency.

For its part, the Lok Dal hoped to draw the Scheduled Caste vote away from the Congress by adopting a well-known Jatav candidate. It was hoped also that Maurya would be able to repeat his feat of 1962 of combining Muslim and Scheduled Caste votes. The Scheduled Caste vote, combined with its traditional vote among the Jats and other backward castes would, it was hoped, retain the seat for the Lok Dal.

Congress strategists, however, predicted that Maurya would not get many Scheduled Caste votes because he had left Aligarh years ago and had allegedly done nothing for them even when he was the MP from Aligarh. Moreover, it was felt that the Scheduled Castes (assumed to be generally hostile to the Lok Dal) would also be reluctant to vote for the Lok Dal, despite the presence of a Jatav candidate on its ticket, whereas the Jats would desert the Lok Dal because the party had selected a Jatav. Nor was it felt that Maurya would be able to draw upon the Muslim vote as successfully as he had done in 1962 when Muslims in Aligarh had become more disaffected with the Congress than they were now thought to be.

The BJP candidate, Indra Kumari, a Rajput, the incumbent MP who had been dropped by the Lok Dal, was expected to draw Rajput votes from the Congress and the votes of the Lodhas, an important backward caste in a segment of the constituency where the BJP MLA was a Lodha, from the Lok Dal. However, Indra Kumari could only have been expected to draw votes away from the two main contenders, but not displace them.

It is possible to "explain" the election result in Aligarh in 1984 in terms of such caste calculations by arguing that the

Congress strategy proved to be the correct one. However, the size of the victory was unprecedented for the Congress in this constituency (though the BLD won it with an even larger majority in the Janata-wave election of 1977). Moreover, the Congress victory in Aligarh was obviously part of a state-wide pattern that cannot be explained fully in terms of such caste calculations. At the same time, the strategy of caste calculations remained an element of continuity for all sides in this election, which was not without a foundation in the reality of voting.

A further related element of continuity in this election concerned speculation about the trend in the Muslim vote. The Muslims in U.P. are considered part of the Congress committed vote, but they are also considered to be more volatile than other components of the Congress core support structure. There was a widespread feeling among both Congressmen and opposition politicians this time that the Muslims, discontented over recurring Hindu-Muslim riots, particularly in west U.P., where the police and the Provincial Armed Constabulary allegedly often attacked and killed Muslims during such riots instead of restoring the peace, would desert the Congress. The Lok Dal hoped to capitalize upon this presumed anti-Congress Muslim sentiment by fielding a large number of Muslim candidates. My own observations during my tour of U. P. in December, 1984 were that, in many constituencies, the Muslims did, in fact, desert the Congress en bloc and that, in most others, the Muslim vote was divided in the 60-40 percent range on one side or the other. Such losses for the Congress among Muslims are not a discontinuity with the past. It happened massively in 1977 and the Muslim vote was also divided in U. P. in 1980. What is discontinuous with the past is a massive Congress victory in the face of major desertions from this important segment of the Congress "committed vote."

On the whole, the elements of continuity identified so far add up to one central fact, namely, that the core support structures of both the Congress and its main opposition, the Lok Dal, remained largely intact. Although the Lok Dal won only two seats in U.P., it polled 22 percent of the vote, a loss of 7 percentage points from its popular vote share of 1980, but approximately the same vote share as it won in the 1984 legislative assembly elections. Moreover, the Lok Dal core

support base remained the same as in the past, coming primarily from the leading land controlling backward castes of Jats and Yadavs.

The Congress core support structure also remained largely intact. Brahmins and Scheduled Castes continued to provide overwhelming support to the Congress. The Congress also drew support again from other elite land controlling castes, particularly Rajputs. There was some further erosion in its support base among Muslims, but this was neither unprecedented nor unanticipated. The Congress also retained some support among sections of the backward castes, particularly among the important land controlling caste of Kurmis, and among the "lower backward" of poorer backward castes.

There were two other elements of continuity between this election and previous Lok Sabha elections in U.P. and in north India generally. The first was the "wave" itself. Ever since the "delinking" of parliamentary and legislative assembly elections in 1971 and the consequent freeing of parliamentary elections from their then much greater dependence upon local coalitions, all the parliamentary elections, with the possible exception of 1980, were "wave" elections. A "wave" election may be described as one in which a clear tendency begins to develop in one direction or another towards a national party or its leader(s). It is based upon an issue or set of issues that transcend local calculations and coalitions and draws the bulk of the uncommitted and wavering voters in the same direction with an increasing momentum in the last days of the campaign as the word spreads from village to village, tea shop to tea shop across the vast north Indian plain.

The first such "wave" was the Indira wave of 1971, which was based, among other issues, upon an identification of voters with Mrs. Gandhi in her defiance of the old party bosses and upon her slogan of "garibi hatao," which drew to her the bulk of the vote of the low caste poor and landless. The second wave was the massive Janata victory of 1977, which was based upon the large-scale resentment among the people against the "Emergency" regime excesses and the promise of a new era held forth by the coalition of respected and well-known older leaders in a single political formation. The third, much less formidable wave, was the 1980 Indira wave, which was made possible

by a combination of three factors: the discontent of the people with the disintegration of the Janata coalition, a sense of identification once again with the lone figure of Mrs. Gandhi contending against a group of old men bent on harassing her, and widespread scarcities of essential commodities and high prices. The 1984 Congress wave was as impressive as the Janata wave in the north in terms of seats won and even more impressive in the country as a whole in that respect. It was also an unquestionably authentic wave in terms of the great increase in Congress vote shares. It was not, however, unprecedented. The Congress vote share in U.P. in 1984 was less than its vote share under Nehru in 1952 and far less than that of Janata in 1977. Its basis will be examined in the next section.

Discontinuities

A striking discontinuity between the 1984 parliamentary elections and previous elections was the absence of major economic issues that had in the past been either central to election campaigns or, at least, important in them, namely, issues such as scarcity, high prices, poverty, low producer foodgrain and sugar cane prices. Agricultural productivity has been continuing to increase in large parts of U.P., especially wherever new irrigation facilities, canals and tubewells, have been introduced. Diesel and electricity seem to be more available than previously. There were no evident major food scarcities. Many *kisans* had stopped growing sugar cane or reduced significantly their acreage sown to cane, as a consequence of which the cane price was high.³ There were no promises to abolish poverty. Indeed, Congressmen hardly spoke about economic issues at all. Lok Dal leaders, particularly Charan Singh, recited economic statistics to demonstrate that agriculture and the rural areas were being discriminated against in resource distribution, taxation, and parity of prices, but there was no single item of current distress prevalent in the countryside that could be identified to dramatize these general issues. When landholding villagers were asked what their main problems and concerns were or when candidates were asked what they perceived as the main problems in their constituencies, the most frequent item mentioned was the need for link roads, from village to road or to market, or for

bridges. This is clearly not the stuff to produce a great wave.

A second discontinuity was the inadequacy of caste calculations to predict the result. As one astute Congress political campaigner put it to me as he himself was reciting the usual kind of analysis of anticipated caste voting and caste coalitions during the election campaign, "It is all caste calculations and they are generally not correct." Similar remarks were made to me elsewhere in U.P. during the campaign. The statement does not mean that caste calculations are irrelevant or that the voting behavior of castes cannot be predicted, but that parliamentary election results cannot be accurately predicted any longer on the basis of such calculations.

There are three interrelated reasons for the inadequacy of such caste calculations as a basis for predicting parliamentary election results. The first is that the castes and communities counted are usually the leading land controlling castes, the Scheduled Castes and the Muslims. The proportion of voters represented in such calculations usually accounts for no more than 50 to 65 percent of a constituency. The old assumption that the land controlling castes control the rest of the votes is no longer valid, though they do still have great influence over some low and lower backward caste voters in many areas of the state. When a wave develops, there remains a huge voting population whose behavior has not at all been accounted for in the usual caste calculations and which may move massively in one direction.

The second reason is that the parliamentary elections since 1971 have normally thrown up transcendent issues that can move millions of uncommitted voters and can sway previously committed voters to depart from former patterns of voting behavior. Such issues are usually not present in the legislative assembly elections where the old caste calculations do, therefore, provide a much more reliable basis for predicting the outcomes. However, *garibi hatao* in 1971, Emergency excesses in 1977, scarcities and high prices in 1984, and the sympathy factor, the hope inspired by the "new man," Rajiv Gandhi, and the theme of the unity of the country in danger from internal and external enemies provided transcendent issues that swayed whole categories of voters and the millions of uncommitted and "unaccounted for" voters in those elections.

The third reason for the inadequacy of caste calculations in predicting parliamentary election outcomes is that, as with all calculations of group voting in all countries, it is a mistake to neglect the minority in every group that does not vote with the general sentiment of the group as a whole. The politicians in India, of course, do not forget those minorities. In fact, the utterly astonishing numbers of independent candidates in the last two parliamentary elections reflect such awareness on the part of the leading candidates and their agents who support such "dummy" candidates just for the purpose of taking away 5 or 10 percent of a caste's vote that, it is assumed, will otherwise go to one's opponent. At the same time, most voters in India, as in most countries with competitive elections, do not care to throw away their votes. Many voters in India especially see no point in voting for candidates and parties who are bound to lose: they prefer to be known as supporters of the candidate and party likely to win. In most elections, that party is the Congress. In most parliamentary elections, therefore there is a percentage of voters from every caste, including those presumed to be with the opposition, who vote Congress. In the aggregate, that minority percentage from each caste and community adds up to a percentage in each constituency that may be as large or larger than the vote for any of the parties from any of its more solidary caste supporters.

Part of the explanation of the massive Congress victory in December, 1984, therefore, is that this was an authentic wave election that built upon the assassination, the personality of Rajiv Gandhi, and the issues raised by him in the campaign in such a way as to transcend caste calculations and carry along with it the uncommitted voters, the unaccounted-for voters, and the minority voters from groups, most of whose members were committed to other parties.

A third discontinuity between this election and previous elections was the extent to which voters self-consciously rejected local considerations to cast a vote for a party, the Congress, which was perceived as the best party for the good of the country. This was not the first election in which voters in parliamentary elections saw their votes as being cast, not primarily for the MP in their constituency, but for one of the national leaders or parties, for Indira Gandhi or Charan Singh. How-

ever, as I went round the U. P. districts, I found voter after voter who told me their Congress MP or the Congress candidate was worthless, a bad character, a person who had done nothing for his constituency, but that they intended to vote for him anyway because they were voting not for particular candidates but for the party. Thus, although, as noted before, the voters continued to judge the candidates and their performance in the old ways, they did not necessarily vote according to their judgment of the candidates. This was a "lamppost" election in which large numbers of people voted for any lamppost or worthless, corrupt, and lazy politician who was lucky enough to have the Congress ticket.

There was also a corresponding negative vote against a discredited and disunited opposition that had proved incapable of governing effectively when in power, of staying united, of offering a credible alternative to the Congress. Only Charan Singh, among the opposition leaders, had a strong image as a political leader in U. P., but only or primarily among the already-committed, backward caste voters. As one Brahman pradhan (who would naturally vote Congress anyway) put it, "there is none else to vote for except the Congress."

The other side of the negative vote against the discredited opposition leaders was a positive vote for the new man, Rajiv Gandhi. This was not, however, an election swayed by a charismatic personality. Rajiv Gandhi is probably the most colorless national leader in the history of modern Indian politics and the dullest public speaker, who does not even hold the attention of his crowds very effectively. He was, however, a known personality with nothing to be said against him (except by the Sikhs, who condemned his failure to stop the murder of thousands of Sikhs after the assassination of his mother), with a so-called "clean" image. However, even Brahman voters had nothing in particular to say about Rajiv Gandhi personally. People voted for him without enthusiasm, but with hope.

We come now to the fourth discontinuity between this election and previous ones, the so-called sympathy vote for Indira Gandhi, or rather, in respect for her martyrdom and for the bereaved son. I heard conflicting reports concerning the extent of this "sympathy" factor and its effects on the campaign both from candidates and voters. Most Congressmen

thought there was such a sympathy vote, especially among women; most opposition politicians thought otherwise. The same Brahman voter just quoted, who had nothing to say about Rajiv Gandhi, spoke of his great sorrow over the assassination of "our leader." Yadavs and other backward castes, however, who normally vote for the Lok Dal, did not seem swayed in their voting by the sympathy factor. They said that every one was sad after the assassination, but that there was no sympathy factor because sympathy and politics were two different things. It is likely, however, that the sympathy factor did affect the uncommitted voters and that women voted disproportionately in favor of the Congress for the same reason. After the election, however, few observers credited the sympathy factor as causing a vote shift towards the Congress of more than 5 to 7 percent. The increase in the Congress vote share in U. P. was 15 percent.

I believe, therefore, that the primary reason for the massive Congress victory in U. P. had more to do with other factors than the assassination of Mrs. Gandhi and the favorable image of her son. Here we come to the major discontinuity between this election campaign and all others: a shift in the attitudes of Congressmen towards the minorities, and an election campaign that focused nearly exclusively on the dangers to the country posed by internal and external enemies and on the need for Indians, meaning Hindus, to close ranks to save the country. Although it was Mrs. Gandhi initially who instituted scapegoatism, blame displacement, and paranoid fear of foreign enemies into election campaigns, there was never an election in which such themes and slogans were so prominent, to the exclusion of even a semblance of debate and discussion of other issues. Nor was there ever an election before in U. P. in which Congressmen expressed less concern about the loss of Muslim votes. There was even some openly expressed antagonism to Muslims by Congressmen, some of whom lumped the Muslims together with the Sikhs as internal threats supported by external agents and foreign countries.

Only two themes were played upon by Congressmen in this election: *Desh Akhand* (One Country or The Country Indivisible) and the dangers to the country from foreign agents. The first theme was nothing but a rewording of the old Jan

Sangh slogan, Akhand Bharat. The second was more in tune with Mrs. Gandhi's manipulation of such notions in the past, but Rajiv Gandhi carried the theme to a new level by singling out a book for special mention written by an American political science professor, in which the author speculated at one point on the question of "After Mrs. Gandhi, what?", as evidence that the U. S. had foreknowledge of Mrs. Gandhi's assassination.⁴ Both themes combined into one, namely, the need to save India from its enemies.⁵

To what extent was the theme of "save India" decisive in this landslide victory of the Congress? Partly it cannot be separated from the feelings aroused by Mrs. Gandhi's assassination, which was depicted as a martyrdom caused by enemies of the country, a murder of the nation's leader and defender. The feeling was widespread among middle and upper class people in the cities and towns that the Sikhs who had been killed in thousands in Delhi, Kanpur, and Begusarai had gotten what they deserved. In the countryside, in December, I did not hear such sentiments expressed widely. Those voters who were committed to the Lok Dal certainly paid no attention to these themes. The Yadav *kisan* already quoted, when asked about the Congress campaign emphasis on unity, threats to the country, and Desh Akhand, said simply, "Corruption is the main problem and there is no problem about unity."

Yet, there is no doubt that the Congress succeeded in capturing a large number of votes that used to go to the Jan Sangh. It was reported widely, in fact, that prominent present and past Jan Sangh/BJP leaders had openly or secretly urged voters to support the Congress this time as the best hope for preserving the unity of the country. RSS workers also were reported to be working for Congress candidates. In some areas, however, I witnessed RSS workers supporting the opposition to the Congress even where there was no BJP candidate. It is certain, however, that the RSS was not unitedly working for the BJP and against the Congress this time. The RSS was divided, supporting the BJP here, the Congress there, and other non-Congress opposition candidates elsewhere. In some places, RSS workers were divided even within a single constituency.

However, we need not speculate overmuch or overinterpret what the voters said or the RSS did. The election results are

clear. The BJP, the main remnant of the old Jan Sangh, mediated through a previous incarnation as the Janata party, was reduced to a very minor force in the 1984 parliamentary elections. The bulk of the increase in the Congress vote share came from the former Janata party/Jan Sangh. That means, inevitably, that the Congress reinforced still further its support among the elite castes, Brahmans and Rajputs, who were among the principal supporters of Janata/Jan Sangh in the past. Since the Jan Sangh used to get some support as well from some of the backward castes and the Lok Dal lost some ground in this election, it means that the Congress increased its strength somewhat among the backward caste voters as well, such as the Kurmis, who are not committed to the Lok Dal. The Congress coalition, then, this time was nearly at its maximum, with greater strength than ever among the elite castes, with its hold on the Scheduled Caste and lower backward votes intact, and with a stronger base than before even among some of the middle castes. In the face of such a massive coalition, the erosion of the Congress base among the Muslims, was not even felt except in a few constituencies.

What had been a three-way contest in 1980 became a two-way contest in 1984. Taking a 12.5 percent vote share (the amount required to avoid losing one's security deposit) in a constituency as the dividing line for a significant showing, Table 1 shows that, in 9 of the 10 constituencies selected for detailed scrutiny in 1980, the contest was three-way, in most cases between the Congress, on the one hand, and two other parties, usually the Lok Dal, Janata (S), or Janata, on the other hand. In contrast, in 1984, only 3 of the 10 contests were three-way. Of the 7 two-way contests, all but one were between the Congress and the Lok Dal.

Taking the results for the entire state, in 65 out of the 85 parliamentary constituencies in 1984, the first or second party was the Congress or the Lok Dal (see Table 2). The BJP came in second in only seven constituencies in the state (compared to nine second place showings for independents). It came in second or third in only 27 constituencies. In only 39 constituencies in the state did the BJP have a candidate who polled at least 5 percent of the vote. In effect, therefore, the major discontinuity in the 1984 parliamentary elections has, paradoxi-

TABLE 2

**Seats Won and Second Place Positions by Party, 1984
Parliamentary Elections, Uttar Pradesh**

<i>Party</i>	<i>Seats Won</i>	<i>2nd Place</i>
Congress	83	2
Lok Dal	2	58
BJP	0	7
CPI	0	3
Congress (J)	0	3
Janata	0	3
Independents	0	9
TOTAL	85	85

cally, sharpened the single most important trend in post-Independence U.P. politics. The Congress having donned the mantle of the former Jan Sangh and, thereby, undercut the social base of its main remnant, the BJP, the *only* electorally significant struggle in U.P. as a whole has become that between the Congress and the Lok Dal. However, this increasingly dualistic struggle is also a lopsided one. The Congress is by far the stronger of the two parties with a much broader social base. It has reinforced its position as a party of extremes, drawing from the top and the bottom of the U.P. social order. It has, thereby, encircled the Lok Dal and its middle peasant, backward caste following in a vise from which it cannot escape.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

*Research for this article was carried out in U.P. in December, 1984 under a grant from the Special Foreign Currency Program of the Smithsonian Institution. The Election Commission of India provided me the provisional result sheets for U.P. and facilitated my work in the U.P. districts to which I travelled. Sri Ganesan, the Secretary, Election Commission of India, since retired, was most helpful in granting authorization for me to obtain the electoral results. I want also to thank Mr. J.C. Chaudhary, Under Secretary, Election Commission of India, for his responsiveness to my requests for electoral data.

None of the above-named persons or agencies are, however, responsible for any errors or for the opinions expressed herein.

¹Prannath Roy in *India Today*, December 31, 1984.

²These ten constituencies fall in the five U.P. districts of Deoria, Gonda, Kanpur City, Aligarh, and Meerut, which I have visited on several occasions during the past 24 years in connection with my research projects on local politics and elections. Although not "representative" in any statistical sense, each district exemplifies one or more characteristic feature of U.P. politics, demographic structure, landholdings distribution, and local political economy.

³This situation itself developed primarily out of discontent among cane growers over non-payment of arrears of cane price to them in recent years. Even so, the issue was not in the forefront of this election campaign.

⁴Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr. had written a group of speculative papers for the U.S. State Department on the future of India that had been published under the title, *India under Pressure: Prospects for Political Stability* (Boulder, CO; Westview Press, 1984). In this volume, a couple of paragraphs speculated on the consequences for the country if Mrs. Gandhi should die before or after the election. Rajiv Gandhi used these paragraphs in his election campaign to insinuate foreknowledge on the part of the U.S. government of Mrs. Gandhi's assassination and, therefore, a foreign hand in it. See the very fair review of Hardgrave's book and the political uses to which it was put by Sandhya Jain in the *Overseas Hindustan Times*, February 16, 1985.

⁶Rajiv Gandhi obviously knew about the spy ring involving French embassy and business personnel as well as other unnamed foreign governments during the election campaign, for the news of it broke just after the election. Perhaps the knowledge he had of this spy ring was the catalyst for his emphasis during the campaign on the dangers to the country from foreign agents.

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